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THE occasion of the four essays which form the first
part of the present volume was the publication of
certain notable books, such as Leslie Stephen s English
Utilitarians, Herbert Spencer s Autobiography, and
James Martineau s Life and Letters. But the studies
they contain of important thinkers and schools are, I
hope, sufficiently careful to merit reproduction in a
more permanent form. Advantage has been taken of
this republication to re-insert a few passages which
had to yield to the exigencies of editorial space, and
the argument at these points will be found more
complete.
The title of the volume is that of the paper which
appeared first in order of time, but the choice is not
merely casual. Doctrines and tendencies discussed in
connection with the Philosophical Eadicals reappear in
the papers which follow, and the prominence through
out of the social and political aspects of philosophical
theory gives a certain unity to the collection.viii PREFACE.
I have added to the Essays three book -reviews,
written at different times, which, from the nature of
the subjects and the scope of the discussion, seemed
important enough to interest philosophical students.
The Eeprints which constitute the last section of the
volume are from books which have been out of print
nearly twenty years. In 1881, as the result of studies
in Germany, I published a small volume on The De
velopment from Kant to Hegel, an outline of a vast
subject. Most of the ground covered in the first part
of the book has been worked over afresh in other con
nections since, and on certain points my views have
changed. But in the second part, which traced the
development of the philosophy of religion in the hands of
Kant and Hegel, and was mainly expository in character,
there is little, if anything, which calls for alteration.
Eeligious thought has moved rapidly during the last
quarter of a century, and the significance of the his
torical element in Christianity for religious faith is a
subject that has been widely discussed, and is under
discussion still. What Kant and Hegel have to say on
that question is as fresh and suggestive as ever, and a
concise account of their attitude may still be found
useful.
I have a special interest in the republication of the
last paper, on
&quot;
Philosophy as Criticism of Categories,&quot;
owing to the circumstances of its first appearance and
the character of its early associates. It was the first
paper in a volume of Essays in Philosophical CriticismPREFACE. ix
published in 1883, in somewhat belated connection
with the centenary of the Critique of Pure Reason.
The volume was dedicated to the memory of Thomas
Hill Green, who died in the previous year, and some
prefatory pages by Dr Edward Caird contained a fine
tribute to the spirit of Green s life and teaching. It
was edited by Mr (now The Eight Honourable) E. B.
Haldane and myself ; and the second essay, on
&quot; The
Eelation of Philosophy to Science,&quot; was the work of the
present Secretary of State for War, in collaboration with
his brother, Dr J. S. Haldane. The other contributors
were (to give them their later titles) Professor Bernard
Bosanquet, Professor W. E. Sorley, Professor W. P. Ker,
Professor Henry Jones, Dr James Bonar, Professor
T. B. Kilpatrick of Knox College, Toronto, and the
late Professor D. G. Eitchie of St Andrews. This, it
will be admitted, was a band of which the editors had
no reason to be ashamed.
The ideas of the book were then comparatively un
familiar, and the writing of the youthful authors was
often, perhaps, unnecessarily difficult, but the critics
were at least unanimous in recognising the sincerity
and scientific purpose which animated the volume. My
individual contribution is reprinted, apart from a few
verbal emendations, in its original form. Naturally
there are things which one might wish to express
differently. The nature of the universal self, for
example, and the difficult question of its relation to
the individual selves of experience, obviously requireX PREFACE.
more adequate treatment. But the main argument of
the paper seems to me as sound now as it did twenty
-
five years ago.
I have to thank the editors of The Quarterly
Keview, The Hibbert Journal/ The Contemporary
Keview/ The Philosophical Keview, and Mind, for
their kind permission to republish the various essays
and reviews. My sincere thanks are also due to my
friend, Mr K. P. Hardie, for the care with which he




THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS ..... 3
MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION .... 47
MARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY ...... 78
HERBERT SPENCER : THE MAN AND HIS WORK . 108
REVIEWS
JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE (1893)
. . . 147
DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY (1904) . .178
M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION (1906)
. . 195
REPRINTS
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL (1882)
INTRODUCTORY . . . . . .215
I. THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
(i) THE FOUNDATION IN ETHICS . . . 220
(ii) THE RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF MERE
REASON ...... 232
II. CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN STANDPOINT AND TRANSITION
TO HEGEL
(i) THE DISTINCTION OF KANT FROM THE EN
LIGHTENMENT ..... 256
(ii) CRITICISM OF KANT S POSITION . . . 261
III. OUTLINE OF THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION . 268
CONCLUDING REMARKS ..... 288
PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES (1883)
. . 293ESSAYSTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
ONE
reflection which will occur to most readers in tak
ing up Mr Leslie Stephen s volumes on The English
Utilitarians/
*
is the rapidity with which even the most
recent representatives of the school have passed into the
region of history. When Mr Leslie Stephen published his
History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,
in 1876, John Stuart Mill was only three years dead,
and the echoes had not yet died away of the famous
controversy in which he led the attack upon
&quot; Intuition-
ism,&quot; as represented by Dean Mansel and Sir William
Hamilton. And although the direct political influence
of the Philosophical Kadicals was even then a com
paratively remote tradition, their social and political
theories still largely moulded the views of reform and
progress held by Liberal and Eadical thinkers of the day.
John Stuart Mill s parliamentary experience in the
previous decade was doubtless of little more than
academic interest, but in the closing years of his life he
was not only the most prominent English philosopher,
but was reverenced as the fountainhead of economic
and political wisdom by men like Henry Fawcett, Mr
Courtney, and Mr Morley, with whom the future of
1 The following paper appeared in the Quarterly Review of July 1901,
shortly after the publication of The English Utilitarians.4 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
advanced Liberalism seemed to lie.
&quot; The foremost
instructor of his time in wisdom and goodness,&quot; are Mr
Morley s words in the fine tribute penned immediately
after Mill s death. The elevation of Mill s character,
and the loftiness of his aims, are as heartily recognised
now as then, but in other respects the aspect of most
questions, whether philosophical, ethical, political, or
social, has changed so much during the last quarter of a
century that
&quot; the equable flow of didactic wisdom
&quot;
in
Mill s pages appeals somewhat coldly to the present
generation. He must always remain one of the most
interesting figures of the nineteenth century in the
region of pure intellect, but the interest will be more
and more that of a transition figure, in whose incon
sistencies we can trace the gradual break-up of the
robust and self-sufficient creed of his youth, and the
sympathetic anticipation of larger truths. The history
of the century is in truth the history of the emergence
and rapid growth of problems with which the rigid
formula? of the Philosophical Eadicals were quite in
adequate to deal.
Mr Stephen s volumes are in his best manner, and
are a valuable contribution to the history of English
thought. As he tells us in the preface, he was himself
a disciple of the school during its last period. This
account of the Utilitarians cannot, therefore, be con
demned as written by an unsympathetic outsider
; and
its clear recognition of the shortcomings of the school
possesses something of the inexorable justice of history.
For the rest, the subject is treated by Mr Stephen in a
way which displays his qualities to the best advantage.
&quot; I have devoted,&quot; he says,
&quot; a much greater proportion of my
work to biography and to considerations of political and social
conditions than would be appropriate to the history of a philo-THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 5
sophy. ... I am primarily concerned with the history of a
school or sect, not with the history of the arguments by which it
justifies itself in the court of pure reason. ... I deal not with
philosophers meditating upon Being and not-Being, but with
men actively engaged in framing political platforms and carry
ing on popular agitations.&quot;




are obscure enough to us now, and there are
quaint, even sordid, figures among them. Mr Leslie
Stephen s intimate knowledge of the byways of history
and biography gives life and circumstance to his narra
tive, and his pages are lit up every now and again by
humorous detail or flashes of sarcastic wit. As he pro
ceeds, however, he becomes more absorbed in the history
of the doctrines themselves, tracing them to their philo
sophical presuppositions, inherited, as he points out, from
Hume, and most clearly expressed in James Mill s
Analysis of the Human Mind.
The three volumes are labelled with the names of the
thinkers who represent the three generations of the school s
existence as an active force in philosophy and politics
Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill. The
first was the founder and patriarch of the school; the
second was its most active propagandist, and the most
vigorous and typical example of its undiluted orthodoxy
and supreme self-confidence. John Stuart Mill has begun
to part with some of the most characteristic Benthamite
tenets
; his admissions and compromises mark, as has been
already observed, the gradual break-up of the school and
its submergence in a deeper tide of thought and feeling.
The three volumes thus coincide with the successive
stages of the sect its rise and progress, its forceful
activity, its decline and fall. Each volume introduces,
besides the principal figure, a number of minor actors.6 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
In the first we have, at some length, an analysis of the
political, industrial, and social conditions of England in
the latter part of the eighteenth century, which constitute,
as it were, the soil and environment in which philosophical
radicalism grew up, and which largely explain its vitality
as a political force. In the second volume careful account
is taken of Malthus and Eicardo, whose doctrines were
incorporated as integral parts of Utilitarian theory and
bulked largely in popular attacks upon the school
; while
the third volume, besides chapters on J. S. Mill s con
tributions to logic and philosophy, touches on the various
social and economic controversies which went to mould
or modify his political economy, and gives an account
of John Austin, Grote, and Buckle, who represented the
school in the departments of jurisprudence, history, and
philosophy of history respectively.
Utilitarianism can lay no claim to originality in its
philosophical principles. Hedonism is as old as ethical
,/




may be traced back in England through Paley,
Hume, and Hutcheson to the chapters of Locke s Essay
which deal with morality. Hutcheson not only lays down
this principle unreservedly as a test of the moral quality
of actions, but contributes also the famous formula of
&quot; the greatest happiness of the greatest number.&quot; Bentham
tells us that he came upon the phrase in Priestley, but
Priestley (whose statement, for the rest, is not so precise)
had it from Hutcheson, and to Hutcheson it was probably
suggested (as Mr Scott has recently pointed out in his
excellent Life of that philosopher) by his readings in
Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius the
watchword of this hedonistic theory being thus traceable,
by the irony of history, to the Stoic
&quot;
citizenship of theTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 7
world.&quot; In Hume the theory is already complete ; and
we do not wonder, therefore, when Bentham tells us that
on reading the third volume of Hume s Treatise on
Human Nature he
&quot;
felt as if scales fell from his
eyes.&quot;
From Hume to J. S. Mill, in fact, the doctrine received
no substantial alteration.
&quot; The writings in which Bentham deals explicitly with the
general principles of Ethics would hardly entitle him,&quot; says
Mr Stephen,
&quot; to a higher position than that of a disciple of
Hume without Hume s subtlety, or of Paley without Paley s
singular gift of exposition.&quot;
Yet it was under Bentham that the Utilitarians first
became a school in any definite sense, and
&quot; Benthamism
&quot;
was for long the current designation of the doctrine.
Under his initiative the doctrine passed from being the
speculative tenet of this or that philosopher to be the
active creed of a band of men bent upon applying it to
political and social reform. With him, therefore, the
history of The English Utilitarians or Philosophical
Kadicals begins. The second title, by which the group
were long distinguished, sufficiently indicates the nature
of the new departure.
The circumstances of English political and social life
in the eighteenth century which formed the antecedents
of Philosophical Radicalism are interestingly sketched by
Mr Stephen in his first volume. He passes in review the
anomalies of Parliamentary representation which made
the House of Commons seem at times
&quot;
little more than
an exchange for the traffic between the proprietors of
votes and the proprietors of offices and pensions
&quot;
; the
chaotic state of English law, accompanied by the absence
of any centralised administration
; the slothfulness and
ignorance of the Universities
; the secular and rationalistic8 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
spirit of the Church, which had become, in the main,
&quot;
simply a part of the ruling class told off to perform
divine services, to maintain order and respectability and
the traditional morality.&quot; Everywhere the established
order of things rested upon tradition, and represented a
series of compromises, not the elaboration of a theory.
It was primarily against the irrationality and chaos of
the English legal system that Bentham directed his
attack, his radicalism growing, as he advanced, till it left
few points of
&quot; the matchless Constitution
&quot;
unassailed.
Meanwhile the growth of manufactures and commerce
meant the rise of great industrial centres and of a new
social class; but the great towns were as yet without
municipal institutions, and if the merchants were inclined
in the main to liberal principles,
&quot;
it was less from adhesion
to any general doctrine than from the fact that the
existing restrictions and prejudices generally conflicted
with their plain interests.&quot; Mr Stephen notes thus early
the divergence of interest between the capitalists and the
labourers, which was so plainly visible in the later history
of Philosophical Eadicalism. Urgent social problems
were presented by the alarming growth of pauperism,
and by the disgraceful state of the prisons revealed by
Howard, while the agitation against the slave-trade was
a further proof of the growth of humane sentiment.
But towards the end of the century, under the influence
of the reaction caused by the excesses of the French
Eevolution, the demand for Parliamentary reform, which
had been growing in volume during the earlier part of
George III. s reign, had entirely lost the support of the
nation; and even a philanthropic agitation like that
against the slave - trade was looked upon with some
suspicion, and abolition was not finally carried till
1807.THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
This part of Mr Stephen s survey may be instructively
and agreeably supplemented by Mr Roylance Kent s
well-informed and well-written history of The English
Radicals. Taking up his subject more exclusively from
the political point of view, and including in it all the
prominent phases of Radical thought, Mr Kent gives
many additional details, often picturesque and suggestive,
and helps to elucidate the differences between the Utili
tarians and other types of earlier and contemporary
Radicalism. Mr Lecky places the birth of English
Radicalism in the year 1769, when the conflict between
&quot;Wilkes and the House of Commons was at its height,
and Mr Kent accepts this date as the starting-point of
his narrative. The first Radical attack, it will be observed,
was directed, not against the Crown or the House of
Lords, but against the House of Commons, which, instead
of being regarded as the bulwark of popular liberty,
appeared to usurp the rights of the electors and to over
ride their most clearly and repeatedly expressed wishes.
Wilkes had right on his side
; Diderot sent him his con
gratulations, and Whitefield prayed for his success. The
effect of the agitation was to give a strong impulse to
political discussion and the practice of holding public
meetings. Political societies were founded in London
and throughout the country. Parliamentary reform was
not, however, a monopoly of the Radicals, and public
opinion had so far ripened in 1783, when Pitt moved
his famous resolutions, that a few years would in all prob
ability have seen the passing of a Reform Act but for
the blow inflicted by the French Revolution on all such
movements. But it would have been a different Act
from that passed in 1832. The democratic views of the
suffrage to which that measure gave partial expression
were then held only by a small band of Radical theorists10 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
and agitators, the chief of whom were Cartwright and
Jebb, Joseph Priestley and Kichard Price.
1
The Eevolution exercised a profound effect upon the
course of political history in England. When it began,
the cause of the reformers appeared full of promise, and
we all know how, for a time, the progress of the Eevolu
tion was hailed by the more generous spirits. But the
licence and cruelty which stained its further course
almost extinguished Liberalism in England for a genera
tion.
&quot; Till I see,&quot; wrote Fox in 1801,
&quot; that the public
has some dislike (indignation I do not hope for) to
absolute power, I see no use in stating in the House of
Commons the principles of liberty and justice.&quot; While
this was the effect on the mass of the nation, the principles
of the Eevolution were presented in their undiluted and
most obnoxious form by the small band of English
Jacobins, or, as they may be conveniently called, the
Jacobinical Eadicals. Of this sect Paine s Eights of
Man was the popular gospel, and Godwin s Political
Justice the more ponderous oracle. Mr Kent states
very clearly the transformation which English Eadicalism
underwent in their writings. From being a scheme of
parliamentary reform, it became a virulent attack upon
the Constitution as a whole, and in particular upon
the Crown and the House of Lords.
&quot; Paine was perhaps
the first to make the point of expense a prime argument
against the retention of the monarchy.&quot; Another point
of difference was that of religious opinion and belief.
The earlier Eadicals had
&quot;
all professed some form of
Christianity, but Paine and Godwin were strong agnostics
1
According to Bentham, it was a sentence in Priestley s Essay on the
First Principles of Government which first suggested to him his principle
of
&quot; the greatest happiness of the greatest number,&quot; and it was a sermon of
Price s which called forth Burke s Reflections on the French Revolution.THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 11
and materialists,&quot; and Paine s Age of Eeason completed
the association of Eadicalism and infidelity in the public
mind. As Coleridge said,
&quot; It was God s mercy to our
age that our Jacobins were infidels, and a scandal to all
sober Christians. Had they been like the old Puritans,
they would have trodden Church and King to dust at
least for a time.&quot; The congratulatory addresses of the
new Radicals to the French National Convention, and
similar performances smacking strongly of treason, roused
a storm of popular indignation against these
&quot;
philosophis
ing serpents,&quot; as Walpole called them. The people wanted
no French fraternity, said the first Sir Robert Peel to
Fox; &quot;they preferred their religion and their legal freedom,
with the good roast beef of Old England, to the atheism,
the liberty and equality, and the broken breeches and
soup-meagre of France.&quot; The mob of Birmingham, shout
ing
&quot; No philosophers,&quot; burned Priestley s house over his
head. Repressive legislation and political prosecutions
were the natural outcome of the feelings aroused, and of
the general atmosphere of suspicion. At the close of the
century English Radicalism had for the time destroyed
itself, and even the old Whig party could scarcely muster
forty members in the House of Commons. This was the
juncture at which the teaching of Bentham became a
force in politics. Radicalism had to be reconstituted in
England between 1800 and 1832, and this was mainly
the work of the Philosophical Radicals.
&quot; The uprising
of the Philosophical Radicals,&quot; says Mr Kent,
&quot; was the
greatest force, of a purely speculative kind, that had ever
been felt in English politics, and nothing ever did so
much to democratise our institutions.&quot;
It is impossible to follow Mr Leslie Stephen in his
genial sketch of the bustling boyish patriarch in whom12 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
selfishness had somehow taken the form of benevolence.
Bentham was present at the trial of Wilkes, and his first
important work was published in the year of the American





at the age of 82, and he died on 6th June 1832,
the very day before the passing of the Reform Act to
which his teaching had so powerfully contributed.
Bentham began as a Tory, and his first bit of writing
was a pamphlet in defence of Lord Mansfield. The
Fragment on Government/ published in 1776, attracted
the notice of Lord Shelburne, at whose house he met
many prominent politicians of the day, and also two men
who were to be of the greatest importance in the dissemina
tion of his views Dumont and Sir Samuel Romilly. It
was the publication by Dumont in 1802 of the Traites
de Legislation de M. Jeremie Bentham which first gave
him his wider reputation and influence. Partly transla
tion and partly a vigorous and lucid statement of the
pith of Bentham s doctrine in Dumont s own words, the
Traites carried his fame into all the countries of Europe.
As many copies were sold in St Petersburg as in London,
and a magnificent translation was ordered. Russian
officials wrote comparing Bentham to Bacon, Newton,
and Adam Smith, as the founder of a new science.
&quot; The grand Baintham,&quot; said the Spanish alcalde to
Borrow, showing him all the master s works upon his
shelves,
&quot; he who has invented laws for all the world. I
hope shortly to see them adopted in this unhappy country
of ours.&quot; Forty thousand copies of Dumont were sold in
Paris for the South American trade. Russia, Spain, and
South America form an ironical conjunction.
At home Bentham s influence grew more slowly, but
had more permanent results. In 1808 he made the
acquaintance of James Mill, who was to be the mostTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 13
powerful apostle of Benthamism, both in its philosophical
and its political aspects. By that time the Jacobin con
troversies had receded into the background, and English
Radicalism of the old reforming type was again beginning
to make itself heard. Sir Francis Burdett was returned
to Parliament in 1807, and his motion in favour of reform
in 1809 may be regarded as the first serious beginning
of the agitation which issued in the first Eeform Bill. _
Bentham continued
&quot;
scribbling on in his hermitage,&quot; as he
called it, and taking no direct part in the political struggle ;
but the politicians came to dine with him at Queen Square
Place, and he was thus in touch with most of the Parlia
mentary reformers, including at a somewhat later date
such men as O Connell and Lord Brougham. The letters
of the latter to his
&quot; dear grandpapa,&quot; and Bentham s notes
enclosing
&quot; some nice sweet pap of my own making,&quot; to
&quot; my dear sweet little poppet,&quot; are sufficiently curious
documents. Bentham purveyed the philosophy of the
Radical movement, wrote a Catechism of Parliamentary
Reform, and furnished Burdett with the series of resolu
tions which he proposed in 1818, demanding universal
suffrage, annual parliaments, and vote by ballot. In 1 8 24,
by which time the
&quot; Benthamites
&quot;
formed a compact and
fairly numerous group, he supplied funds to start The
&quot;Westminster Review as an organ of thorough
- going
Radicalism.
The development of Bentham s views is an instructive
piece of history. His ultimate political conclusions, as
embodied, for example, in his Constitutional Code, are
practically identical with those of the Jacobins, as de
duced from the rights of man. Yet he declared the
American version of these rights, in the Declaration of
Independence, to be a
&quot;
hodge-podge of confusion and
absurdity,&quot; and he wrote a treatise on &quot;Anarchic Fallacies&quot;14 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
to expose the French Declaration of Eights. Natural
rights, he says, is simple nonsense
; natural and impre
scriptible rights is
&quot; rhetorical nonsense nonsense upon
stilts.&quot; The whole abstract and deductive procedure is at
fault. As Mr Leslie Stephen summarises his contention :
&quot; The rights of man doctrine confounds a primary logical
canon with a statement of fact. The maxim that all men were,
or ought to be, equal, asserts correctly that there must not be
arbitrary differences. Every inequality should have its justifi
cation in a reasonable system. But when this undeniable logical
canon is taken to prove that men actually are equal, there is an
obvious begging of the question. In point of fact, the theorists
immediately proceeded to disfranchise half the race on account
of sex, and a third of the remainder on account of infancy.&quot;
All political arrangements must therefore be brought to
the test of experience ; they must be judged by their
&quot;
utility.&quot; Applying this test to existing inequalities,
Bentham believes himself to reach inductively the same
practical conclusions. The difference in method is char
acteristic of the national temperament. Still more char
acteristic is the way in which Bentham was led step by
step from an attempt to reform the penal law to a radical
reconstruction of political society. It was the tradition
of English reformers to start, not from abstract principles,
but from an assault upon particular abuses. Bentham
himself began life, as we have seen, with Tory sympathies.
His original interest (and to the end probably his ruling
interest) was codification
; he desired to reform the mon
strous abuses of the existing penal law, and generally to
introduce order into the bewildering chaos of the English
legal system. But there was no rancour in his zeal.
&quot; I
was a great reformist,&quot; he says.
&quot; but never suspected that
the people in power were against reform. I supposed
they only wanted to know what was good in order toTHE PHILOSOPHICAL KADICALS. 15
embrace it.&quot; This devout imagination was first shaken
by the cool reception which the politicians he met at
Lord Lansdowne s gave to his scheme, and was finally
shattered by the failure of the Panopticon, the great
scheme of prison-reform which occupied him, more or less,
for twenty years. As might have been expected, he passed
with almost equal naivete to the opposite extreme.
Lawyers of all classes, he now insists, have a common
interest in multiplying suits and complicating procedure ;




has grown up, which bars every attempt at reform. Hence
the unmeasured terms in which he denounces Eldon as
worse than Jeffreys, and expresses his belief that the most





to the moral level of an average man.
But the legal profession did not stand alone; it was
in the closest relations with the whole privileged class.
Presently he discovered, as Mr Stephen puts it,
&quot; that behind Judge & Co. were George III. and the base
Sidmouth, and the whole band of obstructors entrenched within
the matchless constitution, and thus his attack upon the
abuses of the penal law led him to attack the whole political
framework of the country.&quot;
Bentham s constitutional gospel follows with charming
simplicity from this new insight, when combined with his






&quot; the greatest happiness of the
greatest number.&quot; But, according to the equally primary
principle of
&quot;
self-preference,&quot; every man always desires his
own greatest happiness, and therefore in every government
the governors will legislate for their own advantage.
&quot; Hence the whole problem is to produce a coincidence of the
two ends, by securing an identity of interest between governors16 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
and governed. To secure that, we have only to identify the two
classes, or to put the government in the hands of all. In a
monarchy, the ruler aims at the interest of one himself ; in
a democracy, its end is the right one the greatest happiness of
the greatest number.&quot;
Universal suffrage, annual parliaments, and vote by ballot





representatives,&quot; and they are not
to be re-eligible till after an interval, every precaution
being thus taken against the possible rise of a class whose
interests might be divergent from those of the community
as a whole. For the rest, since
&quot;
all government is in




all governors be directly responsible, and let us have
as little government as possible. Industry in particular
should say to government only what Diogenes said to
Alexander,
&quot; Stand out of my sunshine.&quot;
The abstract simplicity of the perfect State corresponds
to the abstract simplicity of the philosophical principles
from which it was deduced. Unadulterated selfishness as
the motive, universal benevolence as the end these are
the two fixed poles of Bentham s thought. They pre
sented themselves to him in the first instance as a solution
of his own specific problem, the creation of a science or
philosophy of law, as a basis for practical reform. Utility,
or the greatest-happiness principle, furnished him with a
universal test for the criticism of existing enactments,





law. The other problem of
legislation is the encouragement of actions which pro
mote the general happiness and the discouragement of
actions which have a contrary tendency. This is solved
by an appeal to the universal motive.
&quot; Nature has
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereignTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 17
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to
point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do.&quot; The legislator, therefore, must annex
pains or pleasures to those classes of actions which he
wishes to discourage or promote. Pains and pleasures,
so annexed to courses of action, are called
&quot;
sanctions,&quot;
and they should be so manipulated by the legislator
that from dictates of self-interest alone a man shall
be impelled to conduct which promotes the general
happiness.
As has been already hinted, these philosophical prin
ciples are in themselves neither very original nor very
profound. We have glanced at the source of the greatest-
happiness principle
: the psychological hedonism with
which it was coupled was a commonplace of the schools,
and had been current in English philosophy since Locke.
The truth is, as Mr Stephen puts it, that Bentham
&quot; founded not a doctrine but a method ; the doctrine, which came
to him simply as a general principle, was in his hands a potent
instrument applied with most fruitful results to questions of
immediate interest. . . . The characteristic of his teaching was
not the bare appeal to utility, but the attempt to follow the clue
of utility systematically or unflinchingly into every part of the
subject.&quot;
It is, in short, in the history of legislative theory rather
than in philosophy proper that Bentham holds a place.
Even his psychology, as seen in his
&quot;
analysis of the
springs of action,&quot; is rough and ready. Not unnaturally
he extended the principles which he found sufficient to
solve his own practical problem, and used them as ulti
mate principles of explanation in psychology, ethics, and
sociology. But working principles, sufficiently exact to
yield valuable results in their own sphere, cannot be
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made absolute in this way without revealing their in
adequacy to the task thus thrust upon them. Later
criticism and the subsequent history of the Utilitarian
school itself have made this abundantly evident in the
case of Bentham s abstract scheme of man and society.
But this detracts little from his merit in his own sphere,
the sphere in which his real work was done, a sphere
in which, as Mr Stephen somewhat cruelly puts it, he
&quot;
got on very well without philosophy.&quot; In the de
partment of law, his success was so great that it has
tended perhaps to obscure his merits. With the disap
pearance of the abuses against which his polemic was
directed, and with the general acceptance of the canon by
which he judged them, much of his writing is apt to
appear superfluous. He has been compared to Samson,
who perished in the ruins of the temple he destroyed.
The philosophical defects of Benthamism will be best
considered when we have the subsequent development of
the school before us. We shall proceed, therefore, briefly
to trace its fortunes under the leadership of the Mills,
father and son. The twenty years between 1820 and
1840 may be set down as the period during which the
Utilitarians exercised their most direct influence upon
English politics. They were during that time not only
a group of thinkers with common principles, in constant
communication with one another, but also a compact
political party with clearly defined aims, active both in
Parliament and in the press. Their organisation in this
twofold capacity was unquestionably due in the main to
the vigorous but repellent personality of James Mill.
Bentham himself exerted his influence almost entirely
through his writings, and even of them Sydney Smith
wittily said that, while learned economists have doubtedTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 19
&quot; whether it be necessary that there should be a middle
man between the cultivator and the possessor of the soil,
neither gods, men, nor booksellers can doubt the necessity
of a middleman between Mr Bentham and the public.&quot;
Mill was much more than such a middleman
; he was at
once the systematiser and the prophet of the Benthamite
faith. And there is some truth in Hoffding s
1
descrip
tion of him as
&quot; the intellectual father of the first par
liamentary reform.&quot; The best account of Philosophical
Eadicalism in the days of its confident youth is still to
be found in his son s Autobiography.
&quot; The school,&quot; he says,
&quot; had no other existence than what was
constituted by the fact that my father s writings and conversa
tion drew round him a certain number of young men who had
already imbibed, or who imbibed from him, a greater or smaller
portion of his very decided political and philosophical opinions.
. . . Bentham is a much greater name in history. But my
father exercised a far greater personal ascendancy. I have never
known any one who could do such ample justice to his best
thoughts in colloquial discussion.&quot;
This is confirmed by the accounts of Grote and Mrs Grote.
Mill goes on to indicate the chief articles of the creed
which they held in common.
&quot; It was not mere Benthamism,&quot; he says,
&quot; but rather a com
bination of Bentham s point of view with that of the modern
1 In his History of Modern Philosophy Hoffding gives a remarkably
fresh and well-written account of the Utilitarian thinkers. As a Dane,
Professor Hoffding perhaps takes a more cosmopolitan view of the progress
of European thought than is to be found in the otherwise admirable
histories of philosophy made in Germany. The seventy pages of the
English translation which deal with Bentham and the Mills, Carlyle and
Sir W. Hamilton, are a model of accurate statement, sympathetic appreci
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political economy and with the Hartleian metaphysics. Mal-
thus s population-principle was quite as much a banner and
point of union among us as any opinion specially belonging
to Bentham. This great doctrine, originally brought forward
as an argument against the indefinite improvability of human
affairs, we took up with an ardent zeal in the contrary sense,
as indicating the sole means of realising that improvability.&quot;
The Hartleian metaphysics, as it is here called, was
James Mill s special contribution to the general body of
doctrine. Bentham, as has been seen, was not a trained
psychologist, nor was he interested in such questions. To




so passionately denounced by Cobbett
these investigations were part of his national inheritance.
If he had time, he said in 1817, he could write a book
which
&quot; would make the human mind as plain as the road
from Charing Cross to St Paul s.&quot; In the doctrine of
Association, as applied by Hobbes, Hume, and especially
by Hartley, he thought he had found the instrument
which effected this result; and in his Analysis of the
Phenomena of the Human Mind, published in 1829, he
supplied the world, as he conceived, with the book in
question. He furnished the school at any rate with an
official philosophy in which the very vigour and clearness
of the exposition force into relief the startling inadequacy
of its account of conscious experience. James Mill also
provided the school with a complete political theory in a
powerful series of articles written for the supplement of
the Encyclopaedia Britannica between 1816 and 1823,
and printed as a volume in 1824. As regards political
economy, the Philosophical Eadicals looked upon them
selves throughout as the special champions of the science.
Macaulay, indeed, accused them of discrediting it by the
ostentatious way in which they took it under their pro-THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 21
tection. Kicardo became acquainted with Mill in 1811,
and was induced by him to publish his Principles of
Political Economy in 1817. Malthus s Essay on Popu
lation had appeared in 1798, and in a second, amended,
edition in 1803. The controversies which gathered
round these two names are closely associated with the
history of the Philosophical Eadicals. By their rigid
interpretation of the doctrines in question, and their
uncompromising application of them in the discussion of
practical questions, they were probably responsible for a
large measure of the odium which the doctrines aroused
in many quarters, and which in turn reacted unfavour
ably upon the general political influence of the party.
The decline of Philosophical Radicalism was indeed, from
a variety of causes, as rapid as its rise.
But between 1810 and 1830 the party was still in
process of consolidation. Able recruits were yearly
gathering to its banners, and its members were full of
the most unbounded confidence in the sufficiency of
their own principles, and in the speedy triumph of
these principles over the mass of ignorance and pre
judice which was all that their magisterial assumption
permitted them to see in the forces opposed to them.
Among the practical workers in the cause, the most
notable was perhaps Francis Place, the tailor, whose
shop at Charing Cross was the centre of Radical activity
in the Westminster constituency. Since the days of
Wilkes, Radicalism had migrated from the City to
Westminster, as it was later to move to Manchester
and Birmingham. Place carried two Radical candidates
for Westminster against the Whigs as early as 1807;
and one of these, Sir Francis Burdett, retained his seat
for thirty years. In the press, yeoman service was
done by John Black of The Morning Chronicle, and22 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
later by Albany Fonblanque on The Examiner. Among
members of Parliament, in addition to Sir Francis
Burdett and Sir John Hobhouse, members for West
minster, there were Joseph Hume, a school-fellow of
James Mill s, who, after he entered Parliament in 1818,
made himself, as Mr Kent puts it,
&quot; the self-appointed
auditor of the national accounts,&quot; and Eoebuck, whose
parliamentary career, however, only began in 1832 and
eventually led him into other company. Sir William
Molesworth s activity, as member of Parliament and one
of the wealthy supporters of the cause, also belonged to
the years after 1832. The intellectual leaders of the
movement, besides James Mill and Eicardo, were Grote,
who was introduced to Mill by Eicardo in 1817, and
who, with Mrs Grote, represented to the end the strict
est sect of Philosophical Eadicalism
; John Austin, the
philosophical jurist, and Charles Austin, his younger
brother, whose brilliant oratory in the Cambridge Union
introduced Benthamism to the younger members of that
University and brought several recruits to the standard.
Finally, there was John Stuart Mill, trained from his
earliest youth for the apostolic succession, and already
in 1823 or 1824 beginning to be a leader among the
younger men. In 1824 the foundation of The West
minster Eeview and James Mill s formidable onslaught
in the first number upon The Edinburgh Eeview and
the Whig policy called general attention to the new
party.
&quot;So formidable an attack on the Whig party and policy,&quot; says
J. S. Mill,
&quot; had never before been made, nor had so great a blow
been ever struck, in this country, for Radicalism. ... At a
time when the current was already setting strongly towards
reform, it is not strange that attention should have been aroused
by the regular appearance in controversy of what seemed a newTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 23
school of writers, claiming to be the legislators and theorists of
this new tendency. The air of strong conviction with which they
wrote, the boldness with which they tilted against the very front
of both the existing political parties, their uncompromising pro
fession of opposition to many of the generally received opinions,
and the suspicion they lay under of holding others still more
heterodox than they professed ; the talent and verve of at least
my father s articles, and the appearance of a corps behind him
sufficient to carry on a Review, and, finally, the fact that the
Review was bought and read, made the so-called Bentham school
in philosophy and politics fill a greater place in the public mind
than it had held before, or has ever again held since other equally
earnest schools of thought have arisen in England.&quot;
Down to 1832, and later, the Utilitarians unquestion
ably claimed, as Mill puts it, to be
&quot; the legislators and
theorists
&quot;
of the new tendency. They attacked both the
great political parties with equal bitterness as represent
ing the aristocratic principle in government; but their
special bitterness, hatred, and contempt seemed reserved
for the Whigs, with whom they were compelled to co
operate. The Whig creed was a
&quot;
see-saw,&quot; and the
Whigs themselves were selfish
&quot;
trimmers.&quot; This was the
gist of Mill s attacks in The Westminster Eeview, and
the feeling grew more intense with the approach of a
successful termination of the agitation. The Eadicals,
who, as Mr Stephen says, had some grounds for consider
ing themselves to be the
&quot;
steel of the lance,&quot; saw the
Whig politicians stepping forward to receive both the
reward and the credit of their labours. The Whig
legend of the Eeform Bill is different. Macaulay, then
in the first flush of his Cambridge reputation, ridiculed
the claim of the Utilitarians to be the defenders of the
true political faith. He would draw a broad line between
judicious reformers and a
&quot; sect which, having derived all
its influence from the countenance which they have24 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
imprudently bestowed upon it, hates them with the
deadly hatred of ingratitude.&quot; He is afraid of
&quot; the dis
credit of their alliance.&quot; No party was ever so un
popular.
&quot; It had already disgusted people with political
economy, and would disgust them with parliamentary
reform if it could associate itself in public opinion
with the cause.&quot;
This is obviously unjust to the real influence of the
Utilitarians, in leavening political opinion and pushing
on the cause of reform, but it is a wholesome reminder
of the fate that awaits any extreme party in English
politics. The Philosophical Eadicals had apparently ex
pected that, after the first instalment of reform in 1832,
they would increasingly dominate the Liberal policy of
the future. Nothing could have been more unlike what
actually happened. As the crisis actually approached,
and the tide of feeling rose throughout the country, the
Utilitarians were more or less lost in the crowd. Several
of the party were returned to the first reformed Par
liament. Besides Hume, Hobhouse, and Sir Francis
Burdett, there were Grote, Koebuck, Charles Buller, Sir
William Molesworth, and some others. The hopes of
Mill and his father ran high. But none of them made
any figure in the house.
&quot; On the whole,&quot; says Mill,
reviewing this period in his Autobiography,
&quot;
they did
very little to promote any opinions,&quot; and soon sank into
&quot; a mere cote gauche of the Whig party.&quot;
&quot; I laboured,&quot;
he adds, &quot;from this time till 1839, both by personal
influence with some of them and by writings, to put
ideas into their heads and purposes into their hearts.
I did some good with Charles Buller and Sir William
Molesworth. On the whole, however, my attempt was
vain.&quot; With more irritation he describes them in a
contemporary letter, some as full of crotchets, others asTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 25
fastidious and overloaded with petty scrupulosity, and
all devoid of energy, except Eoebuck and Buller, while
&quot; Roebuck has no judgment, Buller no patient, persevering




&quot; means unpractical ;
while the centrifugal tendency, so curiously characteristic
of all bodies of
&quot; advanced
&quot;
theorists, soon showed itself
in dissensions and mutual recriminations.
&quot; I tell you
what it is coming to,&quot; Charles Buller remarked one night
to Grote
;
&quot; in no very long time from this, you and I will
have to tell Molesworth.&quot; As Buller and Molesworth
both died prematurely, there was thus at least some
plausibility in Macaulay s witty description of the party
as consisting of
&quot; Grote and his wife.&quot; Sir Francis Burdett
became a Tory of the Tories, Sir John Hobhouse took
office with the Whigs, and Roebuck became a law unto
himself. Thus, by 1840, says Mr Stephen, the Philo
sophical Radicals, who had expected to lead the van, were
almost disbanded. &quot;Grote, the ablest of Mill s friends,
retired from Parliament to devote himself to the History
of Greece, about the same time as Mill set to work upon
the completion of his Logic.
&quot;
In the Autobiography, Mill finds a partial explanation
of this result in the fact that the years after 1832 were
essentially a period of reaction, the public mind desiring
rest after the Reform excitement, and being disinclined
to listen to schemes involving further change. He also
attributes it to the want of a leader :
&quot; some man of philosophic attainments and popular talents who
could have used the House of Commons as a rostra or a teacher s
chair for instructing and impelling the public mind, and would
either have forced the Whigs to receive their measures from
him or have taken the lead of the Reform party out of their
hands.&quot;26 THE PHILOSOPHICAL EADICALS.
His father, he thinks, would have been such a leader had
he been in Parliament. But these considerations do not
reach to the root of the matter. No doubt the presence
of a man with the concentrated force of James Mill
might have given more unity and fighting spirit to the
band
; but the main cause of the decline of the Philo
sophical Radicals was the abstract and negative character
of their views, and the want of insight and sympathy
which they displayed in dealing with the concrete ques
tions which now pressed for solution. The
&quot; condition-of-
England question,&quot; as Carlyle called it in his Chartism,
had become clamant. The great industrial revolution
and the development of capitalism had broken up the old
organisation of society in many directions, bringing in its
train many crying evils which have only gradually been
rectified or mitigated. In the most different quarters
men were trying to diagnose the evils and proposing
remedies. Among the Conservatives, Southey and
Coleridge were feeling after a more adequate theory of
the State and its functions, and insisting on the import
ance of the national Church as the organ of sound
religion and morality. Among the non- philosophical
Radicals, Cobbett was raging against the degradation of
the peasantry, and denouncing the economists and all
their works. Owen and his followers, tracing distress to
the development of the manufacturing system, looked
towards Socialism for the remedy. Popular feeling was
inflamed by hideous stories of child -labour and white
slavery in factories and mines, and practical philanthropists
like Lord Shaftesbury were promoting the Factory Laws
to safeguard the human rights of women and children.
The workmen themselves were seeking to organise trade-
unions for the protection of their interests and the im
provement of their position. But all these signs of theTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 27
times were lost upon the
&quot;
paralytic Eadicals,&quot; as Carlyle
sarcastically called them. They either refused to admit
the existence of the evils, or pronounced them to be the
inevitable results of economic laws.
&quot; Laissez-faire
&quot; and
unlimited competition were bound, they held, to work out
the best results, if only the people would lay to heart the
teaching of Malthus, and restrain the increase of popula
tion. Some of the Utilitarians, it is true, were better
than their creed, and supported the factory legislation
but the school was opposed to it on principle. The
Utilitarians were, in fact, as we have seen, the chief
elaborators of the classical political economy, and they
accepted its doctrines, not as abstractions and laws of
tendency provisionally true in given circumstances, but
as an absolute theory of society. They preached these




of every colour. Small
wonder that the dumb instinct of the multitude turned
from men who were always preaching that nothing could
or should be done
; and that the guidance of popular
aspirations passed into other hands.
&quot;.The Philosophical Radicals,&quot; says Mr Stephen,
&quot;
represented
rather intellectual scorn for old prejudices and clumsy adminis
tration than any keen sympathy with the sufferings of the
poor. The harsher side of the old Utilitarianism was there
fore emphasised by them, and Mill s attempts to enlarge and
soften its teaching were regarded by his critics with a certain
suspicion. Their philosophy suited neither party. To the
class which still retained the leading position in politics they
appeared as destructives, and to the classes which were turning
towards Chartism they appeared as the most chilling critics of
popular aspiration.&quot;
One of the most striking features of the Philosophical
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enlist the support of the working classes. The effect of
the Reform Bill had been to throw political power into
the hands of the middle class
; and the working classes,
who had looked for far-reaching social changes as the
result of the agitation, and who now sat, as Carlyle puts
it, at a Barmecide feast, conceived a deep distrust of their
would-be representatives in Parliament. This was the
origin of the Chartist movement, and though the aims of
the Chartists were largely embraced in the Radical pro
gramme, there was no solidarity between the two parties.
The Chartist agitation was a movement of the working
classes themselves, carried on in a lower social stratum
than that to which the Philosophical Radicals appealed.
The Utilitarians mostly belonged themselves to the
middle class even to the prosperous ranks of that class
and, philosophers as they were, were firmly convinced
of the superior wisdom and virtue of their own class.
This is almost naively expressed by James Mill in his
Essay on Government, in which he deduces
&quot; from the
principles of human nature
&quot;
that the lower orders hold
up the middle class as a model to be imitated by their
children, and
&quot; account it an honour
&quot;
to adopt its opinion.
Consequently, however far the franchise were extended,
it is this class which has produced the most distin
guished ornaments of art, science, and even of legislation
which will ultimately decide upon political questions.
&quot; The great majority of the people,&quot; he concludes,
&quot; never
cease to be guided by that rank.&quot; Twenty years later
J. S. Mill, in an article
l
deploring the failure of the
Radicals to secure the sympathy of the working classes,
still emphatically maintains that the motto of every
Radical should be government for the working classes by
means of the middle classes. The ideal of such govern-
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ment would of course, in Mill s conception, be the redress
of practical grievances ; but unfortunately the working
classes and their Kadical pedagogues were not agreed
upon the remedies for the social and industrial ills
they complained of.
&quot;
They could not,&quot; says Mr Leslie
Stephen,
&quot; see a philanthropy which was hidden behind
Malthus and Ricardo, and which proposed to improve
their position by removing privileges, indeed, but not
by diminishing competition.&quot; The Utilitarians, there
fore, disappeared from public life as a distinct party,
although their economic doctrine survived in Cobden
and the Manchester school, and was successfully applied
by them to commercial legislation. But the Free-trade
movement was essentially a manufacturers agitation,
and, apart from political economy, and a hatred of the
aristocratic or land-owning class, Cobden and his friends
had little in common with the Philosophical Radicals
who preceded them.
The year 1840 may be said to mark the end of
Utilitarian Radicalism, as preached by its founders with
logical consistency and with an intellectual intolerance
born of implicit confidence in the all-sufficiency of their
own social scheme. By that time J. S. Mill, opening
his mind to various contemporay influences, had freely
acknowledged the defects and one-sidedness of his in





&quot; which appeared in The London and West
minster Review for 1838 and 1840 respectively. So
early as 1829, he says in his Autobiography, he found
the fabric of his old opinions giving way, and, as he
never allowed it to fall to pieces, he was
&quot;
incessantly
occupied in weaving it anew.&quot; Macaulay s attack on the
Essay on Government convinced him that his father s
premises were
&quot; too narrow, and included but a small30 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
number of the general truths on which, in politics, the
important consequences depend.&quot; Through the writings
of Coleridge, and through the Coleridgians with whom he
was in personal intercourse, through Carlyle also and
others, he had become acquainted with the modern
philosophy of history, and accepted the position that
&quot;
all questions of political institutions are relative, not
absolute, and that different stages of human progress
not only will have, but ought to have, different institu
tions.&quot; About this time, also, he came strongly under
the influence of the St Simonian school, and accepted
from them the theory of an alternation in the history








&quot; Their criticisms on the common doctrines of
Liberalism seemed to me full of important truth; and
it was partly by their writings that my eyes were
opened to the very limited and temporary value of
the old political economy.&quot; They gave him, in other
words, his first impulse in a socialistic direction. A
Utilitarian who can talk in this way of
&quot; the common
doctrines of Liberalism,&quot; who has
&quot; ceased to consider
representative democracy as an absolute principle,&quot; and
who looks even upon political economy as of
&quot; limited
and temporary value,&quot; has already left the landmarks
of his youth far behind him; and a series of articles
on &quot;The Spirit of the Age,&quot; written by Mill in 1831,
caused Carlyle, when he read them at Craigenputtock,
to say to himself,
&quot; Here is a new Mystic,&quot; and led
him, an coming up to London the same autumn, to
make inquiry for the author. But so long as his father
lived Mill felt himself under restraint. He felt it the
part both of prudence and piety to conceal, wherever
practicable, how far he had wandered from the paternal
creed.
&quot; My father,&quot; he says,
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calm and full explanations on fundamental points of
doctrine could be expected, at least with one whom
he might consider as in some sort a deserter from his
standard.&quot; As a dutiful son, therefore, John Mill made
the most of their general agreement on the political
questions of the day. But after his father s death in
1836 he proceeded to liberate his soul in the two
striking articles already referred to. These articles are
truly remarkable for the insight and sympathy they
display. It may almost be said that they already
embody the most important criticisms that have been
made upon Benthamism by succeeding thinkers, while
they contain acknowledgments of the truths contended
for by Bentham s opponents which could hardly be
better stated by these opponents themselves.
In short, if Mill, at the time when this expansion of
his ideas first began, had been an independent and soli
tary thinker, instead of being, as he was, one of a band
of active propagandists, and pledged by all that he held
most sacred to carry on the leadership of the school, one
is tempted to think that the course of English philosophy
in the nineteenth century might have been widely different.
If he had been free from the jealous supervision of his
father and the stricter members of the sect, and had given
free scope to the train of reflection on which he had now
entered, the revision of his philosophical principles might




of Bentham and Coleridge to which he
pointed as the complete philosophy. But, as it was, his
method of incessantly weaving the new into the fabric of
the old, and thus maintaining a semblance of continuity
and consistency, made such a thorough revision impossible.
The old groundwork remained, and the new elements
appeared as incongruous patches. Instead of presenting32 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
a new synthesis, Mill introduces modifications and addi
tions without perceiving their total inconsistency with
principles which he nevertheless refuses to abandon
; and
hence the bankruptcy of Associationism and the old
Utilitarianism was not declared till nearly half a century
later. This may be explained to a large extent by the
fact that the changes which his social theories underwent
never led him to reconsider the atomistic doctrine of
Sensationalism and Associationism which he had accepted
from his father as a theory of knowledge. It was late in
life in connection with the Hamiltonian controversy
that he returned to deal more systematically with these
matters
; and the polemical nature of the occasion pre
cluded any reconsideration of fundamentals. He was the
English champion of one set of views, as Hamilton was of
the other
; and, although in the course of the discussion
his candour led him to make important admissions, it was
without any consciousness of their combined effect upon
the structure of his philosophic edifice. His father s
systematic training had, in fact, done its work more
thoroughly than he was aware of
; and accordingly his
subsequent works show him closer to his father s and
Bentham s point of view than might have been expected
from his critical attitude in the thirties. Those articles,
written while he was still in close intercourse with
Carlyle, Maurice, Sterling, and others, mark the point of
his closest approximation to other ways of thinking
: at
bottom, however, they implied no breaking away from his
moorings, but only (as he himself says) an attempt
&quot;
to
give a wider basis and a more free and genial character
to Eadical speculations.&quot; Later, he tells us that, except
as regards his gradual advance in the direction of Social
ism, he
&quot;
completely turned back from what there had
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Mill says of his father that
&quot; as Brutus was the last
of the Eomans, so was he the last of the eighteenth
century ; he continued its thought and sentiment into
the nineteenth (though not unmodified nor unimproved),
partaking neither in the good nor in the bad influences
of the reaction against the eighteenth century, which
was the great characteristic of the first half of the nine
teenth.&quot; Similarly, in his account of the widening of his
own mental horizon, he treats Benthamism throughout
as synonymous with eighteenth-century thought.
&quot; The
French philosophes of the eighteenth century&quot; were, he
says, the example which he and his youthful companions
sought to emulate in the salad days of 1824. This affilia-
;
tion is beyond dispute. James Mill reproduces the psycho-
logical metaphysics of Hume, while Bentham repeats thei
selfish and hedonistic ethics of Helvetius. Without any
disparagement of that much maligned but indispensable
and meritorious period, it will be admitted that the
eighteenth century represents in philosophy the principle
of analysis ; that its analysis of man and society is con
ducted in an abstract fashion without reference to the
teaching of history ; and that the philosophers are through
out individualists, alike in their presuppositions and in
their resulting dogmatic teaching individualists often of
so pronounced a type as to be more accurately described




as the philosophical groundwork of the
Utilitarian creed. But Hartley s doctrine is, in the main,
simply that of the association of ideas done into terms of
physiology ; the seminal mind of the eighteenth century,
in this as in so much else, is David Hume. James Mill s
Analysis, dropping Hartley s obsolete physiology, offers
us sensations plus associations as a complete explanation
of the mind and its operations, reproducing with almost
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startling exactitude Hume s fundamental positions in the
Treatise. The work is, indeed, as Hoffding says, the
most systematic attempt ever made to explain all mental
phenomena by the association of ideas all associations,
moreover, being reduced to contiguity. Our experience,
[according to Mill s analysis, consists of sensations and
ideas which are copies of sensations
; both may be spoken
of as feelings, a term which includes every phenomenon of
mind. Consciousness is a succession of such sensations
and ideas, which are conceived, both by Hume and by
Mill, as separable atoms. There is no logical connection
between ideas
; but, when two occur together, or in close
succession, an association tends to establish itself between
them, so that the one afterwards suggests the other.
The ideas, in Mill as in Hume, appear to be not only
separable atoms but to be self-subsistent entities, which
somehow cohere, and when aggregated into a cluster con
stitute the mind. J. S. Mill remarks that his father s
theory of Predication (as
&quot;
simply a contrivance for marking
this order of ideas
&quot;) omits all reference to belief. Now
to believe is actively to judge or to make some assertion
about reality ; but mental activity and reality are con
ceptions for which Mill, like Hume, has no place. Belief
can be no more than lively suggestion of one idea by
another in the course of their rapid self-initiated transit.
In other words, Mill omits the active function of thought
altogether, and leaves us with a dance of passively appre





of a mind or apprehending self, and
of a real world which that self apprehends. Like Hume,
he has, in the course of his analysis, got rid both of ob
jective reality and of the mind itself
; the two, indeed,
stand or fall together. But it is hard, as Mr Stephen
says, in unconscious reminiscence of Reid,
&quot;
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of mere loose ideas going about in the universe at large
and sticking accidentally to others. After all, the
human being is in a true sense also an organised whole,
and his constitution must be taken into account in
discussing the laws of ideation.
&quot; When J. S. Mill s
candour long afterwards impelled him to his famous
admission that the mind is more than a series of feelings,
it was felt instinctively that he had surrendered the key
of the position. The question of Judgment or Belief is,
indeed, as he partly saw in his comments on his father s
theory, the crucial question for such a philosophy.
As already indicated, James Mill would fain reduce all
association (and therefore all relation) to the principle
of contiguity or accidental collocation. Even resemblance,
which Hume had retained as one of the fundamental
laws of association, makes Mill uncomfortable, because
it is a relation which seems to depend on the intrinsic
nature of the ideas themselves. He suggests that resem
blance is, after all, really a particular case of the law of
frequency.
&quot; I believe it will be found that we are
accustomed to see like things together. When we see
a tree, we generally see more trees than one
; a sheep,
more sheep than one
; a man, more men than one.&quot; His
loyal son and editor, in disavowing this extraordinary
suggestion, is driven to remark that we are also much
accustomed to see like things separate and to see unlike
things together. Clearly, as Mr Stephen wittily puts it,
sheep are not seen to be like because they often compose
a flock, but are considered a flock because they are seen
to be like. James Mill himself, it is fair to say, does
not insist on this reduction, but the attempt is signifi
cant, for it helps to explain (or at least falls into line
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\ human character by circumstances through the universal
Principle of Association, and the consequent unlimited
1 possibility of improving the moral and intellectual condi-
\ ,tion of mankind by education.&quot; If the individuals with
/ which we start have no character or nature of their own,
I and if there are no connections between them discover-
/ able by reason, but only associations due to chance coin-
[ cidences, then undoubtedly (to vary Hume s famous
I dictum) anything may be made out of anything. James
Mill, in his article on
&quot;
Education,&quot; does, as a matter of
fact, go nearly the whole way with the doctrine of
Helvetius that all the differences between men are due to
education, including under that word
&quot;
all the circum
stances that act during the first months, perhaps the
first moments, of existence.&quot; This is substantially the
doctrine of the school from first to last. J. S. Mill
remarks on Bentham s complete neglect of national
character as a factor in moulding and explaining the
social arrangements of a people.
&quot; Bentham s idea of the
world,&quot; he says,
&quot;
is that of a collection of persons pursu
ing each his separate interest or pleasure, the prevention
of whom from jostling one another more than is unavoid
able may be attempted by hopes and fears derived from
three sources the law, religion, and public opinion.&quot;
That is to say, the material of the legislator consists




actuated by the universal motive. By a sufficiently
skilful manipulation of hopes and fears, and the conse
quent weaving of proper associations, any result may be
attained. In this spirit, as Mr Stephen points out,
Bentham professed himself as ready to legislate for
Hindostan as for his own parish, and he was eager to
make codes not only for England, Spain, and Eussia, but
for Morocco. And J. S. Mill himself, in spite of hisTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 37
censure of Bent/ham, speaks towards the close of his life
of
&quot; the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part
of the marked distinction of human character, whether
between individuals, races, or sexes, are such as not only
might but naturally would be produced by differences in
circumstances.&quot;
1
Indissoluble or inseparable association comes in, finally,
to explain, as J. S. Mill says,
&quot;
all the mental incompati
bilities, the impossibilities of thought, of which so much is
made by a certain class of metaphysician.&quot; After explain
ing in this way the supposed necessity of mathematical
axioms, J. S. Mill proposed to treat the principle of con
tradiction itself as just
&quot; one of our first and most familiar
generalisations from experience.&quot; In other words, we
have found as a fact that
&quot;
belief and disbelief are two
different mental states excluding each other,&quot; just as
&quot; we
also find that light and darkness, sound and silence, any
positive phenomenon whatever and its negative, are dis
tinct phenomena, pointedly contrasted, and the one always
absent where the other is present.&quot; The law is, there
fore,
&quot; a generalisation from all these facts.&quot; It is, in
short, an association arising out of frequently repeated
collocations of facts, and to that extent itself a mere
matter of fact, something that we find to be so, but which
embodies no insight of reason, no necessity of thought.
The antipathy to logical or rational necessity could go no
farther than this attempt to make the law of contradic
tion itself an accident of experience. In the same way,
even resemblance as a perceived relation sticks in James
1 In fairness it ought to be added that this doctrine of the fluidity of all
distinctions, because due to external circumstances, and the consequent
indefinite modifiability of character, was the source of some of the best
features of the Utilitarians as well as of their limitations. It explains
their enthusiastic belief in education as an instrument of social progress,
and their optimistic view of the unlimited possibilities of future advance.38 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
Mill s throat. To feel two things to be alike, he argues,
is the same thing as to have the two feelings. Separate
1 units, accidentally combined, thus constitute, on the con-
I joint testimony of father and son, absolutely the whole
jstock-in-trade of the empirical philosophy.
Bentham s ethics are the counterpart of this psycho
logical atomism. Just as the mind or self is pulverised
into separate and accidentally associated states, so each
man, considered ethically, is a purely self - regarding
creature, connected by no natural bonds of cohesion with
his fellows, but actuated solely by the desire to attain
selfish pleasure or escape selfish pain. Virtue being,
nevertheless, defined as the promotion of the greatest
happiness of the greatest number, the problem of ethics
becomes, in Carlyle s phrase,
&quot; Given a world of knaves,
to educe an Honesty from their united action,&quot; or, as
Mr Stephen puts it, to make universal cohesion out of
universal repulsion. This is achieved by means of
&quot;
sanctions,&quot; that is, pains and pleasures annexed to
actions, which make it a man s private interest to pro
mote the public good. Bentham is entirely occupied
with this jurisprudential question of arranging
&quot;
tutelary
motives,&quot; so that self-interest shall lead in the direction
of benevolence. Dealing only with the overt act, and
disregarding, as from the legal point of view he must, the
motives which led to it, it is apparently indifferent to him
whether a course of action be the outcome of selfish
calculation or disinterested benevolence
; and, as J. S.
Mill confesses, the training of the affections and the will
in the latter direction is a blank in his system.
&quot; Man
is never recognised by him,&quot; says Mill,
&quot; as a being
capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end,
of desiring for its own sake the conformity of his own
character to his standard of excellence, without hope ofTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 39
good or fear of evil from other source than his own
inward consciousness.&quot; Such a view, it is hardly neces
sary to add, amounts to a complete neglect of what
constitutes virtuous action as such, and consequently to
the disappearance of ethics as in any way distinguished
from law.
The actual emergence of disinterestedly benevolent
sentiments, and the logical justification of universal ben
evolence on a basis of universal selfishness, become, there
fore, the special problems of the Utilitarian school. To
Bentham himself the necessity of reconciling Benevolence
and Prudence, and so justifying his own ethical principle,
seems hardly to have presented itself as a difficulty. This
was due, no doubt, partly to his purely external view of
obligation, partly to a vague belief in the actual harmony
of individual and social interests, properly understood an
idea which he found prominently set forth in Helvetius,
and which, in the economic sphere, pervades the work of
Adam Smith. The more analytic mind of James Mill
perceived the necessity of some kind of logical justification,




indissoluble association, by which actions, originally per
formed from motives of self-interest, may come to be
performed for their own sake, as the miser comes to
love gold without any thought of converting it to use.
In his son s Utilitarianism the question is prominent.
As might have been expected from his criticism of
Bentham, J. S. Mill lays great stress on the necessity of
a disinterested love of virtue as a mark of the truly
virtuous man. He will not surrender the fundamental
tenet of the school that
&quot; actions and dispositions are only
virtuous because they promote another end than virtue,&quot;
but he not only recognises as a psychological fact the
possibility that virtue may become to the individual a40 THE PHILOSOPHICAL KADICALS.
good in itself ; he holds that
&quot; the mind is not in a right
state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the
state most conducive to the general happiness unless
it does love virtue in this manner.&quot; We have thus
a parallel to the general paradox of hedonism that
pleasure is only gained when it is not directly pursued.
The solution is sought by Mill very much on his father s
lines by bringing association into play. He lays stress
also upon the social feelings of mankind as affording
a natural basis of sentiment for Utilitarian morality.
&quot; The social state,&quot; he says,
&quot;
is at once so natural, so
5 necessary, and so habitual to man, that except in some
i unusual circumstances, or by an effort of voluntary
^abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as
member of a
body.&quot; Mill is thus, as usual, on the point
of discarding the picture of the abstract individual which
gives rise to the whole difficulty. But, as his manner
uniformly is, he refuses to take the final step which his
successive admissions have necessitated; and Nemesis
overtakes him a few pages farther on, when he endeav















&quot; Each person s happiness is a good to
that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good
to the aggregate of all persons.&quot; The Utilitarianism,
accordingly, like all Mill s works, only marks a stage in
the dissolution of the school, or if to be preferred, in the
transcendence by the school of its original opinions. It was
at least convincing as to the impossibility of justifying
the Utilitarian end on the basis of egoistic hedonism.
The closest reasoner of the school if, indeed, so broad
and cautious a thinker as the late Professor Sidgwick
may be ranked among the adherents of any school pro
ceeded, therefore, to take the final step of dissociating theTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 41
two. By placing benevolence alongside of prudence, and
accepting it as
&quot; the most certain and comprehensive of
intuitions,&quot; he must be held, in spite of certain character
istic reserves, to abandon definitively the ethical atomism
of the original doctrine.
To what extent can such a theory as that of Bentham
and the Philosophical Eadicals explain the structure and
functions of society ? Mr Leslie Stephen hardly improves
upon the answer which J. S. Mill gave in 1838 :
&quot;It can teach the means of organising and regulating the
merely business part of the social arrangements. ... It will
enable a society which has attained a certain state of spiritual
development, and the maintenance of which in that state is other
wise provided for, to prescribe the rules by which it may protect
its material interests. It will do nothing (except sometimes as
an instrument in the hands of a higher doctrine) for the spiritual
interests of society, nor does it suffice of itself even for the
material interests. That which alone causes any material inter
ests to exist, which alone enables any body of human beings to
exist as a society, is national character. A philosophy of laws
and institutions not founded on a philosophy of national char
acter is an absurdity.&quot;
Bentham would probably have retorted that to talk in








; for does not his legiti
mate disciple, Nassau Senior, tell us that
&quot; a State is
nothing more than the aggregate of individual men who
inhabit a certain country
&quot;
? Nevertheless Mill in this
passage lays his finger upon the point where the Bentham
ite theory of society breaks down. Given a society and
a government of some sort, utility, in the hands of the
reforming critic, may furnish an important practical test
of any of its particular institutions and arrangements.42 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
But you cannot apply such a test to the existence of the
social organism itself. It was, no doubt, as Mr Stephen
suggests, a dim perception of this truth that prompted the
theory of the Social Contract, which it is difficult to believe
was ever regarded by its authors as embodying a historical
fact. We may perhaps understand them to mean by it
that the existence of society is, as Kant might have said,
the result of
&quot; an intelligible act,&quot; or, to put it more
simply, that it is the necessary presupposition of all
further thought on these subjects. The modern view of
the relation of the individual to society has obviated the
necessity of having recourse to such a fiction. Through
the influence of Hegel and of Comte, and partly through
the reaction of biological conceptions upon philosophy
and general thinking, the nineteenth century has seen
the definitive abandonment of the individualistic or
atomistic view of that relation. To Mr Leslie Stephen
himself belongs the credit of having, in his Science of
Ethics, worked out with much impressiveness, from a
Utilitarian basis, the conception of the organic nature
of society, and the impossibility, therefore, of treating
the moral individual apart from the society whose
product he is, or apart from the race whose history
he inherits in the instincts and habits which make
him human. With equal emphasis, from another point
of view, T. H. Green (who holds, against hedonistic
theories of every shade, that the moral end must be
formulated in terms of self-realisation) insists that the
self to be realised is social, and that the moral ideal
is therefore the idea of
&quot; a common
good.&quot; This is
&quot; an ultimate fact of human history a fact without
which there would not be such a history.&quot; Instead of
being the unit from which we must start, the individual,
it has been said, is a late product of evolution
; and it is
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only, therefore, within certain spheres and with certain
limitations that we can, by a convenient abstraction, dis





in which he is, as it were, embedded, or out of
which, rather, he is woven. If this be so, it is only with
such qualifications that we can speak of an opposition
between self-regarding and social qualities ; and we are
spared the impossible task of explaining how one of
these abstractions produces the other how pure selfish
ness gives rise to pure benevolence. We do not even
require to justify Benevolence at the bar of Prudence.
The cohesion of the race is secured by organic instincts
which reach deep down beneath any such antithesis.
&quot; How wonderful it all is ! Built not by saints and angels,
but by the work of men s hands ; cemented with men s honest
blood and with a world of tears ; welded by the best brains of
centuries past ; not without the taint and reproach incidental to
all human work, but constructed on the whole with pure and
splendid purpose ; human, and not yet wholly human, for the
most heedless and the most cynical must see the finger of the
Divine.&quot;
These fine words, spoken by Lord Kosebery of the narrower
case of the British Empire, may still more fitly be applied
to the fabric of human civilisation itself, reared upon a
meagre basis of animal needs and impulses by the name
less generations of the past. To this vast process of ^un
conscious reason the Utilitarians were strangely blind.
Like most reformers, they saw in the past only the in
corporated spirit of evil, the fountain of unnumbered
abuses. Every abuse they attacked appeared to them
due to some
&quot;
sinister interest,&quot; which had called it into
being originally, and now opposed its removal. A little
historical sense might have taught them that in many
cases, perhaps in most, what had become an abuse had44 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
begun by serving a useful purpose, while its persistence
after its usefulness had ceased was often due more to the
forces of inertia, and even to a mistaken but intelligible
sense of loyalty, than to any definitely sinister interest on
the part of individuals or classes. It might even have
occurred to them that the long or extensive prevalence of
any opinion is itself a presumption that it is not altogether
a fallacy. But Bentham and his followers contemptuously
dismissed, under the sweeping phrase of &quot;vague general
ities,&quot; whatever their foot-rule of provable utility did not
enable them to measure.
&quot; He did not heed,&quot; says J. S.
Mill in his critical essay,
&quot; or rather, the nature of his
mind prevented it from occurring to him, that these
generalities contained the whole unanalysed experience
of the human race.&quot;
Mill signalises his father s unbounded confidence in the
influence of reason over the minds of mankind, and in so
doing he touches both the strength and the weakness of
the Utilitarian position. Meagrely enough supported by
the records of its constructive application in political and
social history, this confidence in the power of conscious
reflection is none the less a noble and a necessary faith in
the ultimate power of clear intelligence. In a sense, this
faith can only be surrendered if we capitulate to the
powers of irrationality and chaos. It is the claim of the
free human spirit eternally to criticise its own procedure
and all the institutions in which it has embodied itself.
Only by this unceasing criticism can the fabric of human
institutions be kept sweet and clean, and be continuously
adapted, with some measure of success, to new times and
new needs. And in the hands of reformers, utility, as the
most practical test of rationality, may be applied with
potent and beneficent effect to laws and customs which,
useful in their day, have survived their usefulness andTHE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS. 45
become a useless anachronism, a harmful restriction, or a
crying injustice. There is no doubt that, in this sense,
Utilitarianism rendered services of the most important
kind to the true interests of mankind. T. H. Green does
not hesitate to call it the moral theory which has been of
most public service in modern Europe.
&quot; Whatever the
errors arising from its hedonistic psychology, no other
theory has been available, for the social and political
reformer, containing so much truth with such ready
applicability. No other has offered so commanding a
point of view from which to criticise the precepts and
institutions presented as authoritative.&quot; To this extent,
the Utilitarians undoubtedly represent the principle
of modern thought and the freedom of the human
mind. In their assaults upon indefensible privileges,
unreasoned prejudices, and blind appeals to tradition,
the truth has been with them, and they have prevailed.
Law has been simplified, commercial activity has been
freed from its fetters, privileges have been swept away,
and the political machine reconstructed in accordance
with Eadical ideals. And yet the Eadical Utopia has
not been realised
; the state of public opinion on funda
mental points of social and national policy is as far
removed as can well be conceived from that contemplated
by Bentham and his followers. The Utilitarians had, in
a striking degree, the defects of their qualities. The
reason they invoked with so much confidence was abstract
and unhistorical, and, as a consequence, their insight
failed them when they had to deal in any way with the
unseen foundations of society or the hidden springs of
national life. In these cases their criticisms have re
coiled, with fatal effect, upon themselves. Philosophical
Kadicalism was, in short, essentially a negative and
critical movement, and its strength departed from it just46 THE PHILOSOPHICAL RADICALS.
in proportion as its critical attack was successful. When
effect was given to its legitimate criticisms, whatever hold
it had upon popular support was lost, for it had no con
structive suggestions to offer in the work of social
organisation. Its impotence in this respect arose, as
has been seen, from the inadequacy of its philosophic
basis.MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION.
3
IN
Social Evolution Mr Kidd stated some whole
some truths in a fresh and vigorous manner,
which was none the less effective because the statement
was often paradoxical in form, and depended sometimes
on forced antithesis. Clothed in the all - conquering
phraseology of biological evolution, his views on the
nature and factors of social progress attracted an amount
of public attention which was fully justified, on the
whole, by the knowledge of social phenomena and the
power of comprehensive generalisation which the volume
displayed. It had an adventitious popularity in certain
circles because, by the connection it asserted between
religion and the very doctrine of natural selection on
which modern biology rests, it seemed to turn the tables





and social progress on which the book insisted, proved
a palatable phrase to the defenders of supernatural
dogma. Provoking undue heat and animosity in those
of the opposite camp, the phrase led them, perhaps, to
do less than justice to what there was of solid truth in
Mr Kidd s interpretations of history and of the present
1 The following discussion of Mr Kidd s historical generalisations
appeared in The Contemporary Review, June 1902.48 MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION.
trend of social movement. The book thus stimulated
discussion in many quarters ; and as it partook itself of
the nature of a brochure or manifesto, it naturally fore
shadowed an attempt on the part of the author to work
out a system of social philosophy on the basis of the
ideas therein enunciated. This task Mr Kidd has now
essayed in his Principles of Western Civilisation,
which purports to be only
&quot; the first volume of a system
of evolutionary philosophy,&quot; and thus inevitably challenges
comparison with Mr Spencer s undertaking. Unfor
tunately, it cannot be said that in the eight years
interval Mr Kidd s thought has gained in lucidity or
convincingness. In applying the ideas of his previous
book, he has invented a cumbrous and (as it seems to me)
singularly unfortunate terminology, in which he disguises
them almost beyond recognition, and which is repeated
on page after page almost as if he were reciting the
words of an inspired creed, and were fearful of deviating
in the smallest particular from the exact words of the
formula. Mr Kidd is, moreover, himself so impressed
with the importance of his message, and by accumulating
his adjectives labours so insistently to produce the same
impression upon his readers, that in the parts of the
volume dealing with his philosophical generalisations, the
style becomes turgid and inflated, sometimes to the verge
of meaninglessness, and only recovers sanity when it
touches earth, so to speak, in the later chapters dealing
with historical facts and present-day social conditions.
What, then, are the ideas, common to the two books,
in which Mr Kidd believes that he has found the key to
the history of mankind ? The main theses of Social
Evolution were (1) that human society, like animal
life everywhere, progresses only through the stress of
competition the ceaseless rivalry of race with race, ofMR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION. 49
individual with individual in virtue of which, according
to the operation of natural selection, the unfit are weeded
out, and only the fittest maintain themselves and survive
to propagate their kind; (2) that this upward movement
is being carried on at the expense of the individual, and
of the present generation as a whole, in the interest of
the efficiency of the stock and of the generations that
are to follow, and is thus flatly at variance with the
enlightened self-interest of the individuals of whom, at
any given moment, the social organism consists. Self-
interest would teach them to conserve their own material
interests by easing the stress of competition in every pos
sible way, notably, for example, by artificially restrict
ing the growth of population and the consequent pressure
upon the means of subsistence. To these promptings of
self-interest Mr Kidd restricts the term
&quot;
reason,&quot; which
he accordingly describes as
&quot; the most profoundly indi
vidualistic, anti-social, and anti-evolutionary of all human
qualities.&quot;
&quot; Eeason has nothing to do with any existence
but the present, which it insists it is our duty to our
selves to make the most of.&quot; (3) It follows immediately
from this definition of terms that there is no rational
sanction for progress that in submitting to the conditions





in its various forms, and Christianity pre-eminently,
supplies. Eeligion, therefore, instead of being a survival
from primitive savagery, to be gradually merged in
rational insight, appears as the eternal and necessary
counterpart or complement of reason, the cohesive force
in society which antagonises the disintegrative tendencies
of the individual reason and ensures the possibility of
progress. Thus,
&quot; we understand how an ultra-rational
sanction for the sacrifice of the interests of the in-
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dividuals to those of the social organism has been a
feature common to all religions ; we see also why the
conception of sacrifice has occupied such a central place
in nearly all beliefs, and why the tendency of religion
has been to surround this principle with the most im
pressive and stupendous of sanctions.&quot;
Applying this scheme to the facts of Western Civilisa
tion, Mr Kidd finds the characteristic feature of that
civilisation to be the altruism with which it was so
powerfully inoculated at the Christian era, and the
&quot;
development of a stupendous system of other-world-
liness,&quot; in which reason, as a faculty of independent
judgment, came near to extinction, and
&quot; the super-
rational sanction for conduct attained a strength and
universality unknown in the Roman and Greek civil
isations.&quot; Proceeding to contrast modern with ancient
civilisation, he points out that in the latter the tribe
or state was the unit, and the struggle for existence
operated mainly between these groups
: the survival of
a group or society depended, therefore, on its efficiency
as a fighting organisation. In modern societies this
external competition of state with state no doubt con
tinues to operate ; but a marked and growing feature of
modern societies is the relative independence possessed
by the individual, an independence characteristic of
an industrial as distinguished from a military organisa
tion. Mr Kidd, therefore, in dealing with them con
centrates his attention on what has been called intra-
group competition i.e., competition for economic goods
between individuals of the same society. Here his
position is peculiar and worthy of note. As might be
expected from the quasi-religious sanction with which he
invests the struggle for existence, as the divinely appointed
instrument of progress, he sees in this internal rivalry,MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION. 51
which keeps all the powers of individuals at their utmost
tension, the most precious instrument of social efficiency
and the ultimate cause of progress.
&quot; So far from our
civilisation tending to produce an interruption of, or an
exception to, the cosmic process which has been in
progress from the beginning of life, its distinctive and
characteristic feature must be found in the exceptional
degree to which it has furthered it.&quot; The direction of
advance among the modern nations has been, he points
out, towards
&quot; the political and social enfranchisement of
the masses,&quot; so that
&quot; the fact of our time, which over
shadows all others, is the arrival of Democracy.&quot; But
democracy means essentially
&quot;
participation in the rivalry
of existence on equal terms.&quot; The democratic ideal is
&quot; a condition of society in which the whole mass of
excluded people will be at last brought into the rivalry
of existence on a footing of equality of opportunity.&quot;
Thus
&quot; the significance of the entire order of social
change in progress among the Western peoples consists,
in short, in the single fact that this cosmic process
tends thereby to acquire amongst us the fullest, highest,
and completest expression it has ever reached in the
history of the race.&quot; Notwithstanding this laudation of
unlimited competition, it presently appears, however, that
this divinely appointed instrument cannot be trusted to
work alone, and religion is invoked on the opposite side
as a controlling and modifying force. It is significant
of the looseness with which the term religion is used
that, whereas it appeared, to begin with, as the consecra
tion of the struggle, Mr Kidd now proceeds to argue, in
effect, that the process of Western Civilisation is the
story of the gradual success of Christian ideals in
tempering the ruthless action of natural selection. For
presumably
&quot; the power-holding classes
&quot;
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position through the operation of natural selection, by
reason of their greater social efficiency. There is nothing
in that cosmic principle which should induce them to
part with one jot or tittle of the power and privilege
they have acquired. The true moral of the situation is
drawn by Nietzsche, when he urges them to improve
their advantage to the utmost, and to cultivate the
&quot; Uebermensch
&quot; on the labours of a subject population.
Yet, as Mr Kidd tells us, the course of Civilisation has
been marked by the breaking down of privileges one
after another
; and the tendency of recent legislation in
particular has been
&quot; to strengthen and equip at the
general expense the lower and weaker against the higher
and wealthier classes of the community.&quot; This is traced
by Mr Kidd, with much truth, to
&quot; the immense fund of
altruistic feeling with which our Western Societies have
been equipped,&quot; or, in simpler language, to the feeling
of human brotherhood which first found full expression
in the teaching of Christ. The presence of this element
he finds to be the characteristic feature of Western
Civilisation, and one that opens out possibilities of pro
gress which were closed to states of the antique pattern.
These, then, are the ideas upon which Mr Kidd draws
in his present volume. He has not, so far as I can see,
added in any way to the stock
; but those on which he
here concentrates attention reappear under quasi-philoso
phical titles which are intended to magnify their im
portance, but which in reality, I cannot but think, tend
to obscure their real meaning.
He begins as before by connecting his work with the
theory of evolution, calling attention to the transforma
tion which the doctrine of evolution by natural selection
has effected in all departments of knowledge, and
especially in those which deal with man in society. AsMR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION. 53
we have seen, he calls his work expressly
&quot; a system of
evolutionary philosophy,&quot; and professes in it to draw
the ultimate consequences, hitherto unperceived, of the
scientific theory when applied to social phenomena.
These consequences, he contends almost on every page of














stupendous,&quot; that he appears to labour under a sense of
almost prophetic importance in being the first to enunciate
them. His first thesis is that the evolutionary process
works everywhere in the interests of the future, that is
to say, in the interests of the species or type, not in
the interest of
&quot;
existing individuals considered either
separately as individuals or collectively as members of
political society.&quot; The recognition of this fact involves,
he maintains,
&quot; a shifting of the centre of significance in
the evolutionary hypothesis.&quot; Social philosophy has been
governed hitherto by the idea of &quot;.the ascendancy of the
interest of the present
&quot;
; but in the evolutionary process
truly interpreted the evolutionary centre of the process
is seen to be in the future, and its meaning therefore can
never be grasped by
&quot;
any theory of utilitarian politics in
the State.&quot; This is what he intends by the ever-repeated
phrase that the meaning of the process is
&quot;
projected
beyond the limits of merely political consciousness.&quot;
And under the title of
&quot; The Principle of Projected
Efficiency
&quot;
a title surely singularly unfortunate and
ill - adapted to express the author s meaning this
idea becomes the keynote of the book. It is next
identified with the principle of Western i.e., modern
or Christian as contrasted with ancient, civilisation
;
and thus the social evolution of mankind falls into
two great periods, ancient or pre
- Christian civilisa
tion, based entirely, according to Mr Kidd, on the54 MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION.
ascendancy of the present, and Western or Christian
civilisation, based on the ascendancy of the future.
Political and social writers before Mr Kidd have not
recognised the significance of this remarkable antithesis,
and consequently their speculations continually tend to
revert to an antique standard. This declension of
thought from the governing principle of our civilisation
is also to be noted in the practical sphere in many
current ideas and tendencies. But in proportion as a
society or nation refuses, for considerations of immediate
interest or personal ease, to take upon itself the burden
of the world-process, to that extent it falls behind in the
selective struggle for the inheritance of the earth. This
is the ultimate principle of division between dead or
dying nations and those to which the future belongs.
The English-speaking peoples (with the possible addition
of the Germans) represent in this respect most truly the
underlying principle of Western civilisation.
Such is a brief and, I think, a fair outline of Mr Kidd s
argument. What meaning and value can we attach to
it as a theory of human history and progress ? In what
sense is it true, in the first place, that evolution works
for the future and not for the present ? And, secondly,
what connection is there between this fact, if it be a
fact, and the principles of the Christian religion
?
In regard to the first point, no one would think of
denying it is indeed a commonplace that natural selec
tion works towards the improvement (or, to be quite strict,
towards the modification) of the species or type, and that
the individual or the present generation may be regarded,
in any given case, as simply a link between the past and
the future a material, as it were, in which the develop
ing principle is working out ends which do not yet
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as Mr Kidd intimates, that Darwin and the earlier
Darwinians were blind to this fact : it is the very essence
of their doctrine. Of course Darwin constantly describes
natural selection as taking advantage of variations which
are beneficial to the creature itself. But how otherwise
could he express the fact ? It is because the variation
is beneficial to the individual that it is preserved and
accumulated for future generations. If it were not
beneficial to the individual in the first instance, natural
selection would have no material to work upon. It
does not follow from this statement of plain fact that
Darwin or any other evolutionist regarded the present
individual or the present generation as a terminus
ad quern : the procession of the generations is the
presupposition of all evolutional thought. And, in
truth, Mr Kidd s exclusive insistence on the aspect of
futurity involves a much more serious risk of distorting
the true significance of the theory. Pressing into his
service the striking essay in which Weismann treats the
death of the individual as a device in the interest of the
species to prevent stagnation and provide for variation,
adaptation, and progress and referring to such facts as
the growing burden of parenthood which accompanies
growing complexity of structure in the individual, Mr
Kidd discerns
&quot; a principle of inherent necessity in the
evolutionary process, compelling ever towards the sacrifice
on a vast scale of the present and the individual in the
interests of the future and the universal.&quot;
&quot; It is the
burden of the generations to come which controls the
whole process.&quot; The meaning of the drama of life
&quot; remains continually projected beyond the content of the
present.&quot;
&quot; The interests of the individual in those
adjustments profitable to itself . . . have actually no
place except in so far as they are included in, and have56 MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION.
contributed to this larger end in the future.&quot;
&quot; The win
ning qualities in the evolutionary process must of necessity
be those qualities by which the interests of the existing
individuals have been most effectively subordinated to
those of the generations yet to be born.&quot; And applying the
same idea to different types of social order, he says,
&quot; The
interests of all the visible world around us can have no place
except in so far as they are included in the larger interests
of a future to which they are entirely subordinated.&quot;
Now if it is an abstraction to speak of the individual or
the present as if it were an ultimate and independent and
self-explaining goal, it is equally an abstraction to treat it
in this way as merely the matrix of that which is to be.
The consequences of such a mode of presentation are in
structively exemplified in Mr Kidd s own theory. For we
are embarked, in that case, upon what philosophers call the
infinite progress. The present generations are sacrificed (if
we are to speak of sacrifice) to the interests of those that
are to follow, but they cannot be said, any more than their
predecessors, to reap the fruit of those sacrifices. They are
the victims of the same stress and strain in the interest of
the hungry generations to come, whose feet are at the door,
but who will likewise be sent empty away from the
Barmecide feast of existence. Once embarked upon this
process, there is no possibility of stopping anywhere;
and when the idea is realised, it reduces the cosmic
process to a manifest futility, making it the pursuit
of a goal which is nowhere reached, and to which in
strictness, owing to the conditions of the case, we never
make any nearer approach. But the illusion results
from the abstraction to which we originally committed
ourselves. The present, it must be repeated, is not a
terminus ad quern ; but it is, at any given point, the term
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well as the womb of the future. Past and future are
alike projections from its reality. It is the heir in
possession. It lives its own life and realises its own
satisfaction. And it may not be amiss to remark that
the common way of speaking of the generations of the
past as sacrificed to produce the present stage of evolu
tionary progress is largely misleading. We import thereby
a mistaken pathos into the situation. Every generation
realises all the satisfaction of which its nature and its
life-conditions render it capable. If in many respects
the life of a past generation appears poor and mean,
compared with the opportunities and capacities of which
we are conscious, we do well to remember that our life-
conditions would have appeared to the ancestors we com
passionate vastly more
&quot;
stale, flat, and unprofitable
&quot; than
theirs appear to us. Nor must we forget in such an esti
mate those
&quot;
joys in widest commonalty spread
&quot;
spread
as wide, indeed, as the bounds of animal life itself the
joys of love and battle and the more passive pleasures of
elemental being.
&quot; Is it so small a thing
To have enjoyed the sun,
To have lived light in the spring,
To have loved, to have thought, to have done,
To have advanced true friends, and beat down baffling foes ?
&quot;
It is impossible, therefore, to separate the present and
the future as Mr Kidd does. His argument (though I
do not think he intends this) sometimes conveys the im
pression that the efficiency of a stock in the future is
purchased at the price of its efficiency in the present.
This is, of course, in the teeth both of science and of logic.
It is only through its efficiency in the present that any
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of natural selection and win the promise of the future.
Natural selection, that is to say, works equally for the
present and the future, according as we look at it, but
always primarily for the present, and for the future only
so far as its conditions are identical with those of the
present, or are being continuously modified in the direc
tion hitherto observed. Should any fundamental change
of conditions ensue, natural selection would discriminate
in favour of the race which could most rapidly retrace its
steps along the course of development it had hitherto
followed. Natural selection, indeed, can never do any




fact. In a sense, therefore, it would be more correct
to say that natural selection never carries us a step
beyond the present
: it deals with conditions as they
arise, but is in itself entirely blind, so far as any foresight
of the future is concerned. Looked at as a natural law
of causation, in short, the principle of natural selection is
always at work, and always at work in precisely the same
way. It is impossible, therefore, to use it as a principle
of division between periods of human history, and to divide
that history into two epochs, in the first of which natural
selection works for the efficiency of the existing political
or social organisation, in the second of which it works
for the efficiency of society in the future. Whatever
difference there may be between Ancient and Western
civilisation, Mr Kidd s mode of arriving at this dichotomy
in human history cannot be accepted as satisfactory.
But if natural selection possesses in itself no principle
of guidance seeing that in one sense everything, just as
it is, may be traced to the operation of natural selection
how does Mr Kidd come to assign to it the philosophical
importance he does ? What he really has in view seems
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strictly so called to be, in fact, a teleological interpreta
tion of the cosmic process. Natural selection, or the sur
vival of the fittest, it cannot be too clearly understood
supplies us with no standards of value not merely no
standards of ethical comparison, but no basis for comparing
different stages of the process as better or worse in any
respect whatever, save that of adaptation to the immediate
environment. Such adaptation may mean retrogression
as well as development ; it may mean, that is to sayr
what we, with our inveterate habit of so judging, call
retrogression or development. But natural selection itself
gives us only a sequence of events, not in a strict sense an
evolution. Given, however, the last term of the series
(for our present purposes man as so far evolved), and
assuming the value (in ethical or other terms) of the
result, it is always possible for us to regard the sequence-
of events which terminated thus, as travailing towards
this birth, or, in Bacon s large phrase, guided by a
&quot; divine
marshal
&quot; towards this issue. Such a teleological inter
pretation may be entirely immanent in character, implying
no interference ab extra with the mechanical operation of
natural selection
; but it derives its warrant, not from
that scientific principle, but from a conviction of the
absolute worth of the end attained a conviction strong
enough to determine us to interpret the whole process in
the light of its culmination. The sequence of events, so
viewed, becomes then, throughout, a chain of means and
ends. The forces which have been operative, either con
tinuously or at critical junctures in human history, appear
as the main factors which have contributed to produce
the result. This is what is meant by a philosophy of
history. It is a philosophy of history in this sense, and
depending on these assumptions, which Mr Kidd professes,
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When history is thus conceived as the working out of
an end, it at once becomes evident that the means em
ployed in its realisation are such as often completely
transcend the short-sighted calculation of the human
actors through whom at any given epoch the purpose
is being accomplished. God, as the theologians say,
makes the wrath of man to serve Him. Or, to put it
more generally, the shaping spirit of the future uses
the blind instincts of men, their follies and obstinacies,
their light desires, to beat out the fabric of the years
to come.
&quot; Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well,
When our deep plots do pall
: and that should teach us
There s a divinity that shapes our ends,
Eough-hew them how we will.&quot;
The blindness of human beings and of nations to the
true issues of their actions is a commonplace of the
moralist and historian. Sometimes it meets us in an
encouraging form. Saul, the son of Kish, who went out
to seek his father s asses, and found a kingdom, has been
often quoted ; and the handful of British traders who
laid the foundations of our Indian Empire is also not a
new comparison. On the other side, there is a passage
in J. A. Symonds s biography, in a letter to the late
Professor Sidgwick, in which he gives poignant expression
to the helplessness of the best-deduced political principles
to aid a people in the crisis of their fate.
&quot; We cannot
apply what we have learned, and the green tree of life
laughs at our gray theories. Nay, worse, the unexpected
evolutions of the organism force us to doubt what we
confidently thought we had learned. Surely England
has reached a crisis at which, if ever, principles ought
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applicable. Sternly, blindly, patiently, sufferingly, we
shall have to live it out, just like the meanest mollusc.&quot;
Mr Kidd concentrates on the contrast, so often em
phasised by psychologists and moralists, between self-
preserving and race -preserving activities. The living
being is a mass of impulses and instincts, of whose
origin he can give no account, and whose purpose in
the scheme of things is hid from him. His nature
being what it is, the satisfaction of all his impulses
and instincts is necessarily, so far as it goes, a source
of pleasure ; and the unreflecting individual is thus
impelled by an inner force to the performance of the
one set of functions no less than the other. But the
accounts of egoism and altruism are far from easy to
balance, when the calculating reason appears upon the
scene. The Pessimists have expended perhaps a dis
proportionate amount of time and labour in proving that
if the individual is taken in isolation from his kind, the
balance of pleasure and pain will in most cases come out
on the wrong side. The sexual and parental impulses
and instincts may be taken, without injustice, as the
central fact in animal life
; but it is due to the wiles of
the Unconscious, insatiately bent on its own ends (so runs
the argument), that the individual fails to perceive, or
perceives too late, that he has been duped in the interest
of the generations to come. No bountiful Venus, hominum
divomque wluptas, but an insatiate mother of longing and
woe, she blinds one generation after another to the clear
est teachings of reason. The role of the Unconscious in
human affairs, and in the cosmic process generally, fur
nished Von Hartmann some forty years ago (as it had
done Schopenhauer before him) with a system of philos
ophy ; and though handled in a different interest, the
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frequently an instructive resemblance to what we find in
Mr Kidd. There is the same contrast in both between
the selfish hedonistic reason and the ends of the cosmic
process, though these ends are viewed by Mr Kidd as the
perfection of wisdom and by pessimism as the perfection
of folly. And in both cases the argument turns upon
the power of reflection which conies with reason. Man
can say to himself, in a sense in which no animal can,
&quot;
Pleasure, be thou my good.&quot; For with the gift of re
flection which makes him man, he acquires the power of
self-control, the power of guiding his instincts and im
pulses ; and while this power is the source of all upward
progress towards the human virtues and graces, it also
implies the capacity of manipulating his instincts in the
interests of selfish indulgence, and, so applied, it may sink
him lower than the brutes from which he springs.
Without following the process of the selfish reason to
the lower depths of moral degradation, Mr Kidd, both in
this book and in Social Evolution, returns repeatedly to
the population question. Taking, as he does, a pro
nouncedly optimistic view of the world-process and the
ends to which it moves seeing also, as a practical
politician, the way in which the natural increase of
population has worked in the past to secure the future
of the English-speaking races the tendency towards
artificial restriction of the birth-rate presents itself to
him as a dereliction, so to speak, from cosmic duty. It
means at all events the deliberate resolve, on the part
of an individual or community, to limit its horizon to
considerations of its own comfort and wellbeing. And
to that extent it may be fairly taken as a symptom of
the degeneracy of the race in which it appears. Such
a race must have an ever-dwindling share in the future
of mankind
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that society has never been founded, and will never be
maintained, on a basis of individual self-interest or
pleasure. This furnishes him with a text from which he
preaches, in a way which is bound to be useful, against
two apparently opposite, but at bottom closely related,
tendencies of modern thought and practice.
In designating his first chapter
&quot; The Close of an Era,&quot;
Mr Kidd expressly indicates that it is the Utilitarian
theory of society and of the State, as expounded by the
Philosophical Eadicals, and as preached and practised
by the Manchester School of economists and politicians,
which he regards as having reached its term. These
doctrines of political enfranchisement, combined with un
limited economic competition and social laissez-faire, may
not always have been expressed with precision or held
with consistency ; but they have formed, as he points
out, the common creed of the older Liberalism and
Eadicalism. On the political side it is no exaggeration
to say, as he does, that
&quot; the political party in England
which has been most closely identified with the cause of
progress in the past inherited . . . the greatest tradition
in politics which our civilisation has produced
&quot;
; and its
principles may claim in this respect to have conquered
the world. But, as he says again,
&quot; the great Utilitarian
movement of the nineteenth century has run its course
&quot;
;
&quot; the basis of the old Radicalism has
gone.&quot;
&quot; There has
been no system of ideas that has ever held the mind of
the world, from which the intellectual basis has been so
completely struck away.&quot; To students of philosophy and
to philosophical students of history and society, this con
clusion can hardly be called novel. The doctrines of
individual freedom and human equality which made
modern Liberalism a power conquering and to conquer
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principles of our civilisation
; but it was their fate to be
interpreted and formulated in terms of abstract individ
ualism, by men who had been bred on the philosophy
of pure sensationalism which dominated the eighteenth
century, and found its classical expression in Hume.
Reducing experience to isolated impressions and ideas,
adhering to one another in consequence of casual colloca
tion, this philosophy treats society as an aggregate of
mutually exclusive units, each pursuing as sole end his
own individual pleasure. The problem of Utilitarian
ethics and politics thus takes the form of evolving social
and benevolent action from the play of individual
selfishness, or, as Carlyle puts it, &quot;given a world of
knaves to educe an Honesty from their united action.&quot;
Mr Leslie Stephen has recently, in his volumes on
English Utilitarianism, ably exposed the bankruptcy of
this system of thought as applied to social affairs.
Utility, he says in effect, may be a valuable practical
test of many political arrangements or social institutions,
but you cannot apply such a test to the existence of the
social organism itself. The origin and maintenance of
society depend on cohesive forces which cannot be weighed
in such a balance. Mr Stephen laid stress chiefly on the
defects of this system of thought as a social philosophy ;
but its social consequences depend on the fundamental
defects of its theory of knowledge, and these the pro
longed criticism of modern Idealism may claim to have
effectively exposed long before Mr Stephen wrote. The
influence of such criticism is slow and cumulative in its
effects, but perhaps Mr Kidd s relegation of this whole
system of ideas to the past may be taken as a sign that
this lesson has at last gone home to the general con
sciousness. And it is no small advantage, it may be
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a book which is bound to be widely read by many whose
contact with philosophical ideas is mainly at second-hand.
But in bracketing with the Manchester School the
apparently opposite ideals of Marxian Socialism and
Social Democracy, Mr Kidd performs, perhaps, a more
timely service
; and in condemning them upon the same
grounds, he shows the^ philosophical power of detecting a
single underlying principle in its diverse manifestations.
The point of resemblance is their exclusive preoccupation
with the conditions of material wellbeing. Political
Economy was central, as is well known, in the thought
of the Utilitarian Eadicals, and formed the gospel of the
Manchester School. It is the same economic interpreta
tion of history which dominates modern Socialism. The
process of human development is regarded as determined
entirely by economic conditions, and assumes the aspect
of a war of interests between existing members of society.
The conflict of labour and capital sums up for Marx the
significance of the human record
; and his sole ideal is
the adjustment of the conflict by the extinction of the
antithesis and the cessation of the personal struggle for
existence. The ideal is thus concerned purely with the
distribution of material goods, or, as Mr Kidd likes to
put it, with the material interests of the present. While,
as we shall see, entirely in sympathy with many so-called
socialistic proposals, Mr Kidd censures this profoundly
materialistic conception of human good on which the
systems of aggressive Socialism are founded, and which
is so frankly expressed in the anti -
religious ideals of
Social Democracy in Germany and elsewhere. He finds
there systematised and formulated the spirit of practical
materialism which is fostered by many influences and in
many quarters at the present time, and in which he
recognises, not without reason, the great and growing
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danger of our civilisation. As regards the socialistic con
tention, he had already pointed out in Social Evolution
that if the economic factor were indeed the only operative
factor, the forces at work would long since have reached
the equilibrium demanded by their inherent tendencies.
&quot; If we are to have nothing but materialistic selfishness
on the one side, leagued against equally materialistic
selfishness on the other, then the power-holding classes,
being still immeasurably the stronger, would be quite
capable of taking care of themselves, and would indeed
be very foolish if they did not do so.&quot; The very exist
ence of the socialistic propaganda would be inconceivable
but for the presence of humanitarian factors quite other
than the economic. In spite of the avowed materialism
of what may be called its official principles, Socialism, as
an active force in practical reform, really rests upon
ethical, or, as Mr Kidd prefers to call them, religious
principles, which set limits in human affairs to the
ruthless operation of natural selection, as it is seen at
work in the animal world. The more equal distribution
of material goods is claimed as the indispensable sub
structure of a more truly human life. In this at least
consists the appeal of socialistic ideas to the conscience
of the modern world.
All this is excellent. It is when Mr Kidd proceeds
to connect these valuable criticisms with his twofold
division of human history, founded on his distinction
between the ascendancy of the present and the ascendancy
of the future, that we begin to feel that we have left
solid ground behind us. In one sense, we have seen, in
considering the action of natural selection, that the
ascendancy of the present represents nothing objectionable
is indeed the inevitable condition of all human effort.
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means the recognition of none but material ends, and
the acknowledgment of no principle of action but in
dividual self-interest, then surely few generalisations
could be more rash than to seek to affix this label either
to pre-Christian civilisation as a whole, or to Greek and
Eoman civilisation in particular. Yet the ground on
which Utilitarianism and official Socialism are condemned
is repeatedly stated as being that they represent the
principles of the older civilisation, and have not become
conscious of the forces operative in our own. Splendid
patriotism and devoted affection not to mention more
homely virtues were assuredly as little absent from
the ancient world as were ideals of truth and good
ness, far transcending the conditions of material well-
being. The pagan ideal undoubtedly differed in many
ways from the Christian, but all human virtue must




is perhaps nearer the truth than
Mr Kidd s laboured antithesis. The old civilisation no
doubt ended in practical materialism and a recrudescence
of the grossest superstition, but these were the causes
of its death, not the forces which made it great.
If we press the parallel between the social atomism
of the Utilitarian theory and the principles of ancient
civilisation, the want of coherence springs at once to
light ; for in antiquity the State rather than the indi
vidual is the unit. That is to say, the cohesive forces
of society are so strong that, within the ancient State,
the individual does not attain the full measure of
development of which he is capable. The individual in
this sense is a modern product. This is, of course,
one of the commonplaces of philosophical history, and
Mr Kidd is far from being unaware of it. Indeed he
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State as one of the points in his contrast between ancient
and Western civilisation. Both impeachments, it would
seem, can hardly be true
; but Mr Kidd passes from one
to the other through the assumption which he apparently
makes that the ends of a State are necessarily material
in their character. In so doing he falls back upon the
idea, already criticised, of the materialistic basis of
ancient civilisation. But here, again, the antithesis will
not bear analysis. The State, as such, certainly deals to
a large extent with externals
; and, in the conflict of
State with State for sovereignty and predominance, the
materialistic aspect of its functions must necessarily fill
the eye. But it is the ethical virtues, nurtured by the
State in its citizens, which in the long-run (as Mr Kidd
himself is not slow to argue) decide such conflicts. And
there must be something wrong with an antithesis
which would compel us to rank the Athens of Pericle&
or the Home of Hannibal s day as representative of
materialism, and (let us say) Chicago or the Eand as the
exponent of Western idealism. The patriotism of Sparta
and Eome or the ethical outlook of Sophocles cannot be
put on one side as qualities which refer to a limited
present, while modern communities live under
&quot; the
shadow of the infinite future.&quot;
The difference between ancient and modern civilisation
is not the difference between selfishness and altruism,,
nor yet that between action for the present and action
for the future. Profound differences there obviously
are, and Mr Kidd is right in connecting them with the
influence of Christian sentiment
; but the nature of that
influence may surely be much more simply and un
ambiguously expressed. It seems almost a deliberate
perversity to represent the message of Christianity as
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early Christians did not believe in any future for the
race
; they looked for the speedy conclusion of this
mundane drama. The future in which they did believe
was a future for the individual in another world. The
interests of this future were certainly of such tran
scendent importance in their eyes, that they quite over
shadowed the passing concerns of the present life. This
is the primary (though not, I admit, the deepest) meaning
of the Christian antithesis between the things that are
unseen and eternal and the things that are seen and
temporal. To Christian sentiment the interests of future
generations are no more a satisfying object of devotion
than the interests of the present generation
: both belong
to the same plane of existence the world that now is.
The destiny to be realised is outside the world-process
altogether. Mr Kidd s statements of the central principle
of Christianity are so highly generalised one might
almost say, so studiously vague that they might cover
either interpretation of the future.
&quot; We have present,&quot;
he says,
&quot; in that religion, underlying all its phases, how
ever varied, however obscure, one central phenomenon
which constitutes not only the essential fact of its inner
life, but the distinctive principle to which its evolutionary
significance is related. It is the opening in the indi
vidual mind of the terms of a profound antithesis, of
which the characteristic feature always remains the
same namely, that it is incapable of being bridged or
closed by any principle operating merely within the
limits of present consciousness.&quot; Statements like this
are hardly calculated to convey a very definite idea of
Christian teaching; but knowing what we know of





referred to in the
Christian sense. Mr Kidd, however, so far as one can70 MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION.
see, has no interest in that interpretation. Present and
future, all through his volume, mean present and future
in the mundane history of the race
; and to that sense he
seems to pass through the ambiguous middle term of
the
&quot;
infinite.&quot; The eternal world of Christian faith is
often described as the infinite in contrast with the
finite
; and the procession of future generations may also
be spoken of as infinite (in another sense), seeing that
it never comes to an end. When Mr Kidd speaks of
the Christian era as
&quot; the epoch in which the present
and the finite begin to pass under the control of the
future and the infinite,&quot; the two meanings seem to
become interchangeable in his mind; and it is certain
that the whole of the rest of his argument depends
upon a supposed antithesis to which the most typically
religious minds of Christendom would have been pro
foundly indifferent. It is almost incredible that Mr
Kidd should leave the matter thus ambiguous ; but it is
upon this ambiguity, mainly, that the identification of
the supposed principle of Prcjected Efficiency with the
central phenomenon of the Christian religion depends
for its plausibility.
What are, let us ask ourselves, the Christian ideas
which have worked like a slow leaven in modern
civilisation ? If we try to answer this question very
generally, but at the same time as simply as possible,
should we not say that the most fundamental idea, in
a social regard, was the idea of a perfectly universal
human brotherhood based on the doctrine of a common
divine sonship ? This was the principle that burst the
bonds of the antique state. To those who learned the
lesson of Jesus there was
&quot; neither Greek nor Jew,
circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian,
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time by Jesus, no one will deny that through his life
and teaching this idea first became a vital force in
world-history. The brotherhood of all was intimately
associated with might indeed be said to be based upon
the new and infinite worth recognised in each. In
Christianity the individual steps out of the limitations
of a merely civic or national existence, not in the
negative sense of Epicureanism or Stoicism, but as one
who while in the world is raised above it, as one whose
fellowship is with God, and who is the heir of eternal
life. As the compassion of Christ went out towards
universal man, so the same thought is perpetuated in
the mystical dogmas in which the Church enshrined
his teaching. The doctrine of the Incarnation invests
with sacredness for evermore the human flesh in which
God himself had deigned to dwell. When Gregory the
First urged upon the conscience of Christendom the
manumission of slaves, it was, in his own noble words,
because
&quot;
redemptor noster, totius conditor naturae,
humanum carnem voluerit assumere.&quot; Similarly, oppres
sion and cruelty become sin, because they are an offence
against those for whom Christ died. And the mystical
unity of all men with Christ becomes their unity with
one another :
&quot; Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of
these little ones, ye did it unto me.&quot; On the one hand,
there is thus a raising of the whole scale of values.
Human life is invested with a new significance. In view
of his eternal destiny and infinite capacities, man is
removed from the category of natural things which are
born and live their season, and perish, so to speak, in
the using. A single human soul outweighs to the
Christian thinker the whole material system. And, on
the other hand, this intensification of the value of each
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family. The slave takes his place beside the free man
;
the new-born infant, the weakling, the deformed, the aged
and hopelessly diseased, are all alike invested with the
sacredness of a divine humanity. Practices, therefore,
such as infanticide, which the harsher pagan world had
sanctioned without remorse, became at once impossible to
the Christian conscience. And though the pagan hard
ness long perpetuated itself in institutions and laws, and
is far from being yet extinct, Mr Kidd is right in con
necting with Christian sentiment the gradual amelioration
in modern times of the general human lot, and in
particular the striking increase of genuine concern for





there is no thought of any antithesis
between present and future generations. It is simply
man as man who has become invested with claims to
consideration which the sentiment of the ancient world
restricted to the citizen. The way had been prepared
for such a revolution in feeling by the ideas of the
later Stoics and by the world-wide extension of Eoman
citizenship ; but Christianity alone impressed it upon the
world, and gave the feeling its warmth and its absolute
universality.





undoubtedly worked in our civilisation towards political
enfranchisement and social betterment. Democracy may
be something of a catchword, but in a large sense Mr
Kidd is fully justified in connecting the general move
ment of modern political thought with the ethical and
religious conceptions in which our civilisation is rooted.
And there is one part of his argument, in the chapters
on
&quot; The Position in Modern Thought
&quot; and
&quot; Western
Liberalism,&quot; which is full of suggestion and warning.
Quoting Sir Henry Maine, he points out that the modernMR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION. 73
doctrines of popular government are essentially of English
origin, and may be said to have been evolved in the
political struggles of the seventeenth century. These
doctrines may all be conveniently resolved into
&quot; the
claim of the native equality of all men.&quot; But
&quot;
by the
men with whom the assertion of natural right originated
in England, the doctrine of the native equality of men
was most certainly not accepted as a first principle. It
had no meaning apart by itself. We see that it was
accepted at the time, as it was accepted later in Locke s
writings, only as a corollary to a conception of the rela
tionship in which men were held to stand to a meaning
in their lives which transcended the meaning of the
interests included within the limits of political conscious
ness.&quot; Later, however, in the French thinkers who
heralded the Eevolution, in Bentham, in the social
philosophy of J. S. Mill, and in the current theories of
Social Democracy, the doctrine of equality has become
detached from the ethical considerations which originally
gave it force. It is presented as a first principle or self-
evident truth on which these writers base their theory of
the State. And as they do not start from ethical con
ceptions, their theory tends to contemplate the State ex
clusively in its economic or material aspect ; their chief
topic and problem is the conflict of rival interests and
their reconciliation on the basis of self-interest. This
may not be entirely true of a writer like Mill, but in the
theories of social democracy which start from Marx the
logical outcome of the matter is seen in the frank accept
ance of a purely
&quot;
materialistic interpretation of history.&quot;
But when humanity is emptied in this fashion of
ethical content, and the claim to equality is advanced as an
abstract doctrine on behalf of the self-seeking individual,
what cogency does it possess ? Does it not justly pro-74 MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION.
voke the furious scorn which Nietzsche heaped upon it ?
For a right is an ethical idea, and can be vindicated only
by an ethical view of human capacity and destiny. If
history is reduced to a mere struggle for power and gain,
then strength is the only law, and leati possidentes the
only creed. Mr Kidd has done good service, I think, in
calling attention to the process of degradation which the
principles of modern Liberalism have undergone in being
separated from their ethico-religious presuppositions, and
to their inherent inability, when thus separated, to cope
with a materialistic gospel of force, or with the many
dangers which threaten our modern society from the un
scrupulous pursuit of wealth, the immense accumulations
of capital, and the hardening effects of selfish luxury. I
have already commented on the injustice of Mr Kidd s
attempt to identify the materialistic interpretation of
history with
&quot; a return to the standpoint of the ancient
world.&quot; It would be more correct to describe it as a
reappearance among the Western peoples of the same
canker which blighted the ancient civilisation. But
apart from this misrepresentation, jVTr Kidd utters a
well-timed warning. His book is a reminder of ideals
which have moulded and directed our civilisation in the
past, and which he rightly maintains to be essential to
its continued existence.
In the same spirit he criticises the opposition of the
older Utilitarians&quot; and the Manchester School to the
humanitarian legislation of their day as a declension from
the social consciousness of Christendom. He praises
them for their
&quot;
profound instinct that the future of the
world belongs to the principle of free competition
&quot;
; but
despite his former criticisms of official Socialism, he recog
nises in socialistic theories an expression of
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profound instinct that the conditions of laissez-faire are
nothing more or less than conditions of barbarism.&quot;
They are conditions, moreover, which defeat their own
object ; for competition, if left to itself and allowed to
go on to the bitter end, leads to the monopoly of the
strongest, and so abrogates the conditions of free com
petition on which social health depends. He cites as
examples the gigantic Trusts which have sprung up in the
United States, and which threaten in the near future to
become matters of national, and even international, con
cern. It is impossible for any civilised State to permit
the conscienceless use of such tremendous resources for
the exploitation of the community in the selfish interest
of a capitalistic ring. This leads Mr Kidd naturally to
a definition of his own standpoint in practical politics.
He is prepared to see the attitude of laissez-faire aban
doned in many directions, and he sympathises to that
extent, as we have seen, with much that the survivors
of the old Radicalism condemn as socialistic. But the
interference must be prompted throughout by ethical con
siderations, and must never be such as to kill the prin
ciple of free competition, in which he recognises from
first to last the salvation of society. His programme,
in short, is not strikingly original, but possesses the
English virtues of moderation and good sense though
in his ideal of competitive stress and strain he seems to
reflect the nervous tension of American life rather than
the temperament of the parent stock. So insistent is




as the guarantee of political, intellectual, and
religious wellbeing, that at times he seems to preach
competition for competition s sake, just as, in his idea of
the relation of the present to the future, he seemed to76 MR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION.
fall into the idea of sacrifice for sacrifice s sake. Apply
ing the idea of a competitive struggle for survival to
intellectual beliefs and moral conceptions as well as to
more material spheres, he envisages the ideal social state
as that of
&quot; a fair, open, and free rivalry of all the forces
within the social consciousness a rivalry in which the
best organisations, the best methods, the best skill, the
best government, and the best standards of action and
belief shall have the right of universal opportunity.&quot; In
some of his statements the ideal appears to cut at the
very notion of truth as something which claims universal
allegiance. But it would be more just to Mr Kidd to
eay that it is his confidence in the omnipotence of truth
which inspires his optimistic forecast of the ultimate issue
of such a conflict. Does he, after all, say more than
Kant said, when he spoke of the age on which we had
entered as the age of criticism, in which every doctrine,
practice, or belief must establish its right to continued
existence ? Both simply draw the last consequences of
the principle of Protestantism and of modern scientific
thought. Mr Kidd s ideal of universal toleration as the
ultimate safeguard of truth itself compares advantageously
with the mediaeval authority with which Comte seemed
anxious to invest his scientific and spiritual hierarchy.
In his contention that the principle of toleration is itself,
like the doctrine of human equality, the product of
ethical and religious conviction rather than an abstract
truth of reason, Mr Kidd returns to the fundamental
idea of his book that the fabric of human society rests
ultimately on ethical conceptions, and that the history of
mankind is essentially the development of man s ethical
ideals. It is the forcible and often fresh presentation of
this perennial truth, rather than any new philosophicalMR KIDD ON WESTERN CIVILISATION. 77
construction of history, which gives the book its vitality.
For the main formula which Mr Kidd seeks to establish
as a philosophical law of human development seems both
ambiguous and misleading. But so many have apparently
made up their minds of late that man does live by bread
alone, that even the paradoxes of the book may have
their use in stirring the turbid waters of popular thought,MABTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY.
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IN
attempting any estimate of Martineau s work, it is
particularly desirable to bear in mind the long
period over which his intellectual activity extended.
The dates of his life almost coincided with those of the
nineteenth century. He was born the year after Kant
died, and two years before Hegel published his first
volume. When he left college, in 1827, Hegel was still
teaching in Berlin and Goethe was still alive at Weimar
;
in France, Cousin was at the height of his reputation as
a philosophical lecturer, and Comte had not yet pub
lished the first volume of the Philosophic Positive
;
while, at home, James Mill was leading the Philosophical
Eadicals to victory in The Westminster Keview, and his
son had just discovered the future designation of the
school in a novel of Gait s. The elder Mill s Analysis
of the Human Mind, and Sir William Hamilton s cele
brated article on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned,
landmarks in the history of two different schools, did not
1 This paper appeared in The Hibbert Journal of April 1903. I am
indebted throughout to Professor Upton s luminous account of Martineau s
Philosophy in the second volume of the Life. Professor Upton not only
furnishes all the material for a critical estimate of Martineau s place in
English thought, but himself touches with discriminating hand the weak
no less than the strong points of his master s system.MARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY. 79
appear till two years later. During the twenties, as
Professor Upton says, what philosophical interest existed
in the British Isles
&quot; was divided between the Hartleyan
empirical school and the Scotch school of so-called com
mon-sense
&quot;
; and young Martineau was brought up by
his college preceptors on Belsham s Elements of Mental
and Moral Philosophy, which popularised the associa-
tionist and necessarian tradition of Hartley and Priestley.
In the philosophical classes which the young minister
gathered round him in Liverpool in the thirties, the text
books were James Mill s Analysis and Dr Thomas
Brown s Essay on Cause and Effect. In his first
article in 1833, devoted to Priestley, he talks of &quot;the
piercing analysis of Brown or James Mill, before whose
gaze the most intricate and delicate of human emotions
and the most evanescent trains of human ratiocination
are arrested, questioned, and made to marshal themselves
in their true places amid the nimble evolutions of the
mind.&quot; Before he was appointed professor, however,
in 1840, he had already fought his way, under the
imperative pressure of conscience, to the clearly denned
ethical position which he ever afterwards occupied.
And as the change of view in ethics was necessarily
accompanied by a revision of the doctrine of causation,
Professor Upton goes the length of saying that
&quot;
his
philosophical teaching remained for the rest of his
long life substantially unaltered. The modifications
which it underwent were all the outcome of, and in
harmony with, the basal principles which he adopted
in 1839.&quot;
The date carries us back to a time when Hamilton
had only been three years in his Edinburgh Chair
and John Stuart Mill was still at work upon his
Logic. It is not without significance, therefore, that80 MARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY.
although Martineau s Study of Religion was published
in 1887, we are told in the first sentence that the
word Religion will be used throughout
&quot; in the sense
which it invariably bore half a century ago&quot; The fact
is not without significance, I mean, if we are to form
a true judgment of the value of Martineau s work. His
philosophical books all appeared towards the close of the
century, but the ideas they contained had been formu
lated forty or fifty years before, and had indeed been
operative in English thought for a generation, through
the author s college teaching and numerous important
articles and addresses. This would be true even if we
date his complete philosophical equipment from the
fifteen months he spent in Germany in 1848-49, the
effects of which he so eloquently describes in the Preface
to the Types of Ethical Theory, speaking of it as &quot;a
kind of second education,&quot; and
&quot; a new intellectual
birth.&quot; In 1848, it is important to remember, the
Origin of Species was still eleven years ahead, and, so
far as Great Britain was concerned, the serious study of
Kant and Hegel had yet to begin. In Germany it was,
on the whole, ebb-tide in philosophy. The great ideal
istic movement in the beginning of the century had tem
porarily spent its force, and was discredited in the land
of its birth by the extravagances of some of its adherents.
Martineau did not come under its influence, and thus his
thought was formed and matured independently of the
two great influences which have transformed English
thought within the last forty years.
His most productive period was during the fifties and
sixties. During these decades he contributed to the
Prospective and National Review what Professor
Upton justly describes as
&quot; a splendid series of articles,
as finished in expression as they are powerful in thought,MARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY. 81
dealing with the chief philosophical thinkers and move
ments of the time.&quot; He appears impartially as the critic
of Hamilton and Mill, of Comte and Newman, of the
agnosticism of Spencer and Mansel. In these articles,
and in the still more celebrated criticisms of modern
materialism called forth by Tyndall s Belfast address in
the seventies, we may probably recognise his most direct
influence on contemporary thought, before the cumulative
effect produced by the publication, in advanced age, of his
two systematic treatises and the garnered harvest of his
Essays, Eeviews, and Addresses. There are imperish
able principles that persist through every change of
philosophical dialect or fashion, but on other parts of a
philosopher s work the time -
spirit has his will. The
famous battle of the Intuitionalists and Sensationalists
round Hamilton s body in the sixties no longer tempts
us to break a lance on either side. Its very echoes have
grown strangely faint. Professor Upton comments aptly
on the sudden transformation of philosophical issues
which followed these heated encounters.
&quot; Just at the
time when the followers of Hamilton and those of Mill
and Bain were thus vehemently contending with each
other, and Dr Martineau was holding his own indepen
dently of both, two fresh and quite unexpected claimants
for philosophical supremacy appeared upon the scene. Of
these one sprang into birth on British soil, the other was
of German extraction. The motto of the former was
&quot; Evolution and Heredity
&quot;
; that of the latter the &quot;Abso
lute Eeality of Thought
&quot;
; but each of them vigorously
attacked the fundamental principles both of the Edin
burgh Intuitionalists and of the London Sensationalists ;
and it is one of the most dramatic events in the history
of philosophical thought that, in less than twenty years,
these newcomers had between them managed to dethrone
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and dispossess both of the pretenders to philosophic rule
with whom Dr Martineau had, in previous years, such
brilliant encounters. From this circumstance it comes
about that Dr Martineau s earlier polemics, powerful as
they were, have now not much more than a literary and
historical interest.&quot;
l
The services of Martineau to spiritual philosophy in
England during the nineteenth century cannot easily, I
think, be over - estimated. These services seem to me,
however, to be to a large extent independent of the
specific form which the fundamental doctrines of such
a philosophy assume in his own theory. His peculiar
theory of conscience has grave defects, and I question
whether any one maintains it at the present day. But
his splendid insistence on the moral life and its implica
tions, as furnishing the key to human existence and
man s relation to the divine the massive resistance
which he offered to every attempt to explain ethical
experience by other than ethical categories, whether
baldly physical or of the metaphysical kind that are but
physical in disguise, these are in the spirit of Butler
and of Kant, and greatly helped to raise English thought
from its inherited hedonism and necessarianism. Even
should his doctrine of Freedom itself be found to require
modification, it was ethically true as against the neces
sarianism from which it emancipated Martineau himself
and all who have listened to his searching and persuasive
pleading. So, again, his own doctrine of Cause may be
open to serious philosophical criticism, but his distinction
between ordered sequence and real agency, and his
demonstration of the impossibility of reducing the latter
to the former, enabled him to dissect the sophisms which
are apt to gather round the term
&quot;
law.&quot; His exposure
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of the fundamental absurdity of a mindless universe, his
timely reminder of the true scope and meaning of evolu
tion, and his impassioned vindication of moral right as
&quot; no local essence,&quot; but allegiance
&quot; due to one eternal
Perfection which penetrates the moral structure of all
worlds,&quot; made his addresses on Modern Materialism
more effective than any other utterances in stemming the
dangerous tide of turbid materialistic speculation to
which the Darwinian doctrine at first gave rise. The
clearness and beauty of Martineau s style, the rhetorical
force of his pleading, the ethical passion and spiritual
dignity of the man, combined to make him an ideal cham
pion of the spiritual view of the world in a time of
transition and intellectual insecurity. For myself, I
cannot but think that it is on such imperishable services
to the common cause of Idealism, rather than on the
peculiar features which differentiate his own treatment
from other systems, that Martineau s place in the history
of English thought will ultimately depend. So that
when Professor Upton speaks of
&quot; the systems of Hegel,
of Lotze, and of James Martineau
&quot;
as the three philo
sophical systems which are most likely by their contribu
tions to mould the philosophy of religion of the twentieth
century, I feel as if the word system were almost out of
place in connection with Martineau s influence, and as if
this juxtaposition of the three thinkers suggested claims
which it might be difficult to establish. For we find
Professor Upton himself acknowledging on important






of which, he con
siders, did not do justice to important aspects of truth
which, in less systematic moments, find expression in
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osopher, qua philosopher, takes a distinctive place in
the historic series. It was some perception of this
which led E. H. Hutton, another old pupil, to write
in his memorial article in The Spectator
:
&quot; We doubt
whether the historian of the English thought of our time
will credit Martineau with any distinct modification of
the theological or philosophical opinions of this age. It
was something that went below opinion ; it was a revela
tion of spiritual character and power.&quot; The turn of
expression hardly does justice to Martineau s clear-cut
thought and great intellectual force
; yet in the end this
estimate may perhaps be found nearer the mark than any
more far-reaching claim.
It is as the vindicator and, one may almost say, as
the prophet of Theism that Martineau is widely honoured.
Thus Professor J. E. Carpenter, in an eloquent tribute at
the unveiling of a memorial in Little Portland Street
Chapel, described his philosophical achievement as essen
tially a revolt against
&quot; the interpretation of the universe
by a mechanical Deism.&quot;
&quot; He discovered a new philo
sophy and a new religion which brought the human spirit
into immediate communion with the living God, placed
His authority within the soul, and transformed the
infinite spaces of the universe from lonely immensities
into the presence
- chamber of the everlasting Mind.&quot;
Martineau s own characterisation of Deism, in the Study
of Eeligion, as an imperfect Theism which scarcely passes
into a religion, may be accepted as justifying this esti
mate of his philosophical intention. And, indeed, as
regards the external universe, what Martineau did was
substantially to substitute Berkeley s conception for
Locke s, reducing its ordered sequences of events to the
organised expression of continuously active Divine Will,
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the immediate presence of the Divine to the human soul.
But although the intention of his philosophy doubtless is
to provide us with a doctrine of Theism which shall rise
above the externalities of Deism, and conserve all that
is true in the counter-error of Pantheism, it is only in his
deepest religious utterances that he completely emanci
pates himself from deistic presuppositions. His intellect
ual scheme of the world was much more under the
influence of his individualistic and deistic training than
he was himself aware of




its frequent rigidity and externality
and its exaggerated anthropomorphism are nearly all
traceable to this source.
As we have already seen, Professor Upton considers that
his main positions had been reached as early as 1839, and
that his teaching remained substantially unaltered after
that date. The terms in which Martineau himself speaks
of his &quot;Annus Mirabilis
&quot;
in Germany ten years later do
not seem to me inconsistent with this statement. There
is no evidence that he experienced
&quot; a new intellectual
birth
&quot;
in the sense of a revolution in his own philoso
phical convictions. He made a careful study of Kant,
and also read Plato and Hegel side by side. Ancient and
modern philosophy shed light upon each other, and of
Greek philosophy especially he got quite a new impression.
&quot; I seemed to pierce through what had been words before,
into contact with living thought, and the bleak gram
matical text was aglow with luminous philosophy. It
was essentially the gift of fresh conceptions,
. . . and,
once gained, was more or less available throughout the
history of philosophy, and lifted the darkness from the
pages of Kant and even Hegel. It was impossible to resist
or distrust this gradual widening of apprehension
: it
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visited before. . . . The metaphysic of the world had
come home to me.&quot; He returned, therefore, with a mind
indefinitely richer for this companionship with the masters
of them that know, and with his own philosophical powers
strengthened by the long wrestle with their meaning. He
could not have spoken as he afterwards did, with the
same largeness of utterance and the same confidence or
knowledge, had he not been lifted by contact with
&quot; the
metaphysic of the world
&quot;
above the parochialism of con
temporary English thought. But still the result was com
parable, after all, to the enlarging effect of foreign travel.
It must be remembered that he was already forty-three
years of age ; and his fifteen months of study, though
they enabled him to base his philosophy more broadly,
did not alter the lines on which it was already laid down.
Neither from Kant nor Hegel can he be shown to have
assimilated any formative ideas. Trendelenburg was not
the best guide to what was really vital in Kant s analysis
of knowledge ; and Martineau appears in his books to
adopt the psychological interpretation of the Kantian
theory which makes it substantially a variety of Intuition
alism. He is mainly concerned to refute the subjectivism
and relativism of the theory, and this is done largely in
the spirit of Natural Eealism. As for Hegel, he must be
said to have remained entirely outside the system, so far
as sympathy was concerned and the more intimate under
standing that is born of sympathy. In that respect he
was unfortunate in the date of his visit. The reaction
against Hegel had set in, and though Martineau studied
him conscientiously, he may easily have been led to
regard him as a spent force. It was a quarter of a
century later before Hegelianism began to be a power in
English thought, and by that time Martineau was close
upon his seventieth year.
&quot;
Strange to
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Upton tells us &quot;he never fully realised the powerful
attraction which Absolute Idealism has for many minds,
nor at all anticipated the lengthened influence it was
destined to exert on both sides of the Atlantic.&quot; This
want of sympathy is to some extent an indication of
defective speculative insight, and is only explicable by
the pronounced individualism of Martineau s own view,
which resulted from the exclusively ethical cast of his
mind and the relics of an imperfectly transformed deistic
theory. He was at least much nearer the deistic than
the pantheistic extreme, and had all his life long quite
an exaggerated apprehension of anything that could be
considered to savour of Pantheism. Even Professor
Upton s modest criticisms and amendments on his own
theory he considered
&quot; sometimes came dangerously near
to Pantheism.&quot; Now however valuable Martineau s
&quot; Ethical Individualism
&quot;
may be as a protest against cer




in Hegel (to use Dr Stirling s apt phrase) is so





a voluntary impoverishment of thought, which cannot be
made good from any other source.
In issuing his Study of Eeligion in 1887, Martineau
remarked with a touch of sadness, in the closing words of
his Preface, that he was well aware that the volumes
were in conflict with the prevailing opinions and ten
dencies of the time. The same note is heard occasionally
in his correspondence. The isolation which he felt was
not altogether imaginary, and it arose mainly from the
circumstance that the two greatest intellectual influences
of the century had left his scheme of thought practically
unaffected. Professor Carpenter comments on the signifi
cance of the fact that
&quot; his essential work as a thinker
was done before the production of the Origin of Species,
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and we have just seen his attitude to Hegel and modern
Idealism. The result was that when he abandoned the
associationism and necessarianism of his youth, the theory
he adopted was, in essentials, akin to the Intuitionalism
of the Scottish philosophers. In Ethics, it is explicitly
to
&quot; the writers of the Scottish school and their editors,
critics and disciples in Paris,&quot; that he refers as being,







clined to betray their science to the physiologist on the
one hand and the ontologist on the other.&quot; ( Types
of Ethical Theory, i. 19.) Ethics to him, as to them,
is the science which collects and vindicates
&quot; our ethical
intuitions,&quot; or
&quot; the particular averments of the moral
consciousness.&quot;
&quot; Our moral verdicts,&quot; he says,
&quot; are
the enunciation of what is given us ready-made and
has only to pass through us into speech.
. . . We have
nothing to seek by logical process, but only to give forth
what we find.&quot; ( Study, ii. 6.) Martineau s pages, like
Hamilton s, abound with appeals to
&quot; the veracity of
consciousness,&quot; though at a pinch both Martineau and
Hamilton are found interpreting the responses of the
oracle in a sense which might astonish the ordinary man.
In regard to the external world, the doctrine of Natural
Kealism is maintained, quite in Hamilton s manner, on
the faith of
&quot; the intuitive witness borne by consciousness
to the presence of a world beyond the contents of that
consciousness.&quot; ( Study, i. 133.) Martineau, while sym
pathising with Professor Laurie s supposed
&quot; return to
Dualism,&quot; finds fault with him because he does not
&quot;
accept the non-ego, as, like the ego, immediately known
in the act of perception.&quot; (i. 191.) &quot;Our reference




&quot; an intuitive apprehension of what
is,&quot; and to
doubt it is a
&quot; surrender of the reliance which we inevi-MARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY. 89
tably place on the veracity of our own faculties.&quot; (i. 77.)
In short,
&quot; the idealist s superior airs towards the natural
postulates and the direct working of the honest under
standing are seldom unattended by intellectual error and
moral wrong.&quot; (i. 80.)
But to present the task of philosophy in this way is
surely to demonstrate unwittingly its perfect uselessness
;
for if we have only to
&quot; trust in the bona fides of our
intuitive witnesses
&quot;
to find ourselves in possession of
truth, why should we trouble further ? The service of
metaphysics, Dr Chalmers once wrote,
1
is
&quot; not to supply
a new but only to certify and authenticate an old instru
ment of observation, given ready-made to all men by the
hand of nature, and which all men could have confidently
and successfully made use of without the necessity of
being told so by a right metaphysics, had not a wrong
metaphysics cast obscuration on the dictates and dis
turbed the confidence of nature.&quot;
&quot; The child sees an
apple on the table and affirms an apple to be there. A
Berkeleian philosopher labours to disprove the assertion.
A second metaphysician arises and repels the sophistry of
the first.&quot; And so the child keeps his apple. It is not
often that the position is stated with such naivete, but
Martineau comes near saying the same thing when, in the
Preface to his Study of Religion, he speaks of the meta
physical investigation as winning at last
&quot;
only the very
position which common-sense had assumed at first,&quot; and
when he describes metaphysics his own, be it observed,






&quot; but medicine for sickly minds, which the
healthy may well fling away as they would apples of
Sodom.
&quot;
&quot; I believe,&quot; he adds,
&quot; in the permanent neces
sity of the philosophic schools which torment the wits
of mankind.&quot; The critical process, however,
&quot;
gives no
1 North British Review, vi. 275-279.90 MARTINEAUS PHILOSOPHY.
new revelation, but reinstates us where we intuitively stood,
only with certainty secured that the ground is not hollow
beneath us.&quot; ( Life/ ii. 217.)
There is, of course, an important truth in the view
that, as Tucker put it, philosophy may be likened to
Achilles spear which healed the wounds it had itself
inflicted. One great function of good metaphysics is to
- oust bad metaphysics and disprove its pretensions. In
a sense, it is even true that a true philosophy will be
found to justify the principles of common-sense that is
to say, the beliefs upon which we all act in practical life.




for the purposes of
that life, and not as oracles of ultimate truth. The
philosophical problem the question, that is, how we
may most truly express the ultimate nature of reality
cannot even be stated, till we have left the hard and
fast distinctions of common-sense far behind us. If
the question is to be solved at all, it must be, not by
accepting these categories and distinctions as final, but
by allowing the free play of reflection upon them to
disclose their inadequacy and to show us the way to a
higher truth. In the particular case of Ethics a similar
criticism holds.
&quot; To interpret, to vindicate and sys
tematise the moral sentiments,&quot; says Martineau, &quot;con
stitutes the business of this department of thought&quot;
( Types,
i. 1). If to vindicate the moral sentiments meant
to vindicate our ethical experience as a foundation of




meant to investigate, like Sidgwick, what common-sense




meant to bring to self-consciousness the principles which
have unconsciously guided its formation and progress,
- and to relate the ethical life to other aspects of reality,
then, indeed, the definition would be as comprehensiveMARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY. 91
and as unexceptionable as could be desired. But the
Intuitional Method, it is obvious, understands by vindica
tion the acceptance of




; and, in that
case, the task of systematisation and interpretation seems i.
to become comparatively unimportant, if not superfluous.
It is certain, at least, that Intuitional moralists as a rule
devote little attention to this part of their work.
To this Intuitionalism, and to what I have called the
survivals of Deism in his thought, the main defects of
Martineau s ethical theory are traceable. His volumes
abound in passages of keen psychological analysis, of rare
moral insight and spiritual beauty ; but his specific
theory of Conscience, as in every case intuitively deciding
between two conflicting motives, never, I think, made
any converts, and is not really maintainable, either on
psychological or on philosophical grounds. What is true
and suggestive in it is that the moral choice is not so
much between an absolutely good and an absolutely bad,
as between a better and a worse
; though the choice of
the better is, in the particular circumstances, the absolutely
right for me, and the choice of the worse would be the ab
solutely bad. We may also, perhaps, arrange the
&quot;
springs







; the appetites, for example,
coming near the bottom of the scale, the love of power
or ambition a good deal higher, the primary affections
higher still, and compassion and reverence at the top of
the list. Martineau supplies such a list in considerable
detail
; and his theory is that, whenever any of the pro-
pensions, passions, affections or sentiments thus classified
comes into conflict with one higher in the scale, right
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1
although this will probably be true as a general rule, and
the scale of motives may therefore be useful as serving
to
&quot; indicate in a rough and general way the kind of
desires which it is usually best to encourage and indulge,
in comparison with other kinds which are ordinarily likely
to compete and collide with them,&quot; still it cannot be
maintained that any such
&quot; universal relation of higher
or lower subsists between any pair of impulses as is here
affirmed.&quot; Common - sense would rather hold
&quot;
that, in
all or most cases, a natural impulse has its proper sphere,
within which it should be normally operative, and that
the question whether a motive commonly judged higher
should yield to a lower, is one that cannot be answered
decisively in the general way in which Martineau answers
it.&quot;
&quot; Love of ease and pleasure,&quot; for example, comes
nearly lowest in Martineau s list, and
&quot; love of gain
&quot; and
&quot; love of culture
&quot; much higher ; but we often find men
prompted by the latter motives to shorten unduly their
hours of recreation. The answer must depend in every
case on the particular conditions and circumstances of the
conflict. And hence it is impossible to evade Sidgwick s
general conclusion that the comparison ultimately decisive
is
&quot; not a comparison between the motives primarily con
flicting, but between the effects of the different lines of
conduct to which they respectively prompt, considered in
relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end of
. reasonable action.&quot;
l But if we accept this conclusion, it
also disposes of the notion of a special faculty issuing
j immediate decisions on the moral question at issue. The
apprehension of the superior worth of a principle is,
according to Martineau,
&quot; no mediate discovery of which
we can give an account, but is immediately inherent in
1 The Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau/ pp. 359-361. This
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the very experience of the principles themselves, a
revelation inseparable from their appearance side by side.
By simply entering the stage together and catching the
inner eye, they disclose their respective worth and
credentials.&quot; Or, as he puts it elsewhere,
&quot; there is no
analysis or research required ; the claims are decided by
a glance at their face.&quot; To this the reply is, that if
by Conscience is understood what it usually means in
ordinary speech, the response of the trained moral nature
in view of any ethical alternative, then every one will
admit that conscience acts with much of the swiftness
and certainty of an instinct, and furnishes in most cases
an infallible touchstone of the nature described. But
apart from experience of the effects of action as regards
the individual, apart from moral training and the ethical
heritage of humanity I am totally unable to conceive
the existence of such a power of immediate or abstract
judgment as Martineau s theory seems to imply.
Martineau s extreme Intuitionalism here was, in one
sense, a natural consequence of the individualism which




is the term which Professor Upton uses more
than once as giving
&quot; the keynote of his moral philo
sophy.&quot; It springs from his intense realisation of the
personal character of the moral life, and is one great
source of his power as a moral teacher. But in the
region of theory it leaves him committed to untenable,,
abstractions. The idea of conscience as an infallible
faculty in each individual is closely connected with the
view of mankind as a collection of isolated or self-
sufficient individuals. Martineau does scant justice to the
social aspect of morality the extent, that is, to which
our actual conscience is the creature of authority, moulded
by inherited institutions and customs, the product, in a94 MARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY.
word, of the age-long
&quot; education of the human race.&quot;
This view may be presented so baldly as to reduce
morality to an affair of external sanctions, a sense of
punishability which would mean the elimination of the
moral element from conduct altogether and, in his
reaction from this false form of statement, Martineau is
carried to the extreme of treating the individual as
sufficient unto himself. But it is not really open to
doubt that we are men and moral beings at all, only as
we share in the corporate and inherited life of humanity.
We are quite literally members one of another, and the
subjective conscience is, in its main contents, the organ
of the objective ethos which has shaped itself in human
history and lies around us from our infancy. It would
be unfair to say that Martineau nowhere recognises this
unity of mankind. He could not have been the great
religious teacher he was, had he not recognised it.
There is a passage in the second volume of his Types
of Ethical Theory which expresses the true view so finely
that I will venture to quote it, even at the risk of seeming
to cut the ground from under the foregoing criticisms.
He is describing the transformation of conscience
&quot; into
social consensus and religion.&quot;
&quot; This process so implicates together the agent and his fellows
that we can scarce divide the casual factors into individual and
social, inner and outer : bodily, no doubt, he stands there by
himself, while his family are grouped separately round him
; but
spiritually, he is not himself without them
; and this reveals
itself by a kind of moral amputation, if death should snatch them
away, and put his selfdom to the test of loneliness. It is the
same with the larger groups which enclose him in their sympa
thetic embrace. His country is not external to him : he is woven
into it by sensitive fibres that answer to all its good or ill : its
life-blood courses through his veins, inseparably mingled withMARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY. 95
his own. The social union is most inadequately represented as
a compact or tacit bargain subsisting among separate units,
agreeing to combine for specific purposes and for limited times,
and then disbanding again to their several isolations. It is no
such forensic abstraction, devised as a cement for mechanically
conceived components ; but a concrete though spiritual form of
life, penetrating and partly constituting all persons belonging to
it, so that only as fractions of it do they become human integers
themselves.&quot; ( Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 373.)
But it is to be noted that this eloquent acknowledg
ment only appears as an afterword, in the act of passing
beyond ethics to a religious standpoint, and though
doubtless coexisting with it in the author s mind, is not
really harmonised with the exclusive individualism of the
formulated ethical theory. Moreover, it can be shown
that although he rises above it in the utterances of
personal religious feeling, his individualism invades his
theory of religion itself. His ethical individualism leads
him to an ethical Deism which treats God consistently
as
&quot; another person.&quot; There is no part of Martineau s
theory which is more characteristic, or on which he lays
more stress, than his doctrine of Obligation. It is probably
his chief contribution to the theistic argument ; for in
Obligation he sees, as it were, the meeting-place of the
human and the Divine.
&quot; In morals, it is God and self that
stand face to face.&quot; But the explanation he offers of the
feeling of Obligation is that
&quot; the Moral Law is imposed
&quot;by an authority foreign to our personality, and is open, not
to be canvassed, but only to be obeyed or disobeyed.&quot;
*
Professor Caldecott justly remarks on this as
&quot; an expres
sion so forbidding that, were it not for the fact that it is
italicised, one would have ignored it as a lapsus.&quot;
2 But
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this feature of the ethical consciousness which carries us
on to religion, and gives us an immediate certainty of the
Divine existence. It forms the pivot of his argument,
against Sidgwick and Green, that the law cannot be self-
imposed.
&quot; It takes two,&quot; he says,
&quot; to establish an obliga
tion. To whom, then, is the alleged obligation upon the
agent ? You will say, perhaps, it is to himself that the
obligation lies to choose the more fruitful lot. By the
hypothesis, however, he is the person that bears the obli
gation, and cannot also be the person whose presence im
poses it : it is impossible to be at once the upper and the
nether millstone. Personality is unitary, and in occupy
ing one side of a given relation is unable to be also in
the other.&quot;
1 He concludes, therefore, that
&quot;
if the sense
of authority means anything, it means the discernment
of something higher than we, having claims on our self,
therefore no mere part of it. ... If I rightly interpret
this sentiment, I cannot therefore stop within my own
limits, but am irresistibly carried on to the recognition
of another than I, ... another Person, greater and higher
and of deeper insight.&quot;
2
This position is in the sharpest contrast to the Kantian
doctrine of the autonomy of the will, which is surely one
of Kant s most valuable contributions to modern thought.
A man can be bound only by the enactment of his own
self-legislative will. So long as the law comes to me
from without, I can demand its warrant and evade its
claims
; but I cannot escape from my own law from
the law which is the expression of my necessary will.
Martineau himself follows this more excellent way in the
Introduction to his Study of Religion, where he is dis
cussing the relation of Ethics to Religion.
&quot; Without an




Ibid., ii. 97.MARTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY. 97
mandate brings its appeal,&quot; he says,
&quot; the consciousness
of Eight is impossible, and the human world is suscept
ible of government only as a menagerie.&quot; And it is
undeniable, he further admits, that
&quot; conscience may act
as human before it is discovered to be divine. . . . Ethics,
therefore, have practical existence and operation prior to
any explicit religious belief : the law of right is inwoven
with the very tissue of our nature, and throbs in the
movements of our experience, and cannot be escaped by
any one till he can fly from himself.&quot;
l But if that is so,
then the bindingness of moral rules cannot depend
essentially on the fact that they emanate from
&quot; another
Person,&quot; and consequently Martineau s theological version
of the ethical consciousness cannot be true as it stands.
He is, of course, absolutely right in insisting on the
objective nature of the moral law, and in rejecting the
notion that the law is in any way constituted, or made
authoritative, by the subjective act of recognition. Duty
may, therefore, not unfitly be spoken of as the law of God
revealed in the consciousness of the individual who
recognises it. But the difficulties of Martineau s theory
all arise from the sheer separation which he appears to
make between the self of the moral being and its divine
source, conceived in this connection as an objectively
legislating Will. This appears from the hypothetical
examples to which he has recourse to justify his position.
He supposes
&quot; the case of one lone man in an atheistic
universe,&quot;
2 and asks whether there could
&quot;
really exist
any authority of higher over lower within the enclosure
of his detached personality
&quot;
; and he not unreasonably
concludes that
&quot; an insulated nature,&quot;
3 &quot; an absolutely
solitary individual,&quot; cannot be conceived as the seat of
1
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authority at all. But such an individual is a non-ens,
the creature of a theory, and is certainly improperly
spoken of as a self or a person. If any being were shut
up, in Martineau s phrase,
&quot; within the enclosure of his
detached personality,&quot; he would be a self-contained uni
verse to himself, or rather he would be one bare point of
mere existence. If intelligences were simply mutually
exclusive points of subjectivity, then indeed they could
not be the seats and depositaries of an objective law
; they
could not be the subjects of law at all. Consciousness of
imperfection, the capacity for progress, and the pursuit
of perfection, are alike possible to man only through the
universal life of thought and goodness in which he shares,
and which, at once an indwelling presence and an un
attainable ideal, draws him






in Martineau s sense, as occupying
one side of a relation and unable to be also on the other.
The very capacity of knowledge and morality implies
that the person is not so confined, but is capable of re
garding himself and all other beings from what Martineau
well names
&quot; the station of the Father of Spirits.&quot;
]
It is only, therefore, after discarding the intuitionalism,
and the abstract individualism and deism of the theory,
that it can be accepted as a true account of the ethical
consciousness and its implications. These may be the
features most distinctive of Martineau, the technical
philosopher, but they were not the inspiration of the
religious thinker and seer who habitually spoke of God
as &quot;the Soul of all souls.&quot; Professor Upton has very
clearly pointed out the coexistence in Martineau s writ
ings of
&quot; two modes of conceiving God, one of which is
deistic or Hebraic, while the other is distinctly and in
tensely Christian.&quot;
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&quot; another and higher person
&quot;
; the second represents Him
as
&quot; the Soul of souls.&quot; The former conception rests upon
an inferential knowledge of God, derived either from the
experience of God s resistance to our will through the
forces of Nature, or from God s felt restraint upon us in
the voice of Conscience. In both cases, the Supreme
Being is regarded as completely separated from the
human soul, and His existence and character are appre
hended and demonstrated by a process of reasoning.
This rationalistic or deistic view Professor Upton ac
knowledges to be mainly in the foreground in the
formulated philosophy, but he strongly contends that
in the other view
&quot; in the apprehension of God as
the Infinite, including all finite existences, as the im
manent Absolute who progressively manifests his char
acter in the Ideals of Truth, Beauty, Eighteousness, and
Love, we have the inmost essence of Dr Martineau s
religious philosophy,&quot;
* and that without this
&quot; both his
philosophy and his sermons would lose much of their
characteristic depth and beauty.&quot;
2 I most readily be
lieve this, and only regret that this
&quot;
mystical,&quot; or,
as I should prefer to call it, speculative, insight found
such inadequate expression in his formal theory. Pro
fessor Upton suggests by way of explanation that,
although in 1841 Martineau explicitly treats the moral
and spiritual affections as
&quot;
constituting a participation
in the divine nature,&quot; he soon afterwards became alarmed
by the danger to which such a doctrine is exposed of
gliding easily into Pantheism. Certain it is that, dur
ing the greater part of his life, he seemed dominated
by an almost morbid dread of this particular form of
error, and, in his professorial and critical rdle, exhibited an
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truth it embodies. His Study of Spinoza, for example,
contains an admirable
&quot;
Life,&quot; and much acute and in
cisive criticism of technical doctrine, but the criticism is
entirely from the outside. The failure to appreciate the
inner motives of Spinoza s thought and the secret of his
power over some of our greatest thinkers and poets is
complete. One cannot help recalling a significant sen
tence of Hegel s in which he represents the philosophy
of Spinoza as the test of speculative initiation.
&quot; When
one begins to philosophise one must first be a Spinozist;
the soul must bathe in this sether of the one Substance
in which everything that had been held as true has dis
appeared.&quot; It does not appear as if Martineau, so far as
his intellect was concerned, had ever submitted to this
immersion.
I am afraid that a somewhat similar line of criticism
is forced upon us in regard to his Libertarian interpreta
tion of moral freedom. He is right, in my view, in say
ing that
&quot; the language of ethics when translated into
necessarian formulas parts with all conceptions distinctly
moral, and becomes simply description of phenomena
in natural history. It tells us what has been, what is,
what probably will be
; but not (unless in an altered
sense) what ought to be.&quot;
l So far as he insisted on the
inadequacy of such a version of moral action, Martineau
rendered a service to English thought. Kant has shown
once for all that moral action is inseparable from the
idea of freedom. Freedom is the category of morality.
But he has also indicated, in his obscurely expressed
distinction between the empirical and the intelligible
character, that the recognition of this has nothing to do
with the question of causality, as that is investigated by
science. The simple truth is that that question is not
1
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raised ty the ethical consciousness at all. For the moral
agent to entangle himself in questions of this sort would
be, ipso facto, to lapse from the moral point of view
; and
as a matter of fact he does not do so. Kant stated
the truth in a paradox, when he described the moral
act as essentially timeless. The moral agent is, as it
were, tirnelessly face to face with his law or ideal, and
the moral consciousness considers only the relation of
the will to the law. The fact that the law can present
itself to him is sufficient proof that he possesses the
capacity to realise its demands : it could not other
wise be a motive for him at all. As ethical being,
there reside in him all the capacities of his race. What
he ought to be, that he might be, and he judges his act
accordingly, both while it is in process of contemplation
and when he looks back, it may be remorsefully, upon
his choice. Should he really seek to excuse himself in
the sequel, by trying to show that it was impossible for
a man with his particular antecedents to act otherwise
than he did, he is regarding the action entirely from an
external and non-moral (which for him in the circum
stances is an immoral) point of view.
I do not find, therefore, that the unsophisticated con
science, when face to face with a moral alternative, looks
either behind, to assert necessity, or before, to assert
contingency. It does not seem to me to make any
report as to perfectly
&quot;
open alternatives,&quot; if by alterna
tives we mean events one of which is going to happen.
In order to do this, it would be necessary for the agent
to give up the personal problem in whose solution he is
engaged, and to begin to contemplate himself, ab extra,
as a finite object or sum of forces. This is the position
which the ordinary necessarian theoriser takes up, and
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with the empirical individual as a calculable factor in
the production of events. Science, looking at the moral
action merely as an event in time, limits itself to the
question of its relation to its antecedents. The moral
quality of the action is no longer under consideration.
And to the scientific question only one answer that of
Determinism is possible. The initial error of Liber-
tarianism is that it accepts battle on the necessarian
terms, and then seeks to evade the consequences by a
distinction between the character and
&quot; the self which





&quot; determine himself to either branch of an
alternative.&quot;
l But a characterless self is an abstraction
of which it is impossible to predicate agency ; to regard
it as issuing its fiat for the one branch or for the other is
to throw us back on the liberty of indifference. A self
over and above the concrete self of character is no more
a reality than a thing apart from all its qualities ; or,
to put it otherwise, it is the abstraction of form with
out matter, and can do no work in the real world. It is
impossible to load the scales in this way ; and by treating
the self as abstract will, Libertarianisni, no less than
Determinism, though in a different way, deprives the
act of its moral quality. May we not say that the
moral consciousness escapes the dilemma of ordinary
Libertarianism and Determinism just because it does not,




finite being with a definite equipment, whose equation
may be found in terms of character and environment,
and who may therefore be treated as a measurable and
definitely calculable force interacting with other forces ?
Such a conception belongs entirely to the plane of
mechanics, and has all the abstractness of that science.
1
Study,
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Just because he is not a punctual or self - contained
unity, but, in virtue of his reason, a sharer in a universal
life, the potentialities of an ethical being are infinite.
All things are possible to him not as a finite in
dividual at any given moment of time (the ethical con
sciousness guarantees no miracles), but eternally possible
l
to every son of man. The absolute claim of the moral
ideal, and its infinitely regenerative power in breaking the
yoke of the past, seem to me the real facts to which the
moral consciousness testifies. Both Libertarianism and De
terminism misrepresent them by insisting on applying to
them the categories of mechanism and temporal succession.
I have left myself no space to deal with Martineau s
doctrine of Cause and his theory of the material world.
But that is perhaps the less to be regretted, seeing that
Professor Upton acknowledges that this part of Mar
tineau s system does not
&quot; exert the same convincing
force&quot; as his more specifically religious utterances. I
will confine myself, therefore, to reminding the reader
that the theory is based on the assertion of our own
noumenal causality, as revealed in the consciousness of
effort, and the acknowledgment in the same act of a
counter cause, opposed to and controlling our activity.
This is Martineau s Natural Dualism, which, however, he
at once proceeds to interpret in a Berkeleian sense. The
Cause revealed to me in nature can only be a Will, for no
other real cause is known to me
; phenomenal causation,
so called, is relation of events but not agency. There
are no second causes except created spirits like myself ;
in nature we have simply the continual forthputting
of the divine causality, according to certain laws laid
down by God once for all. The theory is thus, in all
essentials, Berkeley s short and easy method with the
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that God is immediately present to us in the phenomena
of sense, as their efficient and regulating cause. Now
there is certainly a perennial attractiveness about
Berkeley s theory, from the way in which it seems
to bring God near to us, and to make the doctrine of
his immanence a reality. It seems very simple to unify
the forces of nature in this way, and regard them all as
the expression of a noumenal Will behind them. But
further reflection shows that to represent the divine
causality as the direct forthputting of a force, of which
we become aware in the experience of
&quot; resistance to our
will,&quot; is to conceive God on the level of mechanical
science merely as a cause of motion the very error for
which Socrates blamed Anaxagoras. We cannot, in
truth, without the grossest anthropomorphism, relate
physical phenomena directly to God by the category of
cause, as that is used in dynamics, or conceive God and
man as two forces pushing against one another. We
must not fly off at once, as Bacon warned us, to the
highest generalities. The complete inappropriateness of
such a conception in an ultimate metaphysical reference
is further seen by the difficulties which Martineau
encounters in connection with space. The divine agency,
it turns out, requires a datum.
&quot; I think of a cause,&quot; he
says,
&quot;
as needing something else in order to work i.e.,
some condition present with it
; as constituting one term
of a relation, and as being a cause only by reason of its





in the form of
&quot;
space, ready to have forces
thrown into any of its points
&quot;
;
l and in his college
lectures he treats space and time as
&quot; the infinite, un
created, eternal data which constitute the negative con
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conception of God as a Being projecting causal energy




himself once for all to
certain general laws of operation, the unfortunate indi
vidual results of which he is thenceforward powerless
to obviate, is, I fear, too deistic and anthropomorphic to
carry conviction or consolation to the present age. And
it is not surprising that Professor Upton finds the doc
trine of space in particular
&quot; a perplexing feature in
Dr Martineau s cosmical philosophy.&quot;
It seems strangely inconsistent with much of the fore
going criticism to find Martineau himself protesting,
&quot; If there is one modern tendency more than another
against which I have striven through life with the
united earnestness of natural instinct and deliberate
conviction, it is the extreme individualism which turns
our foremost politics, philosophy, religion into a humiliat
ing caricature.&quot;
l For it has been chiefly the relics of
individualism and deism in his theory that have been
commented on. But that merely shows how far the
intellectual framework of a man s beliefs may come short
of embodying the animating principle of his thought, and
how subtly pervasive is the influence of inherited concep
tions which we imagine ourselves to have outgrown and
even to be combating. In one of his essays,
2 Martineau
distinguishes between the Religion of Causation, the
Religion of Conscience, and the Religion of the Spirit as
three aspects or stages, of which the third alone presents
God and man in their true relations. Man, from this
final point of view, is no longer
&quot; a spiritual island
planted out in the natural deep of
things,&quot; but lives in a
communion where every moral ideal or spiritual affection
appears as a movement of
&quot; the all-quickening Spirit
&quot;
a revelation of
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the divine element that spreads its margin into us.&quot;
Unfortunately, in his formal philosophy, Martineau
remains almost entirely on the level of the first and
second stages, adopting the defective terminology of con
temporary Intuitionism and the Philosophy of Common-





in the ungrateful position, described in an apt phrase by
Martineau himself, of
&quot;
saying Amen to the faith but
picking holes in the dialectic.&quot; The deepest expression of
his thought is really to be found in his religious writings,
and in those passages of his philosophical books which
are written under the same inspiration. He was of the
lineage of the prophets and the saints rather than that of
the great speculative thinkers. Yet it is easy to under
value his specifically philosophical work, and I should
much regret if the criticisms into which I have been led
tended to encourage such a view. On a previous page
of this article, I have already recorded my sense of his
imperishable services to the common cause of Idealism.
As a thinker, his defects were to a large extent the
defects of his qualities. His insistence on the supreme
place of the ethical life was like a trumpet
- call to
rally men from a naturalistic absorption in the world of
things and events that happen. His jealous reservation
of the personal sphere in man, even from the influx of the
divine, though it may have obscured his own speculative
outlook, was a wholesome corrective of panlogistic and
purely pantheistic tendencies within the Hegelian school.
In a more general reference, his exposure of the futility
of
&quot; ideals
&quot; which are not faiths in
&quot; the everlasting
Keal,&quot; his noble confidence in Reason, and his unclouded
assurance of the immortal destiny of the spirit, made
him a beacon of hope to multitudes in a troubledMAKTINEAU S PHILOSOPHY. 107
century.
&quot; The true,&quot; he writes,
&quot;
is always the divine
;
depend upon it, the facts of the universe will not prove
profane.&quot; And in 1898, at the extreme verge of human
life, he writes to a correspondent
:
&quot; I only know that
duty and love look more divine, and the spiritual life
more surely immortal, than when I spoke of them with
less experience.&quot; With what better words can one lay
down one s pen ?HERBERT SPENCER: THE MAN AND HIS WORK.
1
IT
was eminently in accordance with the fitness of
things that the philosopher of evolution should end
by writing the evolution of himself, and in spite of its
ponderous length and other palpable faults, the result is
a very interesting human document. If Spinoza said
that he would treat of God and the mind exactly as if he
were concerned with lines, planes, and solids, Spencer
analyses himself in these pages much as he might dissect
a natural history specimen. If we add to the outspoken
candour of its self-analysis the unconscious revelations of
mind and character of which it is full, and the details
which it furnishes of his early upbringing and the history
of his ideas, it is manifest that the two volumes give us
a much more intimate knowledge than we have hitherto
possessed, both of the antecedents of the man and the
milieu in which his work was produced. Consequently
they must be an important aid to a better estimate of
that work, both in its strength and its limitations. The
history of an idea or a set of ideas is often the best
criticism that can be offered. Of the Autobiography
itself, as a literary product, it would be easy to speak too
harshly. Some allowance must be made for the circum-
1 The following estimate of Spencer and his work appeared in the
Quarterly Review of July 1904, shortly after the publication of the
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stances of its composition. Dictated as a rough outline
of facts as early as 1875, it was taken up again in 1886
after the last and most serious breakdown in Spencer s
health, when more serious mental work was impossible.
A little time was spent daily in putting the memoranda
into shape ; but even this was not done in chronological
order. Haunted, as he was apt to be, by the thought
that he might not survive to complete the record, he
decided to take up first the sections which he deemed of
most importance, passing thus freely backward and for
ward from one period of his life to another, and gradually
filling up the gaps of the narrative as destiny proved
kinder than his fears.
Such a desultory mode of composition explains many
redundancies and repetitions ; and the ebb-tide of mental
energy during which much of it took shape may also
explain the frequent slackness of style and the prolixity
of non-significant detail through which the reader has
often to plough his way. There is a lack of proportion
in the narrative, especially as it advances in the second
volume. Sometimes it is as if the writer were at the
mercy of his memoranda, and we have a chronicle of
itineraries and incidents which have no interest beyond
the fact that they happened at a certain date, and help
Spencer to block out the blank spaces of his memory.
At other points, an association of ideas betrays him into
general reflections, and he airs for a page or two some of
his favourite
&quot;
nonconformities,&quot; with which readers of
his works are already sufficiently familiar. It is at times,
an unkind reader might say in the author s style, as if
the centres of inhibition had temporarily abdicated their
function. Shall we say that such causes as these help to
explain the 1098 pages to which the volumes run, or
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massive and unconscious that it loses all the pettiness
of ordinary vanity ? Spencer makes an excuse for the
egotistic suggestion which the autobiographical form
necessarily involves, but it does not seem to have occurred
to him that the scale of his posthumous monument would
be taken as the true measure of his self-absorption.
But after all these grave deductions have been made,
the Autobiography somehow succeeds in holding the
reader s interest, and even engaging his sympathy. It
lies in the nature of the man who is its subject, that we
find in it neither the beautiful simplicity of character
which charms us in Darwin, nor the vivid personality
which gives light and animation to Huxley s Life.
Spencer s story owes its attraction chiefly to its frankness,
to the transparent honesty of the narrator, and the
absence of all affectation or pose. Paradoxical as the
statement may seem in view of Spencer s achievement,
the mind here portrayed, save for the command of
scientific facts and the wonderful faculty of generalisation,
is commonplace in the range of its ideas
; neither intel
lectually nor morally is the nature touched to the finest
issues. Almost uneducated, except for a fair acquaint
ance with mathematics and the scientific knowledge
which his own tastes led him to acquire, with the pre
judices and limitations of middle-class English Noncon
formity, but untouched by its religion, Spencer appears in
the early part of his life as a somewhat ordinary young
man. His ideals and habits did not differ perceptibly
from those of hundreds of intelligent and straight-living
Englishmen of his class. And to the end, in spite of his
cosmic outlook, there remains this strong admixture of
the British Philistine, giving a touch almost of banality
to some of his sayings and doings. But just because the
picture is so faithfully drawn, giving us the man in his
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(and his consciousness of these limitations, expressed
sometimes with a passing regret, but oftener with a
childish pride in them), with all his irritating pedantries
and the shallowness of his emotional nature we can
balance against these defects his high integrity and un
flinching moral courage, his boundless faith in know
ledge and his power of conceiving a great ideal and
carrying it through countless difficulties to ultimate
realisation, and a certain boyish simplicity of character
as well as other gentler human traits, such as his fond
ness for children, his dependence upon the society of
his kind, and his capacity to form and maintain some
life-long friendships. A kindly feeling for the narrator
grows as we proceed, and most unprejudiced readers will
close the book with a genuine respect and esteem for the
philosopher in his human aspect.
For the student of Spencer s personality and ideas, the
opening chapters of his natural history, in which he
depicts the stock of which he came and the social sur
roundings in which his early years were passed, are
probably the most valuable. This account of his ancestry
in particular, the picture of his father and of the
uncle who superintended his education gives us already,
&quot; in large letters,&quot; some of the most striking intellectual
and moral features which we associate with the philo
sopher. Spencer sums up the outstanding characteristics
of the race as
&quot;
independence, self-asserting judgment, the
tendency to nonconformity, and the unrestrained display
of their sentiments and opinions, more especially in
respect of political, social, and ethical matters.&quot;
&quot; A
general absence of reticence
&quot; and
&quot; a tendency to dis
agree
&quot;
are, perhaps, simpler and more illuminative phrases.
Wesleyanism was traditional in the family, but
&quot;
they dis
sented more or less from that form of dissent.&quot; In the
case of Spencer s father,
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authority
&quot;
led him to the Quakers meeting-house not,
according to his son, because he had adopted any of their
special tenets,
&quot; but the system was congruous to his
nature, in respect of its complete individualism and
absence of ecclesiastical government.&quot; Among negative
traits of the family, accompanying those mentioned above,
Spencer instances
&quot;a comparatively small interest in gossip. Their conversation
ever tended towards the impersonal.
. . . There was no consider
able leaning towards literature. Their discussions never referred
to poetry or fiction or the drama. Nor was the reading of history
carried to any extent by them. And though in early life they
were all musical, the aesthetic in general had no great attractions.
It was rather the scientific interpretations and moral aspects of
things which occupied their thoughts.&quot;
Ethical and political discussion were the very breath of
their nostrils, and they were all reformers of a radical
type.
The notes we get of Spencer s desultory and fragmentary
education are also instructive. He had a boy s taste for
natural history ; and through helping his father to prepare
experiments for his pupils, he gained some acquaintance
with physics and chemistry, and interest sufficient to
carry him through a popular manual of the latter subject.
In a skipping way, he read a good deal in the medical
and scientific periodicals lying about the house, besides
books of travel and history from the various libraries of
the town. During the years of his more systematic
education under his uncle, the chief feature of the boy
was his repugnance to language
- study and his leaky
memory in that direction. To mathematics he took more
kindly. The sum of his acquirements when he returned
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&quot; A fair amount of mathematics had been acquired, and the
accompanying discipline had strengthened the reasoning powers.
In the acquisition of languages but trifling success had been
achieved ; in French nothing beyond the early part of the grammar
and a few pages of a phrase-book ; in Greek a little grammar, I
suppose, and such knowledge as resulted from rendering into
English a few chapters of the New Testament; and in Latin
some small ability to translate the easy books given to beginners
always, however, with more or less blundering. Education at
Hinton was not wide in its range. No history was read
; there
was no culture in general literature
; nor had the concrete sciences
any place in our course. Poetry and fiction were left out entirely.&quot;
For the three and a half years following this, up till his
twenty-first birthday, he was learning his profession as
an engineer, and actively engaged on the London and
Birmingham and other railways then in course of con
struction. During these important years his mental
development continued in the same course. His mathe
matical studies were carried farther, and his letters to
his father at this time were filled with geometrical
problems and solutions. He did not, however, proceed
to the higher developments of the subject, for at a later




in an attempt to master the differential calculus.
The letters also discuss mechanical problems, and con
tain speculations on various questions in physics. Some
lectures on chemistry in the town where he was placed
prompted a resumption of that study ; and the collection
of the fossils disclosed by the railway cuttings through
the blue lias clay led to some study of geology and to the
purchase of Lyell s Principles, then recently published.
But beyond these scientific and practical interests there
is no record of those stirrings of the higher life of the
imagination, or those impulses towards the deeper problems
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of philosophy and religion which commonly visit thought
ful youth in these years. Spencer, indeed, makes at this
time the impression of a matter-of-fact young English
man of an inventive turn of mind and with a distinct
bent towards reflection on physical problems, but without
much emotional depth of nature or delicacy of feeling,
and with an almost singular absence in his composition





that is to say, the specifically religious and metaphysical
impulse. The religious beliefs in which he had been
brought up were slowly losing their hold upon him with
out any sense of mental crisis, obviously because they had
never been held with any emotional tenacity, had never,
indeed, satisfied in his case any personal need. The creed
of Christendom, he says in a passage which, by the
shallowness of its analysis, sufficiently exemplifies his
own defective endowment, was
&quot;
evidently alien to my nature, both emotional and intellectual.
To many, and apparently to most, religious worship yields a species
of pleasure. To me it never did so ; unless, indeed, I count as
such the emotion produced by sacred music. . . . But the ex
pressions of adoration of a personal being, the utterance of lauda
tions and the humble professions of obedience, never found in
me any echoes.&quot;
At the age of twenty-one he gave up his engineering
appointment, in order to devote himself to working out
the idea of an electro-magnetic engine which his father
had conceived. But within a month it became apparent
that the idea could not be practically applied. The next
seven years of his life were of an unsettled and desultory
character. More than once he was glad to accept tem
porary engineering engagements, but with the exception
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passed in
&quot;
speculating and experimenting, leading to no
practical results.&quot; The idea underlying his restless intel
lectual activity was the hope of making some discovery
or perfecting some mechanical device which might yield a
commercial return. But though some of the ideas looked
promising enough, and one contrivance was actually
patented, the labour was in vain so far as its immediate
purpose was concerned. The range of these speculations




&quot; on which Spencer dwells
with some complacence as a characteristic trait.
1 In
addition to these scientific interests, there also persisted
in the young man the family bias towards social and pol
itical reflection
; and his first appearance as an author in
1842 was in the department of political ethics. A visit
to Hinton in that year, and a renewal of political con
versations with his uncle, suggested a series of letters to
The Nonconformist newspaper embodying their common
views. His uncle gave him a letter of introduction to
Mr Edward Miall, under whose editorship the paper had
recently been established as an organ of the advanced
dissenters, and a series of twelve Letters on the Proper
Sphere of Government appeared in the same year.
1
&quot;The products of mental action are seen to range from a doctrine of
State-functions to a levelling-staff ; from the genesis of religious ideas to a
watch-escapement ; from the circulation in plants to an invalid bed ; from
the law of organic symmetry to planing machinery ; from principles of
ethics to a velocimeter ; from a metaphysical doctrine to a binding-pin ;
from a classification of the sciences to an improved fishing-rod joint ; from
the general Law of Evolution to a better mode of dressing artificial flies
&quot;
( Autobiography, ii. 435). At the point we have reached most of these
larger speculations were still in the future, but in addition to the appliances
mentioned, we hear of plans for an improvement of the printing-press, for
an improved method of typefounding, a rationalised system of letters for
printing, a scheme for a universal language on a monosyllabic basis, and
the outline of a duodecimal system of notation.116 HERBERT SPENCER:
These Letters/ republished as a pamphlet in 1843,
are not to be taken, perhaps, as expressing more than
what he calls
&quot; the mental attitude of the Spencers.&quot;
The principles expounded were those which he drew in
with the air he breathed; in the language of his own
philosophy, they might almost be styled connate. The
Letters elaborate the definition of the State which he
had volunteered to a friend the year before
&quot; a national
institution for preventing one man from infringing upon
the rights of another
&quot;
; and they apply the theory of
individualism with the rigour and vigour of two-and-
twenty. Even war is excluded from the sphere of
government interference, and is to be conducted as a
private enterprise on joint-stock principles. Spencer is
fain to confess, in the light of later reflection, that here
he has gone too far, though, as he characteristically adds,
he might have cited in support of his argument
&quot; the
case of the Iroquois league
&quot;
! But although modified in
particulars, the Letters give us in their first form
ideas which controlled the whole course of Spencer s
political philosophy ; and to the writing of them he
traces himself, in a natural development, the successive
stages of his subsequent authorship.
&quot; Had they never been written, Social Statics, which originated
in them, would not even have been thought of. Had there been
no Social Statics, those lines of inquiry which led to the Prin
ciples of Psychology would have remained unexplored. And
without that study of life in general, initiated by the writing of
these works, leading, presently, to the study of the relations
between its phenomena and those of the inorganic world, there
would have been no System of Synthetic Philosophy
&quot;
(i. 212).
The train of thought initiated in the Letters was
followed out at intervals during the years that followed,THE MAN AND HIS WORK. 117
and latterly became Spencer s chief intellectual interest.
Thus in 1843 he writes :
&quot; I have been reading Bentham s
works, and mean to attack his principles shortly&quot; a
purpose executed in 1850 in the opening pages of Social
Statics. As he explains the matter himself, he had be
come dissatisfied with tke Letters,
&quot; not so much with the conclusions set forth as with the founda
tions on which they stood. The analytical tendency had begun
to show itself. What was the common principle involved in
these conclusions 1 Whence was derived their ultimate justifica
tion ? Answers to these questions had become clear to me ; and
it was the desire to publish them which moved me to write
&quot;
(i. 305).
Accordingly, in the early months of 1846 we find him
beginning a course of reading with a view to his pro
jected book. Characteristically, however, he
&quot;
paid little
attention to what had been written either upon ethics or
politics. The books I did read were those which promised
to furnish illustrative material.&quot; By April 1847 he had
collected a large mass of matter for his Moral Philo
sophy, and it was
&quot;
beginning to ferment violently.&quot; By
September of the same year he was able to send
thirty pages of the Introduction to his father; and
during 1848, while his future hung in suspense, he was
thinking out other chapters as he rambled through the
fields round Derby, his thinking being done then, as
always, he tells us, mainly while walking. So uncertain
did the future seem in the beginning of 1848, that there
was talk of emigration to New Zealand. Another scheme
ventilated was that he should join his father in starting
a school, to be conducted on enlightened educational
principles. But before the end of the year his appoint
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the necessity of considering such alternatives. The record
of his life henceforth is one of steady progress towards a
goal which gradually took definite shape in the ten years
which followed his settling in London. The first step
towards it was taken by the publication of Social Statics.
Many of his evenings were devoted to it during his first
year in London. Great pains were taken with the style,
and it was the end of 1850 before the book saw the light.
Before considering its contents more carefully it will
be well, at the point now reached, to ask what the seven
years just reviewed may be regarded as having added to
Spencer s mental equipment and outlook, and what gen
eral characteristics of the man may be gleaned from his
narrative. It is clear that his multifarious activities had
given him a considerable knowledge of men and business
affairs, while his studies and experiments had increased
his acquaintance with physical science and natural history.
Besides novels, he also read some of the books which were
impressing his contemporaries, such as Sartor Eesartus,
Emerson s Essays, and Euskin s Modern Painters.
The last - mentioned he seems to have valued chiefly
because it gratified his spirit of dissent by daring to
express unfavourable opinions about some of Eaphael s
works. There are several references of an antagonistic
nature to Carlyle s doctrine of hero-worship in the Social
Statics, and Carlyle appears from time to time in the
Autobiography as the incorporation of retrogressive
ideals. In one passage
&quot; some months in a dark dungeon
on bread and water
&quot;
are suggested as a cure for his anti-
utilitarianism and his
&quot; ridiculous notion that happiness
is of no consequence.&quot; But though unaffected by alien
ideas, Spencer was not insensible to vigour and charm of
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Shelley s Prometheus Unbound he pronounces, in a
letter of 1845, to be &quot;the most beautiful thing I ever
read by far,&quot; and he rates Shelley about that time as
&quot;
by far the finest poet of his era.&quot; The mature philo
sopher is rather at a loss to explain this early enthusiasm,
and can only surmise that the poem satisfied one of his
organic needs, variety. He finds the same trait in con
nection with food.
&quot;
Monotony of diet is not simply
repugnant; it very soon produces indigestion.&quot; The
reader will probably conclude more justly that the
Spencer of the forties was more of a human being than
the dyspeptic analyst of the Autobiography. A letter
to his intimate friend, Lott, in 1844, describing a journey
through South Wales, reveals a vivacity of unsophisti
cated feeling which goes much farther to explain the
phenomenon than the laboured hypothesis referred to.
As regards his philosophical equipment, it is to be
remarked that there continues the same singular absence
of the metaphysical, and even of the psychological interest.
&quot; All through my life,&quot; he says,
&quot; Locke s Essay had
been before me on my father s shelves, but I had never
taken it down
; or, at any rate, I have no recollection of
having read a page of it.&quot; Mill s Logic he glanced at
when it came out, but did not carry the study far.
When he came across a translation of Kant s Critique
of Pure Eeason in a friend s house, he stumbled at the
outset over the doctrine that time and space are subjec
tive forms, and went no farther.
&quot; It has always been
out of the question,&quot; he explains,
&quot; for me to go on read
ing a book the fundamental principles of which I entirely
dissent from. Tacitly giving an author credit for con
sistency, I, without thinking much about the matter, take
it for granted that if the fundamental principles are
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reading being, I suspect, rather glad of an excuse for
doing
so.&quot; Acting on this highly dangerous principle,
he tells us that whenever, in later years, he took up the
Critique, he similarly stopped short after rejecting its
primary proposition. Spencer s interests during the
period under review continued, in fact, to be those of
physical science on the one hand and of socio-political
theory on the other. But although he had no traffic
with the philosophers, a certain amount of reflection on
what may be called natural theology was inevitable as
his belief in historical Christianity dropped from him.
The older natural theology summed itself up in the
doctrine that the world had its origin in the creative act
of a personal God. A letter to his father in 1848 shows
that Spencer had considered this theory and definitely
set it aside as incapable of proof, taking up for himself
a purely agnostic position.
&quot;As regards the ultimate nature of things or origin of them,
my position is simply that I know nothing about it, and never
can know anything about it, and must be content in my ignorance.
I deny nothing and I affirm nothing, and to any one who says
that the current theory is not true, I say just as I say to those
who assert its truth you have no evidence
(i. 346).
The turn given to the argument and the phraseology in
which it is expressed anticipate very closely, as he
claims, the doctrine set forth in First Principles twelve
years later. In truth, beyond the new name given to it
in baptism by Huxley, there is nothing recondite in this
easy method of shelving the question. It is the daily
practice of millions. Besides, the cosmological problem,
isolated thus and treated as a quasi-scientific question,
ceases to have a properly religious interest.
&quot; Men have
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Mr Mallock, in his philosophical novel,
&quot;
merely because
they considered it essentially bound up with the doctrine
that a God exists who has dealings with the human soul.&quot;
It was because, with Spencer, the religious emotions
were so little engaged that the agnostic position seemed
to him so simple, and apparently satisfied him so
completely.
The choice of a satisfactory title for his volume caused
considerable difficulty, and the one eventually fixed upon
led to misapprehensions of a kind to which Spencer was
all his life peculiarly sensitive. The title he originally
had in view, A System of Social and Political Morality,
comes much nearer a simple and intelligible description
of the contents than the scientific metaphor which he
afterwards pressed into his service : a friend, however,
whom he consulted thought it too bald and threadbare.
Demostatics, a word used in the Introduction (but sup
pressed before publication) was the next idea. Spencer
considered that it accurately described the subject-matter
of the book, namely, the maintenance of social equilibrium
through conformity to the law of equal freedom, and sug
gested at the same time the strictly scientific character of
the treatment. But the publisher was decisive against
this pedantic neologism, and the term Social Statics was
eventually determined on as expressing the same idea,
though his uncle warned him that it would be taken by
many people for social statistics. The sub-title in the
original form,
&quot;a system of equity synthetically developed,&quot;
is perhaps more accurately descriptive than that which
finally appeared,
&quot; the conditions essential to human
happiness specified, and the first of them developed,&quot;
though the second has the advantage of indicating a rela
tion between the new work and the general Utilitarian
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Social Statics, if it was not productive of the confusion
which his uncle feared, produced not unnaturally a wide
spread impression that the ideas promulgated in the
book were inspired by the social philosophy of Cointe,
who had actually employed the same term for one of the
divisions of his system. It is true that a perusal of the
book would have disclosed fundamental differences between
the two thinkers
; but it was difficult for the ordinarily
constituted man to conceive that any one should under
take a treatise on social philosophy without making
himself acquainted with Comte s work, a knowledge of
which, through Mill and others, had been spreading in
England for ten years previously ; still less that he
should use a technical title of that thinker s coinage with
out intending to indicate some relationship between their
views. But we have seen how, when he set about
systematic reading for his book, Spencer consistently
eschewed his predecessors in the same field
; and, in
credible as it may seem, we have no reason to doubt his
assertion that he
&quot; then knew nothing more of Auguste
Comte than that he was a French philosopher did not
even know that he had promulgated a system having
a distinctive title, still less that one of its divisions
was called Social Statics. The misunderstanding thus
originated continued to haunt and waylay Spencer
through the greater part of his life, much to his annoy
ance, and was the occasion of emphatic and repeated
disclaimers.
When we turn to the work itself, the source of its
inspiration is found to be much nearer home. The con
clusions, as we have seen, are, with very slight modifica
tions, those of the Letters on the Proper Sphere of
Government. With the practical doctrines he remained
entirely satisfied
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he was concerned. He desired, in accordance with the
synthetic bent of his mind, to exhibit the various con
clusions as so many applications of a single principle,
from which, when formulated, they might be deductively
derived. The principles of
&quot; the Spencer family,&quot; in
short, have to be philosophised, and the principles of the
Spencer family were an exceptionally clear and logical
expression of the principles of the English political
dissenters, and of contemporary Radicalism generally.
Spencer began his systematic reading for the book in the
year of the abolition of the corn laws. The philosophical
Eadicals had given place, in popular influence, to the
Manchester school
; but both were at one in their devo
tion to the principle of laissez-faire. By both the laws
of political economy were interpreted, not in the modern
scientific sense as statements of what would happen under
certain given conditions statements, therefore, neces
sarily abstract, and in no sense preceptive as to what
ought to happen in the concrete, but as ordinances
of nature divinely instituted, with which it would be
impiety as well as folly to interfere. Those who were
not in the habit of speaking theistically shared the
current optimism as to the beneficent operation of these
great impersonal forces. The old Liberalism also, fresh
from its campaign against privilege, still occupied the
field with its purely negative ideal of freedom from
restriction.
Such was the contemporary English world in which
Spencer s political thinking grew to maturity ; by tem
perament
&quot; radical all over,&quot; he absorbed the principles of
political individualism and economic optimism so com-
pletely, that they assumed for him the guise of intuitions
of the moral sense. When he proceeds to formulate
the
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unfolded into a scientific
&quot;
(or, as he elsewhere calls it, a
purely synthetic)
&quot;
morality,&quot; what we get is the famous
doctrine of Natural Eights, deriving in England from
John Locke, exported to France and receiving there
world-wide expression from Rousseau and the Declara
tions, which embody
&quot; the principles of 1789,&quot; re-imported
for English political use by Tom Paine and the earlier
Eadicals, and practically animating the Benthamite re
formers, in spite of the fact that Bentham wrote a
treatise on Anarchic Fallacies to expose the French
Declaration.
1 &quot; The law of equal freedom,&quot; or
&quot; the liberty
of each, limited alone by the like liberty of
all,&quot; is the first
law, says Spencer, and
&quot; we may almost say that the first
law is the sole law
&quot; on which scientific morality and the
organisation of society depend. Or, as he states it later
in italics,
&quot;
Every man has freedom to do all that he wills,
provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other
man.&quot; He cites it himself in one place as the doctrine
that
&quot;
all men are naturally equal,&quot; and expressly refers,
in illustrative vindication, to Locke s Treatise on Civil
Government/ the Declaration of American Independence,
&quot; the late European revolutions and the preambles to the
new constitutions that have sprung out of them,&quot;
&quot; the
political agitations that have run a successful course
within these few years,&quot; and even to
&quot; the maxim of the
Complete Suffrage movement.&quot; This principle being laid






(p. 207). It is necessary
because man, now compelled by the increase of popula
tion to live in the social state, retains the predatory
instincts of his primitive life, and therefore does not
uniformly respect the rights of others. But it is a transi
tional phase of human development not essential but
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incidental. Progress is in all cases towards less govern
ment
; and,
&quot; as amongst the Bushmen we find a state
antecedent to government, so may there be one in which
it shall have become extinct.&quot; Indeed such extinction is
inevitable, because the process of civilisation means the
adaptation of man to his new conditions. Man possesses
indefinite adaptability, and
&quot;
humanity must in the end
become completely adapted to its conditions.&quot;
&quot;
Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead
of civilisation being artificial, it is a part of nature ; all of a piece
with the development of the embryo or the unfolding of a flower.
The modifications mankind have undergone, and are still under
going, result from a law underlying the whole organic creation ;
and provided the human race continues, and the constitution of
things remains the same, these modifications must end in com
pleteness. As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands
alone, and slender if one of a group ; as surely as the same
creature assumes the different forms of cart-horse and race-horse,
according as its habits demand strength or speed, ... so surely
must the human faculties be moulded into complete fitness for
the social state ; so surely must the things we call evil and im
morality disappear ; so surely must man become perfect
&quot;
(p. 65).
In the meantime, till this consummation is arrived at,
the State has its function. It may be defined as
&quot; men
voluntarily associated for mutual protection&quot; (p. 275).
There is
&quot;
nothing to distinguish it in the abstract from
any other incorporated society.&quot; Citizenship is
&quot;
willingly
assumed,&quot; and one of the indefeasible natural rights
enumerated is







&quot; to relinquish its protection, and to
refuse paying towards its support&quot; (p. 250). Police
protection (and, he now adds with a grudge, protection
against external enemies) being the purpose for which the
State is instituted, its duty must be rigorously limited to126 HERBERT SPENCER:




way, whether it be by trying to regulate commerce or by
maintaining a religious establishment, by instituting poor-
laws or providing for national education, by imposing
sanitation or maintaining the currency and the postal
arrangements, it is transgressing its proper sphere and
displaying, indeed (p. 295),
&quot; an absurd and even impious
presumption
&quot;
by taking into its own hands
&quot; matters that
God seems to be mismanaging,&quot; and undertaking to set
them right. Those in whom the power of self-restraint
needs educating
&quot; must be left to the discipline of nature, and allowed to bear the
pains attendant on their own defect of character. The only cure
for imprudence is the suffering which imprudence entails. . . .
All interposing between humanity and the conditions of its exist
ence cushioning off consequences by poor-laws or the like
serves but to neutralise the remedy and prolong the evil. Let us
never forget that the law is adaptation to circumstances, be they
what they may&quot; (p. 353).
So again
:
&quot;Inconvenience, suffering, and death are the penalties attached
by nature to ignorance as well as to incompetence are also the
means of remedying these. And whoso thinks he can mend
matters by dissociating ignorance and its penalties, lays claim to
more than divine wisdom and more than divine benevolence
&quot;
(p. 378).
To guard ignorant men against the evils of their ignorance
by protecting them, for example, against quack prescrip
tions, is &quot;to divorce a cause and consequence which God
has joined together.&quot; What a contrast there is, he ex
claims, between the
&quot;
futile contrivances of men and the




Always towards perfection is the mighty movement towards
a complete development and a more unmixed good ; subordinat-THE MAN AND HIS WORK. 127
ing in its universality all petty irregularities and fallings-back,
as the curvature of the earth subordinates mountains and valleys.
Even in the evils the student learns to recognise only a struggling
beneficence. But above all he is struck with the inherent suffic-
ingness of things, and with the complex simplicity of those prin
ciples by which every defect is being remedied- principles that
show themselves alike in the self-adjustment of planetary pertur
bations and in the healing of a scratched finger, in the balancing
of social systems and in the increased sensitiveness of a blind
man s ear, in the adaptation of prices to produce and in the accli
matisation of a plant. Day by day he sees a further beauty,
. . .
contemplation thus perpetually discovering to him a higher har
mony and cherishing in him a deeper faith. And now, in the
midst of his admiration and his awe, the student shall suddenly
see some flippant red-tapist get upon his legs and tell the world
that he is going to put a patch upon nature. Here is a man who,
in the presence of all the wonders that encompass him, dares to
announce that he and certain of his colleagues have laid their
heads together and found out a way to improve upon the divine
arrangements.
. . . These meddlers, these self-appointed nurses
to the universe, have so little faith in the laws of things and so
much faith in themselves that, were it possible, they would chain
earth and sun together lest centripetal force should fail ! Nothing
but a parliament-made agency can be depended on. . . . Such,





is the word which most readers will be
inclined to apply to these and many similar passages of
Spencer s by reason both of their apparent heartlessness
and of their colossal optimism. It will be observed how,
along with the doctrines already referred to, Spencer
reproduces in his argument the deification of nature s
arrangements, which plays so great a part in eighteenth
century thought. He talks freely of
&quot; the Creator s pur
pose
&quot; and
&quot; the divine idea
&quot;
(which is, indeed, the title
of one of his chapters), and, as we have seen, of the
resistless march of progress carrying this idea to its
1 Social Statics, p. 293 (p. 323 in the reprint of 1868).128 HERBERT SPENCER:
realisation. This deeply-rooted optimism, a relic of the
&quot; natural religion
&quot;
of the preceding century, Spencer
carries over into his later philosophy of evolution, after
he has dropped the theistic setting ; and though he
broke it down at points, as he proceeded, by in
consequent admissions, he was unaware and probably
many of his readers are equally unaware - - how
much his original espousal of the theory was due to
the working of this optimistic teleology, and how insen
sibly it influenced his reading of the evolutional process.
Progress as a beneficent necessity, complete adaptation as
the goal these are the original inspiring thoughts, even
although they be crossed in the end by the paralysing
thought of
&quot;
Dissolution,&quot; which reduces the cosmos to an
aimless cycle of alternate building up and pulling down.
It is obviously impossible in the present context to
criticise Spencer s political individualism. It has been
pointed out times without number that the theory which
he carries to its apotheosis is as unhistorical as it is
unphilosophical. The pre-social unit with his natural
rights never existed
; the free individual is the goal of
social evolution, not its starting
-
point. We can only
note, therefore, that, however salutary Spencer s later
protests may have been in his Man versus the State,
as a counterpoise to crudely conceived socialistic schemes,
or as an invigorating discourse upon the virtues of self-
help, his social theory in its totality is no more than a
survival in the modern world. An organic theory of
society and the State, derived more or less remotely from
Hegel or from Comte, has definitely superseded the older
individualism, though, as time goes on, incorporating more
fully into itself the truths and ideals of the earlier view ;
for Hegel also, it may be remembered, defines the history
of the world as
&quot; none other than the progress of theTHE MAN AND HIS WORK. 129
consciousness of freedom.&quot; Save for a few anarchists and
the new individualists who range themselves under
Nietzsche s banner, individualists strangely unlike the
old, whose profoundest belief is in the inequality of man
and the right or duty of the stronger to subjugate and ex
ploit his neighbour, the conception of man as essentially
social, and of the State as the organ of the general will,
has so firmly established itself that Spencer s pamphlets
during the last twenty years sounded like a belated echo,
and he had the air, even to himself, of one crying in the
wilderness. The remarkable thing is that while Spencer
wrote a special essay on
&quot; the social organism
&quot;
as far
back as 1860, and greatly contributed to popularise the
phrase, his own political thinking remained, to the end,
dominated by the conceptions of an abstract and un-
historic individualism, an essentially pre-evolutional phase
of thought.
The importance assigned to Social Statics, and the
space devoted to tracing the education and life-circum
stances of which it was the outcome, are justified by
Spencer s own statement in 1879 when he interrupted
the regular course of his publications to write The
Data of Ethics. He has begun to fear, he says in the
Preface to that book, that health may not permit him to
reach The Principles of Ethics, the last part of the
task he had marked out for himself.
&quot; This last part of
the task it
is,&quot; he continues,
&quot; to which I regard all the
preceding parts as subsidiary. Written as far back as
1842, my first essay, consisting of letters on The
Proper Sphere of Government, vaguely indicated what
I conceived to be certain general principles of right and
wrong in political conduct
; and from that time onwards
my ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate pur
poses, has been that of finding for the principles of right
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and wrong in conduct at large a scientific basis.&quot; In
&quot;similar terms a letter of the same date declares that
&quot; the
whole system was at the outset, and has ever continued
to be, a basis for a right rule of life, individual and
social.&quot; Besides this estimate of the place which his
ethical and political doctrine held in its author s scheme
of thought, it has already been pointed out that the
principles and assumptions which he elaborated in 1850
were of decisive influence in shaping his statement of the
philosophy of evolution. A closer consideration of the
steps by which his cosmic doctrine was reached yields
proof of this assertion.
The chief interest of the decade between 1850 and
1860 lies in the gradual evolution in Spencer s mind
of the idea of a system of philosophy. In the series of
articles published during these years, supplemented by
his comments in the Autobiography, we can follow the
stages of his thought with some minuteness. To these
years belongs his intimacy with George Eliot and the
formation of lasting friendships with Lewes, Huxley, and
Tyndall. It was in a ramble with Lewes, in the autumn
of 1851, that he first met the expression, &quot;the physio
logical division of labour,&quot; which stamped firmly upon his
mind the analogy between biological and social evolution,
of which we already find traces in the Social Statics.
His friendship with Lewes also led him to read not only
his friend s novels, but also his Biographical History of
Philosophy/ from which he derived his first acquaintance
with the general course of philosophical thought.
&quot; Up
to that time,&quot; he says significantly,
&quot;
questions of philo
sophy had not attracted my attention.&quot; And although,
by his theory of benevolence and justice in Social Stat
ics, he has shown his aptitude for psychological reflec-THE MAN AND HIS WORK. 131
tion, psychology likewise (apart from some phrenological
speculations) had remained outside his interests.
&quot; I had
not, up to 1851, made the phenomena of mind a subject
of deliberate study.&quot; The next step in the organisation
of his ideas, and one to which Spencer consistently
attributed decisive importance, was his coming across the
formula in which Von Baer summed up the development
through which every plant and animal passes the
change from homogeneity to heterogeneity. It obviously
expresses in a more generalised form the aspect of organic
growth already described by the economic metaphor of
division of labour. Formulating the nature of the
transformation in a purely structural instead of a func




of the change, it naturally suggested the
transference of the conception to the inorganic world.
But before this idea definitely took shape in his mind,
Spencer s newly awakened psychological interest led him
to extend the idea of development to the mental sphere.
He had long before given in his adhesion to the La-
marckian doctrine of the transmutation of species, moved
rather by a species of anti-supernatural instinct than by
adequate evidence in support of it; and in 1852, in a
short essay on The Development Hypothesis, he had
publicly professed his faith in the theory, basing it upon
the cumulative effect of functionally produced modifica
tions. In the Principles of Psychology (which occu
pied him during 1854 and 1855) mind, animal and
human, is treated in close connection with its bodily
conditions ; and the biological idea of adaptation is trans
ferred to the mental sphere, progressive adaptation being
defined as increasing adjustments of inner subjective re
lations to outer objective relations ; while the correspond
ence between the two is described as advancing from the132 HERBERT SPENCER :
homogeneous to the heterogeneous, and as increasing in
speciality and complexity. It is significant that the
closing paragraph of the Psychology emphatically re
peats the belief of Social Statics in the
&quot; beneficent
necessity displayed in the progressive evolution of the
correspondence between the organism and its environ




&quot; the life must become higher and the
happiness greater.&quot; The admission of free-will, it is
argued, would interrupt this
&quot; advance to a higher har
mony.&quot;
&quot; There would be an arrest of that grand pro
gression which is now bearing humanity onwards to
perfection.&quot;
The same inspiration is revealed in the title of his
next important piece of work, an essay on Progress, its
Law and Cause, which he agreed to write for The West
minster Eeview in the autumn of 1854. This article,
which states the law of evolution for the first time as a
law of universal application, had its origin in the stir and
enlargement of his ideas which accompanied the writing
of the Psychology ; but, owing to the breakdown which
followed the publication of that work, it did not appear
till 1857. It may be regarded, he says, as &quot;the initial
instalment of the Synthetic Philosophy.
&quot;
Beginning
with the nebular hypothesis, Spencer sweeps the law with
a wealth of illustration through cosmic, geologic, organic,
and social phenomena, and concludes, exactly in Von
Baer s terminology, that,
&quot; from the remotest fact which
science can fathom, up to the novelties of yesterday, that
in which progress essentially consists is the transforma
tion of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous.&quot; He
next proceeds to ask whether the universality of the law
does not imply a universal cause, and this cause he finds
in what he calls the multiplication of effects. EveryTHE MAN AND HIS WORK. 133
cause produces more than one effect, and hence
&quot;
it is an
inevitable corollary that through all time there has been
an ever-increasing complication of things.&quot;
&quot; Should the
nebular hypothesis ever be established, then it will
become manifest that the universe at large, like every
organism, was once homogeneous; that, as a whole, and
in every detail, it has increasingly advanced towards
greater heterogeneity.&quot; And
&quot;
thus,&quot; he concludes on
the old note,
&quot;
progress is not an accident, not a thing
within human control, but a beneficent necessity
&quot;
( Essays, i. 52).
Scarcely had he finished this essay, however, before
he seemed to discover a more ultimate cause of evolution
in the instability of the homogeneous.
&quot;The social parts of any homogeneous aggregation are neces
sarily exposed to different forces, forces that differ either in
kind or amount
; and, as a corollary from the law of the
conservation of force, it follows that unlike changes will be
produced in the parts thus dissimilarly acted upon.&quot; ( Essays,
i 281.)
At the same time he took occasion to supplement his
account of the evolutionary process by calling attention
to certain features which had been overlooked in the
previous essay.
&quot;As usual, Herbert, thinking only of
one thing at a time,&quot; was a frequent reproach of his
father s in his boyhood ; and in his preoccupation with
the advance towards greater heterogeneity he had over
looked or temporarily forgotten the fact that it is not an
advance towards mere heterogeneity, but is characterised
by what he here calls
&quot; subordinate integrations.&quot; In
the living being, for example, the parts become con
solidated into definite organs with distinct functions,
which are at the same time closely united as members134 HERBERT SPENCER :
of one whole. And so we arrive at the definition of the
law which appears in the first edition of First Prin
ciples (1862):
&quot; Evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homo




The formula had not even yet, however, reached its final
stage of elaboration. In 1864, while working at the
Classification of the Sciences, he awoke to the fact that,
in making differentiation the primary trait, he had been,
as it were, putting the cart before the horse. Aggregates
of matter must first be formed before the growth of com
plexity in their structure can be profitably considered.
Hence the primary phase of the process is the integration
of matter, a process which necessarily implies a concomi
tant dissipation of motion. Accordingly, in 1867, First
Principles was largely recast for a second edition
; and
the evolution formula appeared in its final shape
:
&quot; Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipa
tion of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite,
incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and
during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel trans
formation.&quot;
For our present purpose, however, the subsequent
elaboration of the formula is of subordinate interest
; the
important step was taken by Spencer in the two essays
referred to above. This is shown by the fact that,
within three months of the publication of the second, he
had drafted the scheme of a system in which
&quot; the con
crete sciences at large should have their various classes
of facts presented in subordination to these universal
principles.&quot; Commenting in the Autobiography on theTHE MAN AND HIS WORK. 135
nature of the advance made, Spencer characterises it as
a transition of the theory in his own mind from the in
ductive to the deductive stage.
&quot; With this change from the empirical to the rational, the theorem
passed into the region of physical science. It became now a
question of causes and effects reduced to their simple forms a
question of molar and molecular forces and energies ; a question
of the never-ending redistribution of matter and motion con
sidered under its most general aspects.&quot;
At the same time he adds
&quot; The indefinite idea of progress passed into the definite idea of
evolution when there was recognised the essential nature of the
change as a physically determined transformation conforming to
ultimate laws of force.&quot; ( Autobiography,
ii. 12.)
Both these statements are true, though in both cases
their implications are different from what Spencer
imagined. By progressively generalising the statement




of the process, Spencer has at length
reduced it to a problem in mechanics. Now whatever
happens may unquestionably be described as a phase in
&quot; the never-ending redistribution of matter and motion
&quot;
;
hut it is quite another thing to suppose that, when we
look at the process or the product in that abstract way,
we have
&quot;
recognised the essential nature of the change.&quot;
On the contrary, that is the least we can say of it, the
most abstract description we can give of it, a description,
moreover, which leaves out, as we shall see, all that we
ordinarily understand by evolution. And that leads to
Spencer s second statement regarding the substitution
of the idea of evolution for that of progress. There seems
no reason to doubt, from the whole history of the idea
in Spencer s mind, and from his first mode of stating it,136 HERBERT SPENCER :
that the statement of evolution was originally intended
to apply to the universe as a whole.
&quot; The universe at
large,&quot; he had said,
&quot; like every organism, was once
homogeneous ; as a whole, and in every detail, it has
unceasingly advanced towards greater heterogeneity.&quot;
It was this conception of one vast cosmic process, irresist
ibly advancing towards a great consummation, which
inspired his imagination, a consummation which might
not inaptly be styled, in language used by himself in
Social Statics, the realisation of a divine idea. In par
ticular, this beneficent necessity was carrying mankind
onwards to the goal of a perfectly adjusted human life.
But it soon became evident that, if the cosmic process be
regarded simply as redistribution of matter and motion,
the series of changes which we have described as Evolu
tion is no more characteristic of it than the opposite
series of changes which may be called Dissolution.
Accordingly, in First Principles, this counter process
is for the first time introduced, towards the close, in a
chapter on equilibration, in which it was pointed out that,
in every case, the process of evolution has its impassable
limit. Spencer is now driven, accordingly, to relegate his
goal,
&quot; the establishment of the greatest perfection and
the most complete happiness,&quot; to the penultimate stage
(that of what he calls
&quot; the moving equilibrium&quot;), the last
stage of all being that complete equilibration which, in




as the final goal, he
finds refuge in the idea of
&quot; alternate eras of evolution
and dissolution
&quot;
&quot; an alternation of evolution and dis
solution in the totality of
things.&quot; But it is perfectly
illegitimate to deal with
&quot; the totality of things
&quot;
as a finite
evolving object; and if it were possible, then no such
resurrection as Spencer anticipates from the clash ofTHE MAN AND HIS WORK. 137
systems would be possible, for there would be only one
dead mass left. But, in point of fact, the two processes
are always going on simultaneously ; and, if we are to be
quite strict, neither notion has any application to the
ceaseless shiftings of the cosmic dust. One organism,
society, or system is growing towards its perfection while
another has entered upon the downward path. More
over, when we speak of such individuals, and of their
perfection and evolution, we are introducing conceptions
which are quite irrelevant and quite unintelligible at the
purely mechanical standpoint. Nor can the process of
evolution, so regarded, be deduced from any laws of
matter or energy known to physicists. The hopeless
ambiguity of Spencer s law of the persistence of force, and
of his use of physical conceptions generally, has often
been criticised, but never so conclusively one might
almost say so remorselessly exposed as in Professor ,
Ward s Agnosticism and Naturalism.
The projected interpretation of
&quot; the detailed phenomena
of life and mind and society in terms of matter, motion,
and force,&quot; and the consequent
&quot;
development of science
into an organised aggregate of direct and indirect deduc
tions from the persistence of force,&quot; was thus, tib initio,
foredoomed to failure. In the case of life, there is the
belated but none the less significant and courageous
confession of Spencer himself, in the chapter on
&quot; The
Dynamic Element in Life,&quot; added to the revised edition
of the Principles of Biology in 1898.
&quot; We are obliged
to confess,&quot; he says,
&quot; that life in its essence cannot be
*-*
conceived in physico
- chemical terms. The processes
which go on in living things are incomprehensible as re
sults of any physical actions known to us
&quot;
(pp. 117, 120).
Of his own previous definition of life he does not
hesitate to say that, while it gives due attention to the138 HERBERT SPENCER:
connections among the manifestations,
&quot; no attention has
been paid to tliat which is manifested. Its value is
comparable to that of a cheque on which no amount is
written.&quot; We are forced, therefore, to conclude that
&quot; that which gives the substance to our idea of life is a
certain unspecified principle of activity. The dynamic
element in life is its essential element.&quot; A similar diffi
culty met him in the case of mind or consciousness, the
specific nature of which was clearly irreducible to
material terms. In this case, Spencer sought to evade
the difficulty by falling back upon the modern principle
of psycho-physical parallelism, but at the cost of import
ing into his system a dualism quite inconsistent with the
promises held out in First Principles of a deduction
from the persistence of force. To note these inevitable
failures implies no desire to vindicate a supposed mirac
ulous creation of certain life-germs, as an appendix to
the material world, at some given moment in the past.
Creation in such a sense does not enter into science, and
it forms no part of modern philosophy. What is meant
is simply that, if we attempt to
&quot;
interpret the phenomena
of life and mind and society in terms of matter, motion,
and force,&quot; instead of reaching, as Spencer contended,
&quot; the essential nature
&quot;
of the phenomena, we leave
that nature out altogether. And this he ultimately
confessed.
It may seem a strange thing to say that the ideas of
the apostle of evolution were, philosophically speaking,
of a pre-evolutional type. But, after all, it is not more of
a paradox than what so many commentators have demon
strated of Kant, that the author of the critical philosophy
was still, on many points, in bondage to the dogmas of
pre-critical thought. Spencer s idea of explaining all
phenomena in terms of molar and molecular forces is akinTHE MAN AND HIS WORK. 139
to his treatment of religion ; or rather, the latter is a special
case of the general point of view. Eeligion is a phenomenon
in which a historical development is demonstrable to
wards worthier conceptions and nobler feelings ; but,
although recognising this development, Spencer ends by
finding the essence of religion in the acknowledgment of
an unknowable power a residuary belief which he finds
common to all forms of the religious consciousness. To
some extent, it may be said, Spencer emancipates himself
from his own logic and seeks a law of development ; but




in rudimentary abstractions like matter and
motion, or in some feature which remains the same
through all the stages of a process, is really to thrust us
always back upon a bare beginning or an identical
element, and so, in effect, to deny the reality of evolution
altogether. Spencer congratulated himself, as we have
seen, upon the substitution of the definite idea of
evolution for the indefinite idea of progress; but few
self-congratulations have ever been more premature, and
already, in the second edition of First Principles
(p. 286), there is a paragraph intimating that the term
is
&quot;
open to grave objections,&quot; and is only used, faute de
mieux, because it is
&quot; now so widely recognised as signify
ing sundry of the most conspicuous varieties
&quot;
of the
process, that it would be impossible to substitute another
word. What he professed to seek was
&quot; a word which
has no teleological implications&quot; ( Autob./ i. 100). Per
haps he meant by that phrase adaptation by an external
designer; in any case he failed to see that his own
cosmic conception, at least up to its penultimate stage,
was through and through teleological ; and that, without
a teleology of some sort, there can be no talk of develop
ment, but only of indifferent and meaningless change.140 HERBERT SPENCER:
It was undoubtedly, as we have seen, the teleological
implications of the process, especially in an ethical and
social regard, which from the beginning cast their
glamour over Spencer himself. As late as 1882, in a
postscript to his speech in New York, he speaks of
Nature as leading men unknowingly or in spite of them
selves to fulfil her ends
&quot; Nature being one of our ex
pressions for the ultimate cause of things, and the end,
remote when not proximate, being the highest form of
human life.&quot; And only in the edition of 1900 was a
sentence withdrawn from the First Principles which
stated that, after deducing from the persistence of force
all the various characteristics of evolution,
&quot; we finally
draw from it a warrant for the belief that evolution can
end only in the establishment of the greatest perfection
and the most complete happiness&quot; (ed. 4, p. 51*7). He
had explained in a controversial essay that the fittest
who survive are not necessarily, or indeed most fre
quently, the best; yet as late as 1893, in the preface to
the second volume of his Principles of Ethics, while
expressing his disappointment that in this part of the
subject he has derived no direct aid from the general
doctrine of evolution, he says that indirectly it sanctions
certain modes of conduct by showing that they
&quot;
fall
within the lines of an evolving humanity, are conducive
to a higher life, and are for this reason obligatory.&quot; So
impossible is it to exorcise the teleological implications
of the word, so meaningless would the word be without
them.
And if Spencer himself was to the last unconsciously
swayed by these implications, it was certainly, in part, to
the comforting suggestions of the word that the theory
owed its prestige in uncritical circles. Another factor
which helps to explain the extraordinary vogue ofTHE MAN AND HI8 WORK. 141
Spencer s philosophy was its coincidence in point of
time with Darwin s discovery. But for the inductions
by which biological evolution was established as a fact,
it seems doubtful whether a speculative theory like that
of Spencer s would have commanded, in scientific and
general circles, the attention and acceptance which, as a
matter of fact, it gained. Spencer became the philosopher
of the new movement
; and if many of the ardent fighters
of its battles were probably in Darwin s case, who
honestly confessed that he
&quot; did not even understand
H. Spencer s general doctrine,&quot;
l
they were equally ready
to
&quot;
suspect that hereafter he will be looked at as by far
the greatest philosopher in England, perhaps equal to
any that have lived.&quot;
2 And as the protagonists were
men of distinguished ability, men to whose ideas the
future belonged, Spencerianism became the creed to which
every one naturally gravitated who desired to take part
against obscurantism. Similar motives operated to






is bitter and constant.
Partly, also, continental thinkers who stood above such
animosities (a historian like Hoffding,
3 for example) were
impressed by the fact that here at last was an English
thinker who had given to the world a Weltanschauung a
complete system of philosophy ; a philosophy also which
realised their expectations by carrying out consistently
the realistic traditions of English thought.
But these more or less adventitious aids are not suffi
cient to explain Spencer s reputation. It is more deeply
based. Although his philosophical interpretation of the
process was radically at fault, and although he has, of
course, no property in the idea of evolution as such, still
1 Life and Letters, iii. 193. 2
Ibid., 120.
3 Die Englische Philosophic, p. 241.142 HERBERT SPENCER :
his early and independent espousal of the idea, and his
consistent advocacy of its universal extension at a time
when such views were very far from being in the air,
made him an intellectual force of great importance.
So completely has the idea passed into the fibre of our
thinking, that it is difficult for the men of the present
generation to estimate the full extent of our debt to
Spencer s work. And especially is this the case as the
philosophical defects of his own imposing structure be
come more and more evident. The absence of the meta-
physico- religious element in his constitution and his
ignorance of preceding philosophy, both of which the
*
Autobiography so strikingly confirms, explain what a
critic so fair and temperate as Henry Sidgwick was fain
to call &quot;the mazy inconsistency of his metaphysical results.&quot;
Dominated by an exclusively physical imagination, he
accepted as dogmas the practical assumptions of common-
sense. Hence, when attacked by thinkers like Green
and Professor Ward, although sensitive in points of
detail, he completely failed to appreciate the fundamental
defects or inconsistencies against which their criticisms
were directed. But it was impossible for a mind so
active as Spencer s, so fertile in hypotheses, and so full of
apt illustration, to marshal the sciences of life and man
under the guidance of a great idea without enriching
them by a wealth of luminous suggestion. In the very
context of the stricture quoted above Sidgwick speaks of
&quot; the originality of his treatment and leading generalisa
tions, the sustained vigour of his scientific imagination,
the patient, precise ingenuity with which he develops
definite hypotheses where other thinkers offer loose
suggestions.&quot;
What is here said of the Psychology is no less true
of the Biology and of his important contributions toTHE MAN AND HIS WORK. 143
sociological theory. But besides such departmental work,
it was much to hold aloft in an age of specialism the
banner of completely unified knowledge ; and this is,
perhaps, after all, Spencer s chief claim to gratitude and
remembrance. He brought home the idea of philosophic
synthesis to a greater number of the Anglo-Saxon race
than had ever conceived the idea before. His own
synthesis, in the particular form he gave it, will neces
sarily crumble away. He speaks of it himself, indeed, at
the close of First Principles (ed. 1), modestly enough
as a more or less rude attempt to accomplish a task
which can be achieved only in the remote future, and by
the combined efforts of many, which cannot be completely
achieved even then. But the idea of knowledge as a
coherent whole, worked out on purely natural (though
not, therefore, naturalistic) principles a whole in which
all the facts of human experience should be included
was a great idea with which to familiarise the minds of
his contemporaries. It is the living germ of philosophy
itself.KEVIEWSJONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE,
1
PROFESSOR
JONES has gone very thoroughly to work
upon Lotze, for this book which runs to 375
pages deals only with
&quot; the doctrine of thought,&quot; as
set forth, for the most part, in his Logic, and a second
volume is promised which shall deal with Lotze s meta
physical doctrines. Even those who are most grateful to
Lotze for his services to philosophy may be disposed to
think that this is to rate his importance too highly ; for,
with all his acumen, Lotze is not a philosopher of the
first rank. The unsystematic character of his mind for
bids us to place him among the dii majores to whom
commentaries are rightly dedicated. It is not, however,
the sympathetic deference of a disciple which has induced
Professor Jones to devote so much attention to Lotze s
methods and conclusions. Lotze is used throughout as
an object-lesson. The conclusion which the book seeks
to establish is that
&quot; the main contribution of Lotze to
philosophic thought, the only ultimate contribution, con
sists in deepening that Idealism which he sought to over
throw. He yields a tergo, and as an unwilling witness,
an idealistic conception of the world
&quot;
(Preface). The
1 A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze (The Doctrine of
Thought). By Henry Jones, M.A. , Professor of Moral Philosophy in the
University of Glasgow. The following critical notice appeared in Mind,
October 1895.148 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
purpose of the book is thus not only to disarm Lotze s
criticism of Hegelian idealism by convicting him of
inconsistencies, but also to re -inculcate Hegel s funda
mental tenet. It may be doubted whether this is the
best way of approaching either Lotze or Idealism; for
it necessarily thrusts into the background the elements
of truth underlying Lotze s criticism which gave it its
vitality, and which Professor Jones seems now and
again to acknowledge. On the other hand, the indirect
method of approaching the idealistic position involves so
much controversial detail that we do not get beyond a
very general statement of the position itself. But as a
living contribution to the philosophical problem as that
is shaping itself at present in English-speaking countries,
the volume possesses a distinct importance of its own, and
it is doubtless in this light, rather than as a historical
monograph upon Lotze, that the author would like his
book to be regarded. Needless to say that Professor
Jones brings critical insight to the destructive part of his
work, and force and fervour to the constructive part which
supplies the nerve of the whole. The whole book is
vigorous and remarkably fresh, and the emphasis laid in





his own theory gives Professor Jones s presentation of
Absolute Idealism a degree of originality which differen
tiates it from the ordinary versions of English Hegelian-
ism that descend from Green.
The first chapter, which deals with
&quot; The Main Prob
lem of Lotze s Philosophy,&quot; takes a general view of Lotze s
historical position in relation to the main currents of
thought during the century, and gives some account of
his chief philosophical contentions, the motives which
underlay them, and the schools or tendencies against
which they were directed. It is so well done that theJONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. 149
ordinary reader will regret that more of the like is not
vouchsafed him ; the remaining chapters plunge at once
into
&quot; the doctrine of thought,&quot; and are sufficiently
stiff reading. As Professor Jones points out in this
chapter, it is as a critic of the two dominant tendencies
of the century that Lotze possesses historical importance.
He criticises, on the one hand, the Naturalism or Material
ism which was so confidently propounded in the middle
of the century as the philosophical outcome of science,




what he considered to be the exclusive intellectualism of
dialectical idealism and its inadequate provision for the
spiritual needs of the individual. To say, however, that
Lotze
&quot; sets himself against the two great constructive
movements of modern thought on behalf of the contents of
the ordinary consciousness,&quot;
*
is rather an unfair way
of stating the case
; and, indeed, Professor Jones admits
that this
&quot; may seem to be a hard saying,&quot; and even that
&quot; taken absolutely it is not true.&quot; He supplies himself
a more generous estimate when he says, a little farther
on, that &quot;Lotze has avoided the one-sided development
of abstract views, placed himself at the point of collision




is no small honour to Lotze that, in an age which
was given over to abstract constructions of man and the
world, he stood almost alone protesting against the rash
haste which secured unity by sacrificing its content.&quot; In
the light of these admissions, the original statement
would be more correct if, for the words which Professor
Jones italicises, we substitute others and read the sent
ence thus : Lotze set himself against the two great
constructive movements of modern thought on behalf of
elements of experience which they alike neglect. It is his
1 The italics are in the original.150 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
massive protest against the sacrifice of
&quot; man s inalienable
and highest aspirations
&quot;
(as he terms them in the
Microcosmus ), combined with his skilful exposure of the
weak places of systems that would override our deep
est needs, to which he owes his honourable place in the
history of nineteenth-century thought. By his undaunted
reassertion of the fundamental truth of the view of the
world implied in moral or spiritual experience, he re-
inspired confidence in many who felt -the consequences of
Materialism and a deified Logic to be almost equally
disastrous, but who had been intimidated by the assur
ance with which the system-makers promulgated their
conclusions. And if, as the century draws to a close,
there is a very general and growing recognition of the
limitations of the scientific point of view, and if Absolute
Idealism, on the other hand, in the person of Professor
Jones and others, endeavours to dissociate itself from the
abstractions of
&quot;
Panlogismus,&quot; and acknowledges more
freely the defects of many statements that have passed
current, this result is due in no small degree to Lotze s
patient work between 1840 and 1880, a period of forty
years during which he must often have seemed to himself
and to others like the voice of one crying in the wilder
ness.
In point of fact, he has exercised a more pervasive
influence than usually falls to the lot of any one who is
not a thinker of first-rate originality and genius. No
doubt Lotze has been enlisted as an ally, or rather
adopted as a champion, by many representatives of what
Professor Jones calls
&quot; the popular and theological con
sciousness,&quot; and it is not to be denied that the curiously
unsystematic character of Lotze s mind, and his habit of
balancing conflicting possibilities without indicating any
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back upon popular thought. But it has to be remem
bered that what Lotze means to defend is not the specific
formula of any accepted creed or system, but only the
ethical or spiritual convictions that underlie its dogmas,
and of which perchance these dogmas may be a very
imperfect expression. To put it even more generally, it
is simply the spiritual view of the world for whose safety
he is concerned. Similarly Lotze s revolt against
Panlogism and his insistence on the part played by the
feelings, both in the structure of reality and in our
reconstructive estimate of it, has no doubt favoured the
development of a type of theological thought which
seeks to fence off the territory of religion from reason
altogether, and thereby ingeniously evades an answer to
the question of the metaphysical truth or untruth of the
doctrines it teaches. But this divorce of the ethical /
or religious from the rational can hardly be considered S
part of Lotze s own programme. He has left on record
in many passages his appreciation of the effort of
speculative idealism, and if that idealism was really,
as he says, in pursuit of
&quot; the supreme and not wholly
unattainable goal of science,&quot; then there is no part
of experience from which reason can be, as it were,
warned off. But of course the historical consequences of
a doctrine may always be fairly produced in evidence
against it, and, so far, Professor Jones is quite within his
rights in pointing out the dangers involved in Lotze s
positions, or at least in his way of stating them.
But it is time to pass from these generalities to
the precise thesis of Professor Jones s book. The points
in Lotze s doctrine of thought on which Professor Jones,
lays most stress and which he sets himself to controvert
are (1) the subjectivity of thought, and (2) its merely
formal or instrumental function in our experience..152 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
Under the first head, he refers to the numerous passages
in which Lotze insists that while our thoughts are valid
or true of things correspond to things they yet are
not the things themselves. &quot;The things themselves do
not pass into knowledge ; they only awaken in us ideas
which are not things.&quot;
&quot; We may exalt the intelligence
of more perfect beings above our own as high as we
please ; but so long as we desire to attach any rational
meaning to it, it will never be the thing itself, but only an
aggregate of ideas about the
thing.&quot; To condemn or dis
parage knowledge on account of this necessary subjectivity
is, however, according to Lotze, quite unjustifiable, unless
we assume that the function of knowledge is not to know
things but to be them. In a sense, Professor Jones ad
mits the obvious truth of these considerations ; but at the
same time he intimates that Lotze s way of stating the
case makes
&quot; the rift between thought and its objects
final.&quot; But the two points mentioned above are too
closely connected to be kept definitely separate in ex
position, and the central part of the book, after the two
introductory chapters, is devoted rather to the second
that is to say, to a critical analysis of Lotze s limitation
of thought to a formal or instrumental function in our
experience. Thought, according to Lotze, is, as Professor
Jones puts it,
&quot;
only a single part or element or faculty of
mind, occupying a restricted place amongst several others,
which co-operate with it in the production of the contents
of our intelligent life
&quot;
(p. 50). More particularly, thought
is dependent upon sense and an
&quot; unconscious psychical
mechanism&quot; for its content. Again, the feelings and
emotions are absolutely irreducible to thoughts or concep
tions : so much so that, as Lotze says,
&quot;
it is possible
that even divine intelligence would find nothing in the
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feeling to issue out of it.&quot; It is to feeling that we owe
the consciousness of the worth which objects have for us.
Feeling, as the source of our judgment of value, thus takes
precedence of cognition, for the Good is a higher category
than the True. Indeed it may be said that to feeling we
owe the ideal of knowledge itself the conception of an
all-comprehensive and harmonious whole, and feeling
also awakens the impulse to seek it. Finally, thought
yields only hypothetical necessity ; absolute or uncondi
tional necessity is given only in the immediate certainty
of {^esthetic and moral conviction.
&quot; It is not pure in
telligence, whether we call it understanding or reason,
that dictates to us those assumptions which we regard as
inviolable; it is everywhere the whole mind, at once
thinking, feeling, and passing moral judgments, which,
out of the full completeness of its nature, produces in us
those unspoken first principles to which our perception
seeks to subordinate the content of experience.&quot;
&quot; The
fact that there is truth at all cannot in itself be under
stood, and is only comprehensible in a world the whole
nature of which depends upon the principle of the Good
&quot;
( Microcosmus, Bk. ix. c. 5). Professor Jones sum
marises the position thus :
&quot; The conception that thought
depends upon a foreign source for its data lies at the root
of the whole attempt of Lotze to limit its powers. It
leads him, in fact, to share the material of thought
between feeling on the one side and sensation on the
other. Feeling supplies it with the ideals which inspire
and guide knowledge, and which express, although in
definitely, the harmonious totality of experience; and
sensation supplies it with the material out of which is
elaborated our world of sensuous objects&quot; (p. 63). And
he points out a parallelism in some respects between
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Lotze the source of our moral and religious ideals. But
he considers the dualism of Lotze s doctrine more dangerous,
inasmuch as it leads (or has led historically) to the sub
jugation of intelligence to feeling, to despair of philosophy
and an appeal to faith and
&quot; the intuitions of the heart.&quot;
After this analysis of Lotze s doctrine, the third chapter
proceeds to redargue the position so far as concerns the
account given of the relation between perception and
conception. Attention is called at the outset to some
of Lotze s metaphors. Thought is &quot;a tool,&quot; or, again,
thinking is the path we take to the hill-top ; it is the
circuit we are compelled to make in consequence of the
position of the human mind, not at the centre of things,
but
&quot; somewhere in the extreme ramifications of reality.&quot;
By thinking we succeed in reconstructing the real world
;
we do get our view from the hill-top. But
&quot; the act
of thinking can claim only subjective significance.
. . .
All the processes which we go through in the forming of
conceptions, in classification, in our logical constructions,
are subjective processes of our thought, and not processes
which take place in
things.&quot; According to Lotze, however,
these subjective processes do in the end enable us to reach
an objective result, and Professor Jones describes his atti
tude as an attempt to
&quot; strike a middle path between the
Scepticism which severs knowledge and reality and the
Idealism which seemed to him to identify them.&quot; The
remainder of the chapter is intended to prove the im
possibility of such a via media.
The specific function of thought, according to Lotze,
is
&quot; to reduce the coincidence of our ideas to coher
ence.&quot; It does this
&quot;
by adding to the reproduction
or severance of a connection in ideas the accessory
notion of a ground for their coherence or non-coherence.&quot;
It thus converts an associative into a reflective or rational
experience. This leads Professor Jones to ask what isJONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. 155
the nature of the relation which exists between the
associative and the thinking form of consciousness.
&quot;Does thought produce the principles which give co
herence to the contents of our experience, or does it
only discover them in that experience ? Is the original
datum of thought a genuine manifold with no inherent
connections, or is there in truth no such thing as a
manifold, but only what appears to be a manifold, because
the principles of unity within it are latent or merely
implicit ?
&quot;





if not inconsistent,&quot; and it may be said at once that 1
he lays his hand here upon serious weaknesses in Lotze s
statement. The last sixteen pages of this chapter form
a very cogent piece of reasoning, as well as an admirable
piece of philosophical writing. Professor Jones succeeds,
I think, in showing that Lotze wavers between a repre
sentation of the datum
&quot; now as a mere meaningless
state of consciousness, and now as a world of objects
related in space and time.&quot; &quot;According to one view,
so much is supplied to thought that nothing is left to
it except to sift the rich content of perceptive ex-
&quot;
perience and rearrange it, without adding anything to
it except the reasons for its combinations. Thought,
on this view, is formal and receptive, and its only
work is that of reflection. It presents the old world
over again, but in the new light of an ordering principle.
According to the other view, it is only through the inter-
jvention of thought that there are either ideas or an intel- -
ligible world at all. It arrests the shifting panorama of
, subjective states of consciousness, objectifies and fixes
them so as to give them meaning, and then relates them
into a systematic world of knowledge. On this view, every
thing, except the absolutely meaningless subjective data,
is due to the spontaneous activity of thought. In other
words, thought, instead of being receptive and formal, is156 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OP LOTZE.
essentially constructive, the cause on account of which




Now it is plain enough that Lotze is here working at
a real problem ; but every careful student of his Logic
must admit that in trying to articulate a theory of
what actually happens, he involves himself in serious
confusion. Professor Jones is, in my opinion, substan
tially right when he finds that the root of this confusion
is
&quot; the assumption that the first datum of knowledge is
\ the subjective state, or the change in consciousness con
sequent upon the varying stimuli arising from the outer
world, and that the first act of thought is to objectify
this subjective. His whole doctrine rests upon the psy
chological hypothesis that what we first know, indefinitely
enough perhaps, is a subjective state, and that the first
act of thought is to make this state in ourselves repre
sentative of an outward object. The subjective is pro
jected, reified, posited, so as to become an object
&quot;
(p. 105).
As against this, Professor Jones successfully maintains
that, just as we do not infer the existence of a seen
object from physiological changes in our brain or nerves,
but, on the contrary, infer these processes because we
have first seen the object, so, although it is true that con
sciousness as a matter of fact must change in order that
we may know the object which incited the change, that
&quot; does not prove that we first know the change in ourselves
and then infer the object. On the contrary, the first in
the order of events is again the last in the order of
thought. ... In the order of knowledge the objective
comes first. . . . The reality first given to us indefinitely,
A- opens out upon us into differences, and sunders into the
\L. primary distinctions of subjective and objective. But we
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of this distinction, to forget or deny the unity of the
reality in which the distinction takes place ; nor is there
any justification for fixing a complete gap between the
subjective and the objective, and compelling thought in
some unknowable way either to objectify the former or
a part of it, or to leap blindly from one world into the
other, from the sphere of mere subjective states to that of
external facts corresponding to them. ... If we begin
with the purely subjective, we must end there. . . .
Lotze himself nowhere explains this extraordinary pro
cess of seizing upon a mere change in consciousness,
flinging it, or a part of it, into a sphere in which it can
confront the self as a not-self, and endowing it with a
quasi-independent existence. Nor is it explicable,
. . .
for in order to begin at all, we must already have an
object&quot; (pp. 105-113).
I think it can hardly be denied that Lotze s account
of the objectification of the subjective as the first operation
of thought, converting impressions into ideas, lays him
open to this criticism, and is, in point of fact, funda
mentally misleading. It is an attempt, in an account of
knowledge, to get behind the fact of knowledge altogether,
to explain how that which is not in any sense knowledge
&quot;
nothing but a state of consciousness, a mood of our
selves,&quot; a
&quot; mere internal movement,&quot; a
&quot;
meaningless
change in the state of the soul
&quot;
is transformed into
knowledge, and comes to have significance or cognitive
value for the subject in which it takes place. Now if
thought is to objectify or in any way to deal with these
subjective states, it must have some knowledge or aware
ness of them as such ; and that implies the fact of
knowledge as already existing. It is indeed obviously
impossible for us to place ourselves outside of this fact
and explain how knowledge of any sort is possible.158 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
Nothing is more certain than that
&quot; the miracle of know
ledge
&quot;
has, from a logical and ultimate point of view,
simply to be accepted. As Professor James puts it
( Psychology, ii. 8)
:
&quot; In his dumb awakening to the
consciousness of something there, a mere this as yet (or
something for which even the term this would perhaps
be too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledg
ment of which would be better expressed by the bare
interjection lo ! ) the infant encounters an object in
which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all the
categories of the understanding are contained. . . . Here
the young knower meets and greets his world ; and the
miracle of knowledge bursts forth, as Voltaire says, as
much in the infant s lowest sensation as in the highest
achievement of a Newton s brain.&quot; From a physiological
or psychological standpoint, we may, of course, say that
the miracle bursts forth on the occasion of certain
antecedent processes; but to ask how these processes
give rise to the unique relation of knowledge is to
involve ourselves in a hopeless hysteron proteron. To
enquire how there is such a fact as knowledge at all,
may indeed be said to be the ultimate form of the type
of enquiry which Lotze so often indicates the desire to





knowledge out of mental states unreferred, is a highly
misleading way of saying that knowledge in the finite
consciousness depends upon organic stimulus. Such
&quot; mental states
&quot;
are the hypothetical result of the
organic stimulus, interposed between that stimulus and
the mental reaction in the shape of attention
; but even
psychology can say nothing of these hypothetical states
beyond consigning them to the convenient receptacle of
the sub - conscious. The desire to explain the actual
passage from the organic to the conscious, to catchJONES S PHILOSOPHY OP LOTZE. 159
nature in the act, as it were, half in and half out, as
Dr Stirling somewhere puts it, is probably at the root
of theories of objectification like Lotze s, but the inter
position of unreferred states does not really help to
elucidate the transition, or to ease in any way the accept
ance of the miracle of knowledge.
The consequence of this false start on Lotze s part is
that at one time he talks as if the whole intelligible
world were the work of thought, superinduced upon a
meaningless datum
; at another time he speaks of thought
as a purely formal function, which receives from percep
tion a world of objects in space and time, and which is
limited to the reflective discovery of the grounds of the
coherence of what is already associatively combined for
it. These are the two views which Professor Jones
signalised in the passage quoted above, and it is plain
that they are the same two views which we find imper
fectly reconciled in Kant s account of the synthesis of
imagination. Lotze s
&quot; unconscious psychical mechanism,&quot;
which prepares the data of sense for the advent of
reflective thought, is just the
&quot; blind but indispensable
function of the soul,&quot; which plays so important a part
in the Kantian exposition. And it seems to me that
Professor Jones s method with Lotze here may be
instructively illustrated by the divergent views which
commentators have taken of this part of the Kantian
theory. According to one interpretation of Kant, objec
tivity, order, and connection are first introduced by the
categories into the formless manifold of sense
; the
apperceptive unity consciously acting through these
functions seems thus actually to make the world we
know. This is the impression we carry away from much
of Green s writing, and to this view, if I am not mistaken,
Dr Caird s first commentary lent some countenance.160 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
Dr Stirling s Text-book to Kant/ on the other hand,
largely in a spirit of polemic against the subjectivity of this
view, laid undivided stress upon the preparatory work of
imagination, to the extent of apparently making the





tions already given. From this point of view he ended
! by characterising Kant s whole scheme of the categories
i as a laborious
&quot;
superfetation.&quot; Dr Caird, in the second
edition of his Commentary, gives a more discriminat
ing account of Kant s real meaning by emphasising the
words which Kant himself italicises, namely, that the




much as it does not bring the categories consciously into
play, yet takes place according to the categories. The
.work of the reflective understanding is simply to bring
to explicit consciousness the principles in which the
associative or pre
- rational consciousness has been un
consciously proceeding. Neither in Kant nor in Lotze,
however, is this distinction between the associative and
the rational consciousness drawn with sufficient clearness
and breadth. I know no place where it is so satisfactorily
worked out as by Professor Laurie in his Metaphysica
Nova et Vetusta. Professor Laurie employs the apt term
Attuition or the attuent mind to designate the receptive
consciousness of objects, and of the relations between
objects, possessed by the higher animals or by a child
before the emergence of active Reason in the strict sense
of that term. Reason converts attuits or passive recepts
into actively grasped percepts, and in its search for
grounds transforms (some instances of) sequence into
causal connections. In general, it makes possible the
beginnings of science, the beginnings of our human
knowledge of a stable system of things. It will not be
denied that this pre-rational consciousness exists ; andJONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. 161
(although the life of reason in every case rises from it as
a basis) the distinction between the two can hardly, it
seems to me, be too sharply drawn. The two lives are
on different planes, and there is no passage from the one
to the other save by a leap. The presence of the reason-
impulse means all the possibilities of science, it means
morality, art, and religion, and all the possibilities of
human history ; its absence means the absence of all
these. But the attuent consciousness, although without
the formative impulse of reason it does not possess the
notion of objectivity and truth which gives rise to
science, is very far from being limited to a succession of
purely subjective states or atomic sensations. It receives
images of objects which it distinguishes from one another,
and some of which it comes to associate together. This
Lotze sees clearly enough, and hence he attributes so
much to sense and the unconscious mechanism, and
apparently leaves so little for thought to do. Professor
Jones is perhaps hardly just or, let us say, hardly
generous to Lotze s intention here
; his criticism some
what resembles Dr Stirling s method with Kant. He
beats Lotze up and down the field, thrusts him back
upon his
&quot;
meaningless changes in the state of the soul,&quot;
quotes his acknowledgment that thought is necessary to
objectify these, and then claims that he has surrendered
his whole position and admitted the presence of thought
in perception from the very first and throughout the whole
process. Or if this is not granted, he insists that Lotze
reduces thought to an otiose appendage of sense. The
success which attends this method of criticism is due,
as we have seen, to Lotze s blundering attempt to get







ideas.&quot; But if we disregard
this and look at the facts as they are, we are bound to
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* admit that the sensuous and associative stage does exist,
and so does the rational. Lotze expresses the difference
! between the two by saying that in the latter thought has
supervened, affirming and organising. This may not be
an unexceptionable, but surely it is a fairly legitimate,
way of stating the difference, seeing that Lotze always
means by thought the reflective, consciously ratiocinative
function, the logical understanding. It is the case that
thought, so understood, adds nothing but its own form to
the sense-matter presented to it, and that many of the
connections which it establishes among sense-objects are
merely reaffirmed or actively taken possession of. But,
even so, the imposition of this form is surely all-
important ; it is the first condition of an intelligible
world. And there are, besides, notions of reason which
x cannot be said to be given in sense at all, such as
those of cause and end. Lotze signalises the first as
constituting in an especial sense the form of reason, when
he says that thought has to convert coincidence into
coherence
; sense only knows b after a, reason knows b
through a or because of .
Professor Jones makes it a general objection to Lotze
that
&quot; the same series of processes seem to be repeated (
upon two different levels, once by feeling or experience
and once by thought&quot; (p. 93). But this is exactly what
happens. Moreover, the reproach seems out of place in
the mouth of one who professes a general allegiance to
Hegel ; for, according to Hegel, all advance is simply
repetition of the same form at different stages. Professor
Jones would probably reply that it is just because Lotze
does not take the associative and the rational conscious
ness as different stages of the same life or the same
world, that he finds his statement of the case objection
able. Indeed this is what he does say
:
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sense and the world of thought correspond point by
point [i.e., in Lotze s account]
; but Lotze does not try
to furnish any reason for this correspondence and
mutual adaptability. If he had supplied such a reason,
the worlds of thought and sense would have become
species in a universal, to use his language, or different
stages in the evolution of a single principle of reason,
to use the language of idealism.&quot;
&quot; We might expect
the simple conclusion that because the higher is possible
only if it is also in the lower, therefore it is in the
lower, and the lower is only an elementary form of the
higher&quot; (pp. 99, 100). Now I am not concerned to
defend Lotze s way of stating the case. I have already
admitted and emphasised his grave initial error. I will
go farther, and add that he frequently does seem to
leave sense and thought side by side or over against
one another as unrelated opposites. He treats the laws
of thought the conditions of the thinkable as if they
were written upon the sky of some abstract heaven,
and had no inherent relation to reality. He repeatedly
stops to give fresh expression to his astonishment that
the world is responsible to thought at all, and not, ab
initio and essentially, unthinkable. Such preposterous
astonishment certainly seems to imply that the mutual
adaptability is the result of a happy accident; and
so far Lotze falls behind Kant, who also emphasised
the mutual adaptation of sense and thought, but
adduced it as evidence that the world has its origin in
intelligence as regards its matter no less than as regards
the formal categories. To speak as Lotze does is
certainly, so far as language goes, to divorce reality from
intelligence and to leave it standing as an
&quot; unknown
external something,&quot; as
&quot; unknown things and processes,&quot;
as
&quot;
things themselves inaccessible to observation which164 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
we suppose to underlie our sensuous perception,&quot; as
&quot; an
invisible something which we suppose to be outside us.&quot;
These expressions, all culled from Lotze s Logic, prove
sufficiently that he commits what I agree with Professor
Jones in considering the unpardonable philosophic sin
the assertion of the thing-in-itself as an unknown and
unknowable kernel of reality. In the light of this
sinister consequence, one can understand Professor Jones s
jealousy of Lotze s procedure in delegating to sense and
the psychical mechanism one after another of the functions
of
&quot;
thought.&quot; He seems to Professor Jones to hand
over these functions to an essentially non-rational process
and to leave thought with its occupation gone, an
uncalled - for excrescence on the self - acting system of
sense. This danger does lurk, we may admit, in Lotze s
general habit of thought, but it does not necessarily
attach to the distinction between the work of sense and
association and the subsequent work of reflective thought.
One may emphasise the work done by the attuent con





function which supervenes upon a ready-made world,
without in the least intending to deny that the world of
attuition is a preformation of reason in sense. Professor
Laurie, for example, after making this distinction the
pivot of his whole exposition, finds no difficulty in
concluding
&quot; that the outer is not merely an x negating
my self - consciousness, but that, on the contrary, it is
Eeason externalised, and that, as universal reason, it is
one with the moments of my finite reason. ... It
would be a strange thing indeed if the energy of Eeason
seizing the external found that the one did not answer
the other that the datum of sense defeated the process
of dialectic, that the plastic power of Eeason encountered
material which it failed to mould. It would be equally
strange if the datum of sense failed to find its knowerJONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. 165
and interpreter, if it for ever remained what it appears
to a dog or a horse ( Meta. Nova et Vetusta/ 2nd ed.,
pp. 213 and 227).
But while we may intelligibly speak thus of the
external world as the externalisation of reason (seeing
that the formal categories of reason are reflected in its
structure), it must still be maintained that the way in





lated to darken counsel. Thought, whether we wish it
or not, is identified beyond recall with the intellect as





not only for thought but for sense, feeling, and will as
well. Professor Jones himself admitted lately, in an




is an inapt and unfortunate term as an
expression of what the Idealists mean. Commenting on
Lotze s opposition of experience or
&quot; the whole mind
&quot;
to
thought or thinking, he added :
&quot; This is a change of
terminology which Idealists would not care to oppose.
In fact, whole mind or spirit expresses their
meaning less ambiguously than thought, in so far as
the former terms cannot be easily confused with the
purely formal faculty of the logician.&quot; And he further
spoke of
&quot; the idealistic identification of reality not with
abstract thought but with spirit and its manifold
activities.&quot; It is disappointing, therefore, to find him
throughout this volume using Thought in the traditional
Hegelian sense, which has been prolific of so much con-
{ fusion. The outcome of this usage is the reduction of
the world to a system of thought-relations, as we find it
in Green s laborious and, after all, ineffectual, attempt to
eliminate the function of sense in perception. Though
we may be able to say nothing of sense as sense (and
this lies in the nature of the case), the difference between
perception and conception remains fundamental and-, *** o
^
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, irreducible. The one is immediate relation to, or experi
ence of, reality ; the second, though itself also, of course,
a real experience, is, as compared with the first, a mediate
relation, which may doubtless give a fuller and truer ac
count of the real, but which depends for its whole mean
ing and for its existence upon the primary and vital
relation of perception. Green is obliged to fall back
surreptitiously upon the sense-data which he seems afraid
openly to acknowledge. In various passages Professor





&quot; Sense by itself,&quot; he says,
&quot;
gives as little as thought by itself. The whole problem
lies in the nature of the relation between these two factors.
No one now can well deny the need of either, and the
difficulty which we have to meet is how to conceive of
both so as to enable them to co-operate and produce the
concrete fact of knowledge, in which form and content
interpenetrate.
. . . Hegel and his followers would find
a unity beneath their differences, and regard that unity
as best characterised by the term Thought or Spirit&quot;
(
(p. 300). Here he gives us, it is true, the alternative of
&quot;
spirit,&quot; but in other passages he talks of
&quot; the Idealism
which found nothing in the world except thought
&quot;
(p. 99), of &quot;the Hegelian view that thought is a con
structive and concrete reality&quot; (p. 287), of &quot;the truth
of Idealism which makes thought think thought
&quot;
(p. 154).
Now surely, if the living whole consists of thought and \
sense, it cannot but provoke misunderstanding to give ,
j to the whole the name of one of the factors. To say
that thought thinks thought, that there is nothing in
the world except thought, cannot but be taken as
an attempt to evade acknowledgment of the facts of
sense. Yet that acknowledgment finds its way into the
statements of even the most uncompromising idealists.JONES S PHILOSOPHY OP LOTZE. 167
Thought cannot get to work unless it has a
&quot; material
&quot;
(p. 105), unless it has &quot;elements of sense&quot; to work
upon (p. 104). It &quot;seizes upon an indefinite reality
and articulates it into system&quot; (p. 359); but the
articulation cannot proceed unless the reality is somehow
given in order to be seized. Professor Jones also speaks
quite freely at times of
&quot; the sensuous and the intelligible
elements&quot; of experience (p. 335), or, what is the same
thing in other words, of
&quot; the content and forms of our
experience&quot; (p. 303). He speaks of conception as
abstracting from
&quot; our sensibility,&quot; and in one place he
says that what he has tried to show, as against Lotze,
is that the &quot;immediate forms of knowledge [perception,
feeling, &c.] could not supply thought with its necessary
data unless they were armed with all the powers of
thought, as well as with those which are peculiar to them
selves&quot; (p. 325). He here admits that thought requires
data, that these data are supplied by immediate forms
of knowledge, and that these immediate forms of know
ledge have powers peculiar to themselves.
But the form in which he clothes the admission enables
us, I think, to understand what he and other idealists
are really fighting for, under cover of an unfortunate
terminology. He is contending for the inseparability,
the mutual implication, of sense and thought, which
seems to him to be threatened by the emphasis which
Lotze and others lay upon the contribution of sense.
Sense seems to him to be asserted as a source of data
altogether alien to intelligence, and to be put forward
as the sole depositary of reality ; and this is either to
play into the hands of a sensationalistic scepticism, or to
evoke the spectre of a hopeless dualism. As against
such a supposed position, Professor Jones contends, in
words already quoted, for
&quot; the mutual implication of the168 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
content and forms of our experience.&quot; &quot;When Lotze says
that
&quot; what is good and evil can as little be thought as
what is blue and sweet,&quot; and asks whether the essence of
love and hate can be exhausted in concepts, he retorts
by asking
&quot; whether love and hate and blue and sweet




sense, by itself, gives as little as thought by
itself.&quot; To this way of stating the case I, for one, have
no objection, and I cannot think that Lotze would have
denied the position. So, again, in regard to the relation
of thought and reality which is another form of the
same question, what Professor Jones proves, and what
he has doubtless really at heart, is the necessity of
acknowledging ab initio what he calls in one place their
&quot;ontological affinity&quot; (p. 334):
&quot;If the world is to
reveal itself to man s thought, it must have ontological
affinity to his thinking powers.&quot; Just as we must
acknowledge the
&quot;
correspondence and mutual adapta
bility
&quot;
of sense and thought, or, in other words, the
&quot;
ontological relation between the two elements of
knowledge
&quot;
(p. 329), so we must not treat the
world as a reality independent of thought and unrelated
to thought ; for, in that case, it would of necessity
remain to the end unknowable by thought. Here again
I have nothing to object to, but why does Professor
Jones go on to obliterate distinctions and reinvoke
the old confusions by translating
&quot;
ontological rela
tion&quot; into &quot;ultimate identity&quot; (p. 330), and speaking
of sensation and perception not only as
&quot;
essentially





Surely there may be necessary relation without identity ;
in fact, if there were identity, the relation would be im
possible. Thought and reality are not the merely different,
but neither are they the merely identical. Moreover,JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. 169
Professor Jones s relapse into such phrases is inconsistent
with what he says of the value of Lotze s criticism of
the idealistic position.
1 And I should like to add that
in insisting on relation, while denying identity, I am not
actuated by a precisian anxiety about a word or phrase ;
for as soon as we speak of identity, the way is prepared




&quot; which Professor Jones condemns as
strongly as any one. I find Professor Jones himself upon
this dangerous inclined plane in his attempt to explain
away the difference between perception and conception,
or to maintain, at least, that the difference
&quot;
is only a
difference in degree of definiteness
&quot;




if we contrast it with colour, is a
particular perception, but if we contrast it with its own
shades of crimson, scarlet, and so on, it is a universal
conception.&quot; But we are moving here altogether in a
world of conceptions. Eed is a concept whether we con
trast it with colour in general or with its own shades
;
the percept red is always a particular shade of red,
though we may not stop at the moment reflectively to
particularise it. The concept crimson or scarlet itself
does not reach the inexhaustible particularity of its own
sense -
presentation, as that is constituted by what
Professor Jones calls the
&quot;
aggressive relations of time
and space and our sensible affections.&quot; These relations
and affections may be
&quot;
comparatively insignificant to the
1
Hegel, as against his predecessors, opposes mainly the tendency BO
to separate the real and ideal as to obscure or annul the principle which
reveals itself in both of them : Lotze directs his main attack against what
he conceived to be their immediate identification by Hegel. And it is
this which, in my opinion, makes him so valuable as an expounder of
Idealism, and helps us to know more clearly than Hegel s immediate
successors what he meant by the principle of thought which he identified
with the principle of reality
&quot;
(p. 273).J J
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true understanding of
things,&quot; but it hardly becomes us





they are, as it were, the tissue in which the real world is
given to us. I heartily agree with the contention that
we must not regard perception as giving us the truth of
reality once for all, and conception as leading us on a
path of abstraction farther and farther away from the
nature of things. Our conceptual account of the world,
as formulated by the sciences, and ultimately by philo-
^ophy, is nearer the truth than the inadequate judgments
of perception with which we start. In this sense, the
process of knowledge is continuous
; it is, as Professor
Jones says,
&quot; a process of discovering distinctions within
an indefinite subject&quot; (p. 362), or the &quot;articulating into
system&quot; of &quot;an indefinite reality&quot; (p. 359). But it is
still true that conception has only a mediate relation to
reality, while in perception there is an immediate relation.
We cannot explain in what this direct experience consists,
for that would be to make it mediate would be, in fact,
to dig up the roots of our own life. All we can say is
that without this direct contact with reality, or rather
this immediate presence of reality in us, there would be
no subject within which to discover distinctions, no
reality to articulate into conceptual system. The dis
tinction, therefore, between perception and conception is
not only &quot;undeniable within its own limits&quot;; it is primary
and fundamental, and the attempt to minimise, if not to
obliterate it, seems to me perhaps the most questionable
and dangerous part of Professor Jones s book. In one
sense, as explained above, it is true to say that reality,
i.e., the true account of reality, is reached only at the end
of our scientific and philosophical analysis ; but, in another
sense, it is as true to say that reality is given in percep-
-4-tion or, more generally, in immediate experience, and givenJONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. 171
there alone. Lotze may not sufficiently distinguish these
two senses, but they are not in themselves inconsistent,
as Professor Jones seems to think (p. 356).
I have left myself no space to comment upon the more
detailed criticism of Lotze s logical doctrines
; but for
penetrative analysis the chapter on Lotze s theory of the
Judgment (chap, iv.) is one of the best in the book.
The laboriously artificial theory into which Lotze is led
by his start from pure identity is successfully shown to
reduce Judgment in the end to a useless tautology ex-
cept so far as Lotze supplements his original principle
by that of Sufficient Eeason, which is tantamount to the
idea of a system of related elements. Professor Jones -
justly censures Lotze s characteristic method of patching
up the defects of one principle by supplementing it by
another. In this case, the second principle, which alone
makes thought possible, is treated by Lotze as a fortunate
accident (!), and the two are left standing inconsistently
side by side. Chap. v. contains a very full exposition
of Lotze s theory of Inference, which is submitted to
criticism in chap. vi.
&quot; The symbol of inference is not
mechanical connection but organic growth. It is the
evolution of the contents of a single, though not a simple,
idea
; and evolution neither admits of anything new nor
simply repeats
itself.&quot; The fundamental function of
thought consists
&quot; not in connecting the discrete but in
differentiating a unity.&quot; This view is convincingly driven
home throughout the chapter, which contains a luminous
account of the actual reasoning process. Lotze s theory
is found to be involved in contradiction because it starts
from the opposite view, that the operation of thought
consists in connecting the discrete. It is the same view
which leads him, in his account of Judgment, to the verge
of declaring that predication is either idle or impossible.172 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
In his account of Inference, the same dominating idea is
seen in his attempt to escape from this conclusion by
passing from Subsumption to Substitution. Substitution,
as Professor Jones observes,
&quot;
is not inference at all. It
is rather the result of a process of inference. The
mathematician will not substitute a + & + c for x, unless
he has already ascertained that they are equivalent ; and
the process of inference lies in the discovery of that
equivalence, after which the act of substitution may
follow as a matter of course
&quot;
(p. 242). It must be
admitted, I think, that Lotze s account of inference is
vitiated by the original sins of his theory of Judgment,
but I am not sure that Professor Jones s account of the
advance of knowledge is, at bottom, so different from
Lotze s as he thinks. He blames Lotze for attributing
all the processes that are effective in the growth of know
ledge to &quot;sense, perception, and faith&quot; (p. 267) &quot;intu
itive processes resting on material knowledge (p. 254).
feut when he gives his own account
&quot;
thought has
only one way of proving a truth, namely, that of show
ing that it is already contained in the premises. And
it shows that it was already in the premises ~by a more
exhaustive investigation of them
&quot;
(p. 243) Lotze might
fairly ask whether this investigation is in strictness
part of the reasoning process. Or, again, when he says
speaking of mathematical calculation,
&quot; The inference is
in no wise based upon mathematical considerations, but
upon the material premises ; and into these premises the
investigator throws all the wealth of his previously
acquired knowledge of nature. And the more discrimina
tive his knowledge, or the more systematic, or the greater
the degree in which he is able to focus the light of the
whole world on the problem in hand, the greater his
success in developing the indefinite system which is inJONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. 173
the datum into an explicit system of necessarily relative
elements. It is consideration of the material which enables
him to predict, and to extend his universal law over cases
not yet observed
&quot;
(p. 262) is this essentially at variance
with Lotze s own statement, that
&quot; the discovery of a
universal law is always a guess on the part of the imag
ination, made possible by a knowledge of facts
&quot;
? The
difference here would seem to be in the main one of
terminology. Lotze, with his analytic habit of mind,
represents as the co-operative result of a number of
factors what Professor Jones describes as a single living
process. And if we extend a similar lenience to Lotze s
account of the relation of sense to thought upon which
Professor Jones returns at the beginning of this chapter
on Inference, might not a sympathetic expositor say
that Lotze s prefiguring of the universals of thought in
corresponding universals of sense might be plausibly
interpreted as another way of saying that the real ia
ideal ? And I cannot forbear pointing out in this con









&quot;content&quot; (p. 227) turns out on closer investigation to
have a modified and much more modest meaning. It is
constitutive of the content
&quot; in the sense that the partic
ulars cannot exist except in their coherence&quot; (p. 228).
It thus
&quot;
comprehends and penetrates its content,&quot; but it
does not constitute or creatively give its sensuous matter.
This is the same conclusion as we arrived at in dealing
with this point more fully above.
I do not, however, put forward these suggestions as a
complete justification of Lotze s procedure, still less with
any intention to minimise the value of the searching
examination to which that procedure has been subjected
by Professor Jones. On the contrary, I think that that174 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
examination has laid bare serious defects in Lotze s
statement, and that Professor Jones has, in the main,
made good his assertion of two warring tendencies in
Lotze s thought. Lotze is, at bottom and in his intention,
it seems to me, at one with what we may agree to call
the idealistic view of the universe. But he stood chrono
logically nearer to Hegel than we do. In his youth the
Hegelian system was still a living theory, held by its
adherents with a rigour and vigour of which, at this
distance of time, we have little conception. To us now
even to those who are most inclined to call Hegel
Master his system has already become historical : it is
simply the last great type of Idealism or Spiritual
Monism. But we do not hesitate to criticise, or simply
to drop, the asperities of the original statement, and to
present what we consider the vital principle in a form
moulded by our own controversies and adapted to our pres
ent needs. But when Lotze began to write, time had not
yet softened the outlines of the theory, and thrown its
details into the shade
; and he may probably be accepted
as a better authority than the present generation on its
original lineaments. He stood forth, in any case, as the
unsparing critic of
&quot; the dialectical idyll
&quot; and the too ex-
/ elusive intellectualism of the Hegelian system ; and the
emphasis given in his writings to this critical note has
led to his being (erroneously) regarded as fundamentally
at variance with the principle of Idealism. Other charac
teristics of his work combined to strengthen this miscon
ception. His mind is analytical and critical rather than
constructive
; and as it is his habit to begin by criticism
of some popular conception or accepted theory, he seems
to be always starting (to use his own metaphor) some
where in the extreme ramifications of the subject. He
seems never to weld his conclusions together from aJONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE. 175
central point of view. In a book like the Microcosmus,
which meanders through the whole region of the know-
able, this want of unity of conception becomes no less
than distressing to the philosophical reader. Fresh as
his criticisms generally are, and instructive as his
laborious analysis undoubtedly often is, his habit of
balancing conflicting possibilities and then passing to
another theme is as undeniably irritating and unsatis
factory. One cannot wonder if it produces upon many
readers the impression that a solution of the difficulties
has been abandoned, and that the result is simply a
return to the disjecta membra of popular orthodoxy.
And even the attempts at co-ordination which we find
are apt to appear to the thinker of speculative and
synthetic tendencies as the mechanical piecing together
of elements reached by different methods and belonging
to inconsistent theories of the world. I do not say
that this impression is just, but it must be admitted
-
that it is not without excuse. Hence I do not think
that Lotze can claim a permanent place as a thinker
with a system of his own. There is great danger that
those who go to him in search of such a system without
much previous philosophical training will miss the point
of much of his finest work, and simply be strengthened
in their antecedent prejudices and unphilosophical beliefs.
But after all these liberal deductions, it remains true
that, by his criticism of dogmatic materialism on the one
hand and of dogmatic intellectualism on the other, he has
been a most important factor in guiding contemporary
thought towards truer conclusions
; and the reader who
is in some measure abreast of the tendencies of modern
speculation will still find much in his writings that is
incisive and memorable and convincingly reasoned.
I have not dwelt seriatim and separately with Professor176 JONES S PHILOSOPHY OF LOTZE.
Jones s concluding chapters on
&quot; The Subjectivity of
Thought&quot; and &quot;The Principle of Keality in Thought
and its Processes.&quot; As they sum up and bring to
a focus the principles on which the whole critical
argument of the book depends, they have been
frequently laid under contribution in the foregoing
account. But reference should be made to the criticism
of Lotze s fundamental and characteristic position, that
&quot;
all our conclusions concerning the real world rest upon
the immediate confidence or the faith which we repose in
the universal validity of a certain postulate of thought
which oversteps the limits of the special world of
thought.&quot; &quot;As regards the ultimate principles which
we follow in this criticism of our thoughts,&quot; he says
elsewhere,
&quot;
it is quite true that we are left with
nothing but the confidence of Reason in itself, or the
certainty of belief in the general truth that there is a
meaning in the world.&quot; Otherwise expressed, it is only
the Good which has in itself the complete right to be
;
and this is recognised in a judgment or postulate of
value, which carries us beyond the merely intellectual
region into the domain of feeling. But Lotze nowhere
says, as Professor Jones makes him say, that this judgment
is possible
&quot;
apart from and without the co-operating
activity of thought.&quot; He only says that it would be
impossible to a thought which was not coloured by
feeling. The criticism here appears to me, therefore,
hardly fair to Lotze, especially as Professor Jones seems
unwilling to deny that the Good and the Eeal may be
taken as identical, and metaphysics ultimately based
upon ethics (p. 295). And when, in his concluding
chapter (the robust realism of which I have already
signalised), Professor Jones says that
&quot; the only way to
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departure from it&quot; (p. 334); or, again, that Idealists
&quot; have made this conception of the systematic and
rational coherence of reality their starting
-
point, in
such a manner that they do not doubt, any more than
men of science do, that the endeavour of thought will
lead to truth, or that reality will yield its treasures to
the inquiring intellect,&quot; and that hence they
&quot; return
once more to the attitude of ordinary consciousness and
of science, and commit their thinking to the guidance




is not itself of the nature of faith ?
Doubtless it is a necessary assumption, and one which
the advance of knowledge, in particular the growing co
herence of knowledge, tends more and more to confirm ;
but is it not ultimately a trust, a supreme hypothesis
?DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY.
1
THE
pre-eminent obligation which the writers of this
book express to Professor James, as well as the
general trend of the doctrines they expound, connect the
volume obviously with the philosophical attitude which
calls itself Pragmatism, and which is so much in evidence
at the present time. But it is not always easy to har
monise the utterances of the adherents of this creed, nor,
in some cases, is it easy to know what precisely they
intend by their principle. Hence it will be best in
dealing with the book to limit the discussion to the
positions actually advanced, or apparently accepted, by
the writers, and, for the rest, to treat it as a serious and
detailed discussion of logical doctrines in a new light,
rather than as a
&quot; manifesto
&quot;
in support of a new philo
sophical faith. In so doing, I believe we shall best con
sult the wishes of the editor and his contributors ; for
though they speak with the confidence of those who find
themselves in possession of a fresh clue to old-standing
difficulties, they speak without pretentiousness or undue
contempt for the theories they claim to supersede. They
1 Studies in Logical Theory. By John Dewey, with the co-operation of
Members and Fellows of the Department of Philosophy of the University
of Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1903. The following
critical notice appeared in The Philosophical Review, November 1904.DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY. 179
make no claim of finality or of systematic completeness.
&quot; The point of view,&quot; says the editor, referring to possible
divergencies among the eight contributors to the volume,
&quot;
is still (happily) developing, and showing no signs of
becoming a closed system.&quot; The divergencies, however,
so far as I can judge, are really remarkably slight, ob
servable for the most part only in the greater emphasis
or sweep with which one writer or another states prin
ciples or doctrines common to all. It is, indeed, most
unusual to find a series of philosophical papers by different
writers in which (without repetition or duplication) there
is so much unity in the point of view and harmony in
results. That this is so is a striking evidence of the
moulding influence of Professor Dewey upon his pupils
and coadjutors in the Chicago School of Philosophy. The
unfamiliar phraseology in which the writers sometimes
couch their meaning makes the volume far from easy
reading at first, but there always is a meaning to be





thought of the day, the book reflects honour
upon the university among whose publications it appears.
The chief points of agreement and therefore the
main contentions of the book are concisely stated by
the editor in his prefatory note
; and as the statement
may be regarded as in a sense official, it may profitably
be set down here for reference.
&quot; All agree that judg
ment is the central function of knowing, and hence
affords the central problem of logic ; that since the act
of knowing is intimately and indissolubly connected with
the like yet diverse functions of affection, appreciation,
and practice, it only distorts results reached to treat
knowing as a self-enclosed and self-explanatory whole,
hence the intimate relations of logical theory with func
tional psychology; that since knowledge appears as a180 DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY.
function within experience, and yet passes judgment upon
both the processes and contents of other functions, its work
and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or trans-
formatory ; that since Reality must be denned in terms
of experience, judgment appears accordingly as the medium
through which the consciously effected evolution of Eeality
goes on
; that there is no reasonable standard of truth
(or of success of the knowing function) in general, except
upon the postulate that Eeality is thus dynamic or self-
evolving, and, in particular, through reference to the
specific offices which knowing is called upon to perform
in re-adjusting and expanding the means and ends of life.&quot;
The obligation of the writers is further expressed
&quot; to
those whose views are most sharply opposed. To Mill,
Lotze, Bosanquet, and Bradley the writers then owe
special indebtedness.&quot; The inclusion in a common cate
gory of thinkers so different in standpoint as those named
strikes the reader at first with surprise, but its meaning
and justification, from the point of view of the essayists,
becomes apparent in the detailed criticism to which Pro
fessor Dewey subjects Lotze s theory of knowledge (in
Essays 2, 3, and 4), and in Miss Thompson s critical
analysis of Bosanquet s theory of judgment in the paper
which follows. The opposition of what we may call the
new view to that which the essayists regard as held in
common by the authors mentioned, and substantially as
the logical tradition of previous philosophers, is summarily







This antithesis introduces us at once to the main thesis




absolute,&quot; or by itself, whose occupation is to
mirror or represent an independently complete and self-
existent world of reality ; it is to be regarded as oneDEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY. 181
function among others arising in the course of experience,
and as having for its sole purpose the transformation,
reconstruction, or reorganisation of experience. Now in
such a statement it seems to me there is much to which
we may cordially assent, though perhaps without regard
ing it as the exclusive discovery of the pragmatists ;
while there are other implications of the words which
we should be compelled to regard as false, or at least as
misleading, in the form stated. We may agree, for
instance, in the emphatic condemnation of the repre
sentational view of knowledge which has so disastrously
dominated modern philosophy. Professor Dewey and
his fellow-essayists argue convincingly that the view of
knowledge as copying or reproducing an independent
reality inevitably issues in scepticism, because in the
very mode of stating the question it opens a gulf be
tween thought and reality which no subsequent effort is
able to bridge.
&quot; In whatever form the copy theory
be stated,&quot; says Professor MacLennan,
&quot; the question in
evitably arises, how we can compare our ideas with reality
and thus know their truth. On this theory, what we
possess is ever the copy ; the reality is beyond. In
other words, such a theory, logically carried out, leads to
the breakdown of knowledge.&quot; Professor Dewey s ex
posure of the shifts to which Lotze is driven by his
initial acceptance of this dualism is a masterly piece of
analysis, running for a considerable part of the way
on the same lines as Professor Jones s criticism in his
Philosophy of Lotze. The whole conception of
&quot; two
fixed worlds
&quot; must undoubtedly be abandoned. As Pro
fessor Dewey excellently puts it in his opening pages
:
&quot; Neither the plain man nor the scientific inquirer is
aware, as he engages in his reflective activity, of any
transition from one sphere of existence to another. He182 DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY.
knows no two fixed worlds reality on one side and mere
subjective ideas on the other
; he is aware of no gulf
to cross. He assumes uninterrupted, free, and fluid
passage from ordinary experience to abstract thinking,
from thought to fact, from things to theories and back
again. Observation passes into development of hypo
thesis
; deductive methods pass to use in description of
the particular ; inference passes into action with no sense
of difficulty save those found in the particular task in
question. The fundamental assumption is continuity in
and of experience.
. . . Only the epistemological spec
tator is aware of the fact that the ordinary man and
the scientific man in this free and easy intercourse are
rashly assuming ihe right to glide over a cleft in the
very structure of
reality.&quot;
If epistemology is understood to imply belief in a cleft
of this nature, then the sooner both the name and the
thing are banished from philosophy the better. In this
shape the supposed problem is inherited from Descartes s
individualistic starting-point and the two -substance
doctrine which he impressed on modern thought. But
the isolation of the mind as a subjective sphere, intact
and self - contained, outside and over - against reality,
necessarily implies that reality is in a strict sense un
knowable. Hence the scepticism and agnosticism which
infect so many modern theories of knowledge. But
reality is one : the knowing mind and its thought are
themselves within the course of reality, parts of its
process, immersed in the give-and-take of living experi
ence. Whether we talk of reality or of experience does
not seem greatly to matter if we are agreed that there
is no real world except the world which reveals itself to
us in our experience and of which we feel ourselves to be
a moving part. Whatever term we use, the essence ofDEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY. 183
our contention is the unity and continuity of the world.
And if I read the signs of the intellectual world aright,
this conviction has so penetrated recent philosophical
thought that the long
- drawn discussions as to the
possibility and validity of knowledge which so keenly
occupied the theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth
and much of the nineteenth century seem to revolve
round a self-made difficulty, and have ceased to that
extent to possess a vital interest for us. We may be
vividly enough aware of the poverty of our knowledge
both in extent and intent, but that there should be in
knowledge an inherent incapacity to know at all is too
topsy-turvy a notion to give us a moment s uneasiness.
This conviction of the unity of existence, I repeat, has
so permeated the best thought of the time that it cannot
be claimed by the pragmatists as an insight specifically
their own
; and it strikes one, therefore, with a sense of
surprise to find Bosanquet s theory of judgment selected
for critical analysis as typical of the old representational
view. There are certainly phrases in Mr Bradley s work
which might seem to leave us, contrary to the author s
intention, with an unknowable Eeality lurking behind the
world of ideas which we predicate of it. But Professor
Bosanquet, one would have thought, had taught more
persuasively than any other living writer the unity of
experience and the fallacy of all dualistic conceptions.
And perhaps it is really because he so nearly approaches
what they consider the true position that the Chicago
logicians have undertaken to show to what extent the
old leaven still works in him and makes him fall short of
the perfect truth. On turning to the essay in question,
I cannot help thinking that Miss Thompson lays undue
stress on expressions which are perfectly legitimate, and
indeed unavoidable^ in any theory which recognises184 DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY.
objectivity in knowledge at all. After all, there is a
nature of things to which our ideas have to adapt them
selves, if it would be well with us
; and in this sense the
real world is certainly independent of our ideas, and un
modified by what we think about it. Why, according to
the pragmatists themselves, it is the difficulty of coping
with a
&quot; situation




is the very type of an independent
world, whose precise nature we have to learn with more
or less expenditure of labour, if we are successfully to
extricate ourselves from our difficulty. The primary
function of knowledge, in such a case, is to represent
the situation accurately, in order to find a way out of it.
But if such phrases are at once innocent and inevitable
in the mouth of a pragmatist, they cannot in themselves
fairly be held to convict Professor Bosanquet of dualism.
But the main objection of the critic seems to be to
Bosanquet s description of knowledge as a system of judg
ments about reality reality being ultimately given for
each individual
&quot; in present sensuous perception and in
the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that
goes with it.&quot; This position (which, again, I hold to be
beyond dispute) is, I submit, entirely transformed when
it is paraphrased as
&quot; the mere assurance that somewhere
behind the curtain of sensuous perception reality exists
&quot;
(p. 92). This is a version of the critic s preconception
rather than of the author s natural meaning. Similarly
Professor Bosanquet may be venturing on slippery ground
when he permits himself to speak of the individual s
&quot;
point of contact with reality as such,&quot; and (still more
so) when he describes the immediate subject as
&quot; the
point at which the actual world impinges on my con
sciousness.&quot; But it is a far cry from such lapses of
expression to speaking of Bosanquet s real world as
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against which we have bumped.&quot; The first of the two
phrases would not indeed, I think, in the context of
Bosanquet s theory, suggest any suspicion of the old
dualism, except to one morbidly on the outlook for
symptoms of that virus. An alternative phrase of
Professor Bosanquet is that the real world is present in
perception ; and while such phrases imply that there is
more of the world, and more in the world, than is appre
hended by us at the moment, they cast no doubt upon
the actuality of the apprehension. Indeed, I cannot see
how this immediate apprehension of reality differs from




living,&quot; which the essayists everywhere assume as the
matrix out of which reflective or logical thinking
develops, and into which it resolves itself again. And
when Green s criticism upon the logic of Locke and
Hume namely, that &quot;the more thinking we do the
less we know about the real world
&quot;
is applied to Bosan
quet s theory, and the result is said to be avoided only
&quot;
by a pure act of faith,&quot; it is surely as open to Pro
fessor Bosanquet as to his critic to reply that the
results of thinking validate themselves by the harmony
or system which they introduce into our experience.
All thinking starts in faith, and is justified by its works.
If that is pragmatism, then we may all set up as prag-
matists. But the badge of pragmatism, in the ordinary
sense attached to the term, is the utilitarian estimate of
knowledge as everywhere ultimately a means to prac
tical activity of the biological and economic order. And
in regard to this estimate I cannot do better than quote
a few sentences from Professor Bosanquet s Inaugural
Address at St Andrews, in which he aptly traces the
pragmatist contention to the very same obsolete view
of knowledge which his critic here attempts to fasten186 DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY.
upon him. After referring to the
&quot; debasement of
the conception of knowledge which followed from
the separation between world and individual, char
acteristic of the modern mind,&quot; he proceeds
:
&quot; In this
whole conception, that Cognition is something secondary,
it seems to me that we have a mingling of obsolete
logic and meaningless spatial metaphor. The entire
fabric is annihilated when we realise a single point.
Knowledge is not a reproduction of an outside world,
but an endeavour to realise our nature by the construc
tion of a harmonious experience. The truth of Cognition
is not its correspondence to something else, but its
degree of individuality in itself. In a word, Cognition
is one great aspect of the life of the soul, in so far as it
is lived apart from the struggle against matter. I have
not repeated the ancient doctrine that it forms by itself
the essence of morality and religion ; but genuinely to
understand how this doctrine fails to be true, is a
problem which modern popular philosophy has never
approached at all. Certainly it is true that in Cognition
our nature affirms itself after a completer type than in
the Volition of everyday
life.&quot;
l
The eloquent vindication of Theoria in the Aristo
telian sense, of which these sentences form part, raises
the whole question whether the pragmatists view of
knowledge is not due to the limitations which they
themselves put upon the term. The writers in this
volume insist upon the
&quot; derivative and secondary,&quot; the I




and by thought they agree in meaning
&quot;
reflective
thought,&quot; or reasoning. Thought, in this sense, as Pro
fessor Dewey puts it in his opening sentences,
&quot; comes
after something and out of something and for the sake
1 On the Practical Value of Modern Philosophy, p. 14.DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY. 187
of something.&quot;
&quot;
Thinking is a kind of activity which
we perform at specific need, just as at other need we
engage in other sorts of activity
: as converse with a
friend
; draw a plan of a house
; take a walk
; eat a
dinner
; purchase a suit of clothes
; &c., &c.&quot; This
view of thought as a specific function within experi
ence is fundamental with all the writers, and they use
a variety of terms to express the other phases of ex
perience with which they contrast it. Thought is said to
arise out of





; and when the
thinking process has been successfully carried through,
it &quot;allows us to proceed with more direct modes of
experiencing.&quot; Its aim, indeed, is
&quot; the resumption of
an interrupted experience.&quot; Experience, with or with
out some adjective, is thus the term on which the
writers most generally fall back. Eeality is described
by Professor Dewey as
&quot; the drama of evolving experi
ence,&quot; a
&quot; world of continuous experiencing.&quot; Conflict




&quot; assume conscious objectification. They cease to be
ways of living, and become distinct objects of observa
tion and consideration.&quot; Objects thus
&quot;
only gradually
emerge from their life-matrix.&quot;
&quot; The object as known
&quot;
is accordingly, we are told,
&quot; not the same as the object
as apprehended in other possible modes of being con
scious of it&quot; (p. 251). When even the conclusion or
the completed judgment the insight at which we
arrive is emphatically denied to be a judgment at all
(p. 122), it becomes plain that the terms thought and
knowledge are being used exclusively of the psycholog
ical process of solving a difficulty or arriving at a con
clusion on some matter about which we are in doubt.
Judgment is therefore described as essentially dynamic,188 DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY.
&quot;
developmental,&quot;
&quot; transitive in effect and purport.&quot;
That is to say, it exists, as it were, only momentarily
in the passage from one mode of activity to another
;









&quot; There is always antecedent to thought,&quot;
says Professor Dewey,
&quot; an experience of some subject-
matter of the physical or social world, or organised
intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with
each other, so much so that they threaten to disrupt
the entire experience, which accordingly for its own
maintenance requires deliberate re -definition and re-
relation of its tensional parts. This is the re-con
structive process termed thinking; the re-constructive
situation, with its parts in tension and in such movement
toward each other as tends to a unified experience, is
the thought situation&quot; (pp. 39, 40). He calls it else
where
&quot; the particular functional situation termed the
reflective&quot; (p. 18).
But in proportion as we narrow in this way the







character and its double dependence,
&quot;
its dependence upon unreflective experience for exist-
; ence and upon a consequent experience for the test of
final validity,&quot; it is plain that debate as to the ex
clusively practical reference of thought becomes inept ;
the question as to this particular mode of experience
being settled by definition, and everything turning, as to
the general question, on the nature of those antecedent
and subsequent modes of experience which admittedly in
clude so much of our conscious life. For by the ante
cedents of thought is not to be understood a pre-rational
or merely animal consciousness, but the general course of
our lives, so far as it flows on smoothly without working
itself up into those express efforts of purposive attentionDEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY. 189
which constitute a
&quot;
thought-crisis.&quot; The antecedents are,
in short, as Professor Dewey puts it,
&quot; our universe of life
and love, of appreciation and struggle.&quot; And each crisis,
in turn, has for its result a unified or harmonised experi
ence which, as we have seen, is the test of its validity.
&quot; The test of
thought,&quot; says Professor Dewey,
&quot;
is the
harmony or unity of experience actually effected. In
that sense the test of reality is beyond thought as
thought, just as, at the other limit, thought originates
out of a situation which is not reflectional in character.&quot;
Those experiences beyond thought as thought
&quot;
pauses
of satisfaction,&quot; to employ a phrase of Professor Eoyce s
adopted by Professor Moore in the last essay are ob
viously the end for which the thought-process, in the
sense defined, exists. But to regard them in turn as
merely practical or instrumental is gratuitously to fall
into the snare of the infinite regress ; while to speak of
them as volitional or active states is true only in the (
sense that all our states are energisings of the conscious^
self. The satisfaction may be gained in the theoretic
insight of the man of science and the philosopher, or in -
the aesthetic contemplation of a landscape or a picture, as ^
well as in the smoother working of some practical activity
in the ordinary sense of that word. This is borne out by
the acknowledgment, at the close of the long essay on
&quot; Valuation as a Logical Process,&quot; that
&quot; the aesthetic ex
perience would appear to be essentially post-judgmental
and appreciative. ... As an immediate appreciation it
has no logical function, and on our principles must be
denied the name of value. ... It may have its origin
in past processes of the reflective valuational type. Never
theless, viewed in the light of its actual present character
and status in experience, the aesthetic must be excluded
from the sphere of values.&quot; Without commenting on190 DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY.
this arbitrary inversion of terms, which refuses the title
of value to what might more reasonably be taken as the
typical instance of an experience possessing independent
value, it is sufficient to note that, on this showing, the
whole realm of aesthetic experience, as post-judgmental
j and extra-logical, is excluded by the writers of this vol-
ume from what they mean by thought. Now the insight
and the glow of art, of knowledge as such, or of religious
vision, certainly display what we may call the static
character of intuition, rather than the features of what
one of the essayists aptly labels
&quot; the doubt-inquiry pro
cess
&quot;
of discursive thinking. But intelligence, reason, or
thought in the highest sense, is of the very essence of
fsuch
states, is indeed the basis of their possibility, for
art, science, and religion are the triple differentia of the
I human from the merely animal consciousness. And, in
I spite of
&quot; our reigning biological categories,&quot; it is in the
vision of truth and of beauty and of a perfect Good that
man. realises. -a. satisfaction, which, though it may be tran
sient in his individual experience, he recognises as not
merely instrumental but an end-in-itself, the satisfac
tion of his specific nature.
It is the more to be regretted, therefore, that these
Studies throw no light on the nature of those non-reflective
experiences which apparently include so much more of
our life, and which are certainly so much more valuable
than the function of thought in the narrower sense in which
it is differentiated from them. Professor Dewey recognises
the existence of the problem, but he passes from it.
&quot; The nature of the organisation and value that the ante
cedent conditions of the thought-function possess is too
large a question here to enter upon in detail.&quot; It may
be hoped that in another place he will undertake
&quot; the
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says that he is here
&quot;
striving to avoid.&quot; He draws a
distinction in the opening essay between logic in the
narrower sense, as the theory of
&quot; the particular func
tional situation termed the reflective,&quot; and
&quot; the logic of
experience, logic taken in its wider sense.&quot;
&quot; In its
generic form,&quot; he says, the latter
&quot; deals with this ques
tion : How does one type of functional situation and
attitude pass out of and into another
; for example, the
technological or utilitarian into the sesthetic, the aesthetic
into the religious, the religious into the scientific, and
this into the socio-ethical, and so on ?
&quot; Such an invest
igation, involving, as it necessarily would, an analysis of
the attitudes in question, could not fail to prove instruct
ive in Professor Dewey s hands. Its result would be, I
think, to limit and qualify the pragmatist position in
such a way as to deprive it of much of its paradox and
novelty, without robbing it of the truth and interest
which it undoubtedly possesses.
In the narrower sphere of logic just indicated, in
logic proper, apart from epistemological or metaphysical
issues of a general nature, the discussions of the present
volume are markedly fresh and suggestive ; and it need
not be denied that they owe these qualities in no small
degree to the stimulus which the writers derive from
their general point of view, and to the systematic way in
which they utilise for the purposes of logic the results of
functional psychology. Professor Dewey s incisive criti
cism of Lotze has already been mentioned. Special refer
ence might perhaps be made to his criticism of Lotze s
metaphors of the scaffolding, which is taken down when
the building is completed, and of the path to the view
point at the mountain-top. Such a view of our think
ing procedure, he contends, makes thought a tool in the
external sense or a merely formal activity. The work of192 DEWEY S STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY.
erecting should not be set over against the completed
building as a mere means to an end
;
&quot;
it is the end
taken in process or historically.
. . . The outcome of
thought is the thinking activity carried on to its own
completion ; the activity, on the other hand, is the out
come taken anywhere short of its own realisation and
thereby still going on. ... Thinking as a merely formal
activity, exercised upon certain sensations or images of
objects, sets forth an absolutely meaningless proposition.
The psychological identification of thinking with the pro
cess of association is much nearer the truth. It is,
indeed, on the way to the truth. We need only to
recognise that association is of contents or matters or
meanings, not of ideas as bare existences or events
; and
that the type of association we call thinking differs from
the associations of casual fancy and reverie in an element
of control by reference to an end which determines fitness,
and thus the selection of the associates, to apprehend how
completely thinking is a reconstructive movement of
actual contents of experience in relation to each other,
and for the sake of a redintegration of a conflicting
experience&quot; (pp. 79, 80).
Miss Thompson s analysis of &quot;every live judgment,&quot;
as involving a situation in part determined and taken for
granted and in part questioned, is very ably stated. In
the doubt-inquiry process of the judgment, the subject
represents what is given or taken for granted in each
case
; while the predicate is that part of the total expres
sion which is taken as doubtful or tentative. As soon as
the doubt arrives, there is always present some sort of
tentative solution
; and if the subject may be described
as fact or real, the predicate is for the time being ideal.
The opposition of fact and idea thus becomes a relative
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which is continually being resolved. As Miss Thompson
puts it :
&quot; All judgment is in its earliest stages a question,
but a question is never mere question. There are always
present some suggestions of an answer, which makes the
process really a disjunctive judgment. A question might
be defined as a disjunctive judgment in which one member
of the disjunction is expressed and the others implied.
If the process goes on to take the form of affirmation or
negation, one of the suggested answers is selected. . . .
The question as to whether a judgment turns out to be
negative or positive is a question of whether the stress of
interest happens to fall on the selected or on the rejected
portions of the original disjunction. Every determina
tion of a subject through a predicate includes both.&quot;
The same point is well put by Professor Dewey in his
introductory essay in connection with the growth of
science and the passage of mere hypothesis into accepted
theory ; and the idea is instructively worked out in Dr
Ashley s essay on
&quot; The Nature of Hypothesis,&quot; to which
Professor Dewey contributes an interesting comparison of
Mill and Whewell. The whole discussion is eminently
fresh, and seems to me an illuminative contribution to
logical theory, though I do not believe that the interpre
tation given is bound up so closely with
&quot; the practical
and biological criterion of fact
&quot;
as some of the writers
seem to suppose.
Dr Gore s treatment of the relation of the image to
the symbolic idea (which may, as one of the essayists
puts it, become a mere index-sign) is one of the most
convincing parts of the book. The idea as working
symbol connects itself, he contends, with the final stage
in thinking, when the content of the image has become
so familiar that it acts as a direct, or, so to speak, auto
matic stimulus.
&quot; We are working along lines of habitual
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activity so familiar that we can work almost in the dark.
We need no elaborate imagery. Guided only by the
waving of a signal flag or by the shifting gleam of a
semaphore, we thread our way swiftly through the maze
of tracks worn smooth by use and habit. But suppose a
new line of habit is to be constructed. No signal flags
or semaphores will suffice. A detailed survey of the
proposed route must be had, and here is where imagery
with a rich and varied yet flexible sensuous content,
growing out of previous surveys, may function in project
ing and anticipating the new set of conditions, and thus
become the stimulus of a new line of habit, of a new and
more far-reaching meaning. As this new line of habit,
of meaning, gets into working order with the rest of the
system, imagery tends normally to decline again to the
rdle of signal flags and semaphores&quot; (pp. 198, 199). Some
mention should also be made of Dr Stuart s analysis of
the process of ethical deliberation as consisting essentially
in the action and reaction of the previously accepted
moral standard and the new mode of conduct contem
plated (pp. 196-202). But it would obviously be im
possible in a notice like the present to enumerate all the
points of interest in the volume. The specimens given
may suffice to suggest how much stimulus and instruction
it provides for all genuine students of logic.M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF EELIGION.
1
ME
M TAGGAET S last volume is written in the
clear, crisp style to which he has accustomed his
readers, and in substance it may be described as the
negative complement of his own constructive theory,
expounded in Hegelian Cosmology. The real drift of
the argument can hardly be understood without reference
to the earlier volume, and in what I have to say I will
endeavour to connect the two books. Mr M Taggart








&quot; he means any proposition
which has metaphysical significance, and a religious dogma
is one whose acceptance or rejection by any person would
alter his religious position. He considers various defini
tions of religion, including the suggestion that religion is
identical with morality ; but he rightly contends that the
two names denote separate things, and should therefore
be kept distinct. Arnold s definition of religion as
&quot;
morality touched by emotion
&quot;
is commented upon
The defect of that definition is, that it does not indicate
the source of the emotion. Eeligion, says Mr M Taggart,
1 Some Dogmas of Religion. By John M Taggart Ellis M Taggart,
Doctor in Letters, Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College in Cambridge,
author of Studies in Hegelian Dialectic and Studies in Hegelian Cos
mology. London: Edwin Arnold, 1906. The following critical notice
appeared in The Hibbert Journal, October 1906.196 M TAGGART s SOME DOGMAS OF KELIGION.
may best be described as
&quot; an emotion resting on the
conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the
universe at large
&quot;
; and some belief in such a fundamental
harmony between our ideals and the nature of things has
always been implied, he contends, in religion. Eeligion
is conceived in common usage as
&quot;
something which brings
with it rest and peace and happiness.&quot;
This view of the relation of religion to morality seems
to me fundamentally sound, and is substantially identical
with the position formulated by Hoffding] in his Phil
osophy of Religion, that
&quot; the characteristic axiom of
religion is the conservation of value the conviction
that no value perishes out of the world.&quot; Religion
would certainly seem to imply such a belief. Ethics, or





does not tell us how far the good is realised, or is cap
able of realisation. That depends on our view of the
nature of the universe as a whole. But, as Mr M Taggart
says, a view of the universe as a whole is a metaphysical
belief or a dogma. In this large and ultimate sense, there
fore, dogma is essential to religion. Our beliefs on meta
physical subjects are, accordingly, far from being as un
practical as many people suppose. They may be of supreme
importance for the determination of our attitude towards
reality in general and towards our own lives in particular.
&quot; It will depend on those beliefs,&quot; says Mr M Taggart in
a fine passage,
&quot; whether we shall consider the universe
as determined by forces completely out of relation with
the good, or whether, on the contrary, we may trust that
the dearest ideals and aspirations of our own nature are
realised, and far more than realised, in the ultimate
reality. It will depend on them whether we can regard
the troubles of the present and the uncertainties of the
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or of a child towards its father. It will depend on them
whether we look on our pleasures as episodes which will
soon pass, or on our sorrows as delusions which will soon
be dispelled. It will depend on them whether our lives
seem to us worth living only as desperate efforts to make
the best of an incurably bad business, or as the passage
to a happiness that it has not entered into our hearts to
conceive. It will depend on them whether we regard
ourselves as temporary aggregations of atoms or as God
incarnate. . . . These questions are not devoid of prac
tical importance. It is common to speak of metaphysical
problems as abstract and unpractical. In reality, all
other questions are abstract as compared with these, and
most, as compared with these, are unpractical.&quot;
But how is dogma to be established ? In other words,
how are such metaphysical convictions to be justified
?
In his second chapter Mr M Taggart considers various
attempts at justification. Dogmas are sometimes sup
ported by the assertion that they do not rest on argu
ments at all, and cannot therefore be shaken by them.
They rest on the immediate conviction of the believer.
&quot;
If the person who holds a belief in this manner,&quot; says
Mr M Taggart caustically,
&quot; mentions the fact to me as
a reason why I should not waste his time in trying to
upset it, he is acting in a perfectly reasonable manner.
And it is also strictly relevant to mention it if he is
writing an autobiography, for it may be an important
fact in his life. Also it is relevant as a contribution to
statistics. It shows that one more person has this par
ticular conviction in this particular way. But it is not
relevant if it is put forward for any other motive. Above
all, it is absolutely irrelevant if it is put forward as a
reason to induce other people to believe the same dogma.&quot;
Dismissing this view, therefore, he proceeds to consider198 M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION.
the argument that a dogma must be true because it is
held by all, or by most people. If it were really held
by all, it would be superfluous to spend time in proving
it. This argument must therefore mean no more than
that the belief is, or has been, very general. But the
opinion of the majority has very often been proved wrong
in the past; and besides, the appearance of a decisive
majority for a particular dogma is often gained by first
excluding certain nations on the ground of their asserted
inferiority. This test of truth, therefore, cannot be
applied with consistency or safety. Nor can the truth
of a religious dogma be proved by miracles. Finally,
there is the argument from consequences. If a particular
dogma is not true, this argument runs, the universe would
be intolerably bad, and therefore the doctrine must be
true. Put in this way, however, the argument evidently
begs the very point in question ; for what reason have we
at this point to assert that the universe is not very evil ?
Moreover, in arguing from our desires and aspirations to
their fulfilment, men too often ignore the races to which
they do not belong, and also leave out of account those
of their own race whose desires are different from their
own. Such arguments are generally put forward in
favour of the orthodox ideas of a particular time and
place. This is notably the case, for example, with the
doctrine of immortality. And if it is argued that any
dogma which would paralyse our activity cannot be true,
we may ask whether there is really any dogma the belief
in whose truth would paralyse action.
&quot; It would be
absurd to act, no doubt, if action made no difference in
any result which was of value. But neither materialism
nor any other dogma which has ever been maintained
could lead to this conclusion. We may not survive the
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endure for only a few brief millions of years ; but mean
while the race has not yet ceased to exist, and here we
are, particular individuals, and while we are here, what
ever the future may be, it is better that we should be
full than hungry, better that we should work than steal,
better that we should read Kobert Browning than that we
should read Robert Montgomery.&quot; As a last resort, an
appeal is often made to faith in matters of dogma on
account of the limitation of our knowledge. Of the
limitation of our knowledge Mr M Taggart is as pro
foundly convinced as Hume, but, as he neatly puts it,
&quot;
it is somewhat remarkable that our want of knowledge
on any subject should be put forward as a reason for
coming to a particular conclusion on that subject.&quot;
So far as these arguments are concerned, therefore,
Mr M Taggart s result is entirely negative. He next
proceeds to discuss in detail the three dogmas of God,
freedom, and immortality, which are usually considered
to form the substance of religious belief. He begins
with the question of human immortality, arguing, in the
first place, that the presumption against immortality,
produced in many people by supposed results of physical
science, should be discarded. Science is concerned solely
with uniformities in the routine of our perceptions.
Physical science can have nothing to say, for example,
on the question of the independent existence of matter,
which is only one theory about the causes of our sensa
tions, and a theory which, on examination, is found to
be involved in inconsistency. The
&quot;
self,&quot; therefore,
cannot be treated as an activity of the body. Its con
scious existence is, on the contrary, a primary reality.
On lines which recall Berkeley and Lotze, Mr M Taggart
thus leads up to the theory of monadistic idealism,
which he had already advocated in his Hegelian Cos-20 M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION.
mology, and, as in that book, he again proceeds to
connect the belief in immortality with the belief in
pre-existence.
&quot; The present attitude of most Western
thinkers to the doctrine of pre-existence,&quot; he says,
&quot;
is
curious. Of the many who regard our life, after the
death of our bodies, as certain or probable, scarcely
one regards our life before the birth of those bodies
as a possibility which deserves discussion
; and yet it
was taught by Buddha and by Plato, and it is usually
associated with the belief in immortality in the Far East.
Why should men who are so anxious to-day to prove
that we shall live after this life is ended, regard the
hypothesis that we have already survived the end of
a life as one which is beneath consideration ?
&quot; Mr
M Taggart himself believes that any evidence which will
prove immortality will also prove pre-existence.
The ethical argument that immortality is demanded
by the claims of the moral personality, and that such a
belief is required if we are to vindicate the goodness
of God or the moral order of the universe, Mr M Taggart
dismisses on the general ground that the nature of reality
is obviously not incompatible with the existence of some
evil, and therefore we cannot hope for an a priori proof
that any particular evil is too bad to be consistent with
the nature of the universe. We are forced back, there
fore, he says,
&quot; on the purely metaphysical arguments.&quot;
These, as partially disclosed here and more fully de
veloped in Hegelian Cosmology/ turn out to be based
on abstract considerations as to the nature of substance.
They are, indeed, curiously pre-Kantian in character, and
it is strange to find so profound a student of Hegel
using substance throughout as the ultimate category
in speaking both of the self and of God. The perdur-
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past as to the future. Substance, indeed, is conceived
as that which can neither be created nor destroyed.
Mr M Taggart believes accordingly that our present
existence has been preceded by a plurality of lives, and
will be followed in like manner by a plurality of future
lives. The obvious objection to this theory is the fact
that we retain no memory of those previous lives, and
Mr M Taggart, it is to be noted, does not imply that
in the lives to come we shall have any memory of
our present existence.
&quot; An existence that is cut up
into separate lives, in none of which memory extends
to a previous life, may be thought to have no practical
value.&quot; He labours hard to prove that this is not
so, his most important argument being that though
the actual experiences are forgotten, their results in the
training of mind and character may be carried forward
into the next life, so that the man will be wiser and
better in the second life because of what has happened
in the first. He will, as it were, have a better start
; he
will build in the new life upon the foundations laid
in the old. This sounds, however, more plausible than
it really is, and depends upon the ambiguity of the word
&quot;
person.&quot;
&quot; In spite of the loss of memory,&quot; says Mr
M Taggart,
&quot;
it is the same person who lives in the
successive lives.&quot; Now, as Mr Bradley has forcibly
recalled to us, it is exceedingly difficult to determine
precisely what we mean by personal identity and what
its limits are. Obviously, within the present life, count
less items of our experience lapse from conscious memory
and survive only as aptitudes, dispositions, and ten
dencies. But they play their part in training the mind
and tempering the character. Our personality is not
exhausted, therefore, by the individual experiences we
can consciously recall. Still, although much may persist202 M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION.
omly in this sub-conscious fashion, it seems clear that a
continuity of conscious memory within certain limits is
involved in the ordinary notion of personality, so that
a complete break of such continuity (and this is supposed
to occur between one life and another) would make the
assertion of personal identity in the two lives unmean
ing. Locke is arguing, therefore, on right lines when he
emphasises in his well-known chapter &quot;that personal
identity consists not in the identity of substance, but in
the identity of consciousness.&quot;
I cannot help feeling that throughout the discussion
Mr M Taggart substitutes for the living and concrete
unity of self-consciousness, as manifested in experience,
the numerical unity of a soul-substance or indestructible
soul-atom on which the personal unity of experience is
supposed to depend, or in which it is somehow housed.
This soul-substance forms, as it were, the vehicle by
which the mental and moral qualities acquired by an
individual in the course of a single life are transmitted
to the next incarnation to be his working capital and the
starting-point, possibly, of further advance. The two
lives are thus continuous in the sense that both have
the same metaphysical substrate, and the identity of
substance manifests itself, on Mr M Taggart s theory, in
identity or continuity of attributes. But even so, it is
surely paradoxical, or rather simply misleading, to speak
of this continuity as
&quot;
personal identity,&quot; and to say that
in spite of the loss of memory it is
&quot; the same person
who lives in the successive lives.&quot; The identity that
exists is the identity of an object for an onlooker; it
does not exist for any one of the successive incarnations.
Each self is the realised unity of its own separate life,
and if the new life is not consciously knit to the old, it
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self. Mr M Taggart argues that the loss of memory
need not render immortality valueless, because the pres
ent life has value, although, admittedly, it carries no
memories beyond itself. Why, then, he says, should
not future lives have value, although in the same way
without memory beyond themselves ?
&quot; In that case
a man will be better off for his immortality, since it will
give him an unlimited amount of valuable existence,
instead of a limited amount. And a man who believed
that he had this immortality would have a more desir
able expectation of the future than if he did not believe
it.&quot; Certainly the future lives, when they come, have
the same chance as this life of being valuable to the
persons who have to live them, and as the lives go on for
ever, there will thus be
&quot; an unlimited amount of valu
able existence
&quot;
; but there is to me a savour of mockery
in the saying that the
&quot; man
&quot;
is better off because the
prospect gives
&quot; him
&quot; an unlimited, instead of a limited,
amount of valuable existence. Mr M Taggart himself is
candid enough to add that
&quot;
if a man should say that he
takes no more interest in his own fate, after memory of
his present life had gone, than he would take in the fate
of some unknown person,&quot; he does not see how he could
be shown to be in the wrong.
&quot; His own fate
&quot;
is so far
a question-begging description of the facts, since it im
plies the truth of Mr M Taggart s theory of what con
stitutes identity. He puts the case more fairly in




could be assured that in a short time he would lose for
ever all memory of the past, would he consider this to be
annihilation, and take no more interest in the person of a
similar character who would occupy his old body than
he would in any stranger
?
&quot;
In both connections Mr
M Taggart expresses his own conviction that most men204 M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION.
would regard the fortunes of this hypothetical individual
with an interest at least analogous to that which they
take in their own conscious survival. That is a question
which could only be determined by statistics, and I will
at least record my adhesion to the opposite view. I am
not here arguing in defence of an immortality accom
panied by memory. I can vividly appreciate the stim
ulus of the Positivist view that all the good of every life
becomes the enduring possession of the race
; or, on more
homely ground, I can understand a man working for his
family or his country without giving a thought to his
personal continuance. But I fail to understand what
special interest a man can take in the unknown series of
those who are to inherit his soul-substance, any more
than in the equally unknown series of those who had the
usufruct of it before him. Nor can I see how what I
should describe as the non-personal immortality of such
individual substances, should
&quot; make any difference to
our attitude towards reality in general and towards our
own lives in particular.&quot;
I think, however, that I see in what consists for Mr
M Taggart the attraction of the belief, considered not
with reference to the particular person who is mislead-
ingly described as immortal, but as a general theory of
the nature of existence. It is because it seems to
guarantee an idealistic theory of the universe. Mr
M Taggart holds, and in this I agree with him, that
value resides only in the experience of conscious beings.
Such values are realised (it may be, progressively realised)
in the present life of the human race upon the earth
;
but if these values are realised only in perishing indi
viduals, in perishing civilisations or races, if our solar
system, for example, is after a given time to pass away,
leaving behind it no result beyond a certain increase inM TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION. 205
the temperature of surrounding space, there is an aim-
lessness in this ceaseless process of building up and
pulling down which is at variance with our moral ideas,
and seems to contradict the belief that spiritual values
constitute the ultimate facts of existence. In order to
save the situation, therefore, Mr M Taggart argues that




or monads, which appear over and
over again in the time series, and serve as the media in
which the cumulative results of experience in the time-
process are preserved. These spiritual entities flower, as
it were, in successive lives. They constitute the
&quot; funda
mental differentiations of the Absolute,&quot; which is, in fact,







finite individuals, each of which finds his character
and individuality in his relations to the rest, and in his





has been recognised by
various thinkers as the highest form of the spiritual
ideal, but the attempt to give precision to the idea by
converting it into the doctrine of a definitely determined
number of eternal self-existent substances seems to me to
obscure the true meaning of personality and to exemplify
the kind of metaphysical speculation from which Kant,
and still more Hegel, was supposed to have set us free.
The other dogmas above referred to the existence of
God and the freedom of the will are treated by Mr
M Taggart in a more exclusively negative sense. Not
only does he set himself to demolish the ordinary argu
ments by which they are supported, but he holds that on
metaphysical grounds they can be shown to be untrue.
The discussion of free-will seems to me below Mr
M Taggart s usual level of freshness and incisiveness.
He attacks a
&quot; freedom of indetermination
&quot;
for which I206 M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION.
do not think any champion would enter the lists. &quot;What
upholder of freedom, for example, would accept the state
ment that
&quot;
according to the indeterminist theory our
choice between motives is not determined by anything
at all
&quot;
? And when Mr M Taggart says that
&quot; on the
determinist hypothesis an omnipotent God could have
prevented all sin by creating us with better natures and
in more favourable surroundings,&quot; and that
&quot; he cannot
see what extraordinary value lies in the incompleteness
of the determination of the will, which should counter
balance all the sin, and the consequent unhappiness
caused by the misuse of that will,&quot; the answer is that
creatures so turned out would not be moral beings at all.
They would be things, and not persons. Mr M Taggart s
own arguments treat the question entirely on the plane
of efficient causality, on which motives are regarded as




is to say, an inherited or implanted disposition. But
such schematic representation remains entirely outside
the realities of the moral consciousness. In the funda
mentals of ethical theory, however unfortunately he may
sometimes have expressed himself, Kant s insight is un
erring, and the basis of all ethical discussion is just the
difference between a person and a thing. A being who
can only act under the idea of freedom is really free in
the sense required by ethics. It is the judgment of the
moral agent upon his own action which can alone tell
us the real nature of the act, however justifiably the
psychologist, the historian, or the social reformer may
deal with it from another point of view. I believe that
a more sympathetic study of the great master in ethics
would have made MrM Taggart s chapter on
&quot; Free Will
&quot;
more adequate to its theme.
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together. Indeed, the tendency of modern thought is
rather to make the conviction of immortality dependent
on the doctrine of God. But for Mr M Taggart the one
doctrine excludes the other. The eternity of finite selves
in the sense explained above negates for him the sup
position that the Absolute is a self or person.
&quot;
It would
be difficult,&quot; he has told us in his Hegelian Cosmology,
&quot;
to find a proof of our own immortality which did not
place God in the position of a community rather than a
person.&quot; In the present volume, Mr M Taggart begins his
discussion of the question by distinguishing God from the
Absolute. The two terms are generally used, he allows,
as synonymous ; but the God of Spinoza, for example, is
not personal, whereas personality seems inseparable from
the ordinary idea of God.
&quot;
By God,&quot; says Mr M Taggart,
&quot; I mean a being who is personal, supreme, and good ;
&quot;
and the definition may be taken as coinciding, so far as





is probably taken to imply that God
is the Creator or Author of the universe
; but in Mr
M Taggart s view it is not necessary for a belief in God
that God should be conceived either as omnipotent or as
creative, provided the belief is retained in a being who is
personal, supreme, and good. He himself, indeed, denies
the existence of God, if understood as a being omnipotent
and creative, but he is willing to admit the possibility of
a non-omnipotent God, whom he styles
&quot; the director of
the universe,&quot;
&quot; a person of appreciable importance when
measured against the whole universe,&quot;
&quot; one who fights
for the good and who may be victorious.&quot; The only
reason why we should not believe in the existence of
such a God, he says, with a dash of cynicism, is that
there is no reason why we should believe in it.
He first attacks the doctrine of an omnipotent and208 M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION.
creative God. The cosmological argument from the neces
sity for a first cause, he points out, is powerless. If we
suppose that God exists in time,
&quot; then we have a sub
stance which has persisted through an infinite past time.&quot;
But if one substance can so exist without being caused,







require one ? On the
other hand, if God s nature is timeless, then it is incap
able of change, and the creation of the universe at a par
ticular moment cannot, therefore, be explained from the
nature of God. If we pass to the argument from design,
Kant has already told us that it can prove, at most, the
existence of an architect or designer, not that of an omni
potent creator. If it proved the existence of a God at
all, says Mr M Taggart, it would also offer a positive
disproof of his omnipotence. He next proceeds to argue
that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible
with the belief in an omnipotent being who is also good.
He repudiates with not unnatural warmth the theory of
Pascal and Mansel that goodness in God may mean
something quite different from what is called goodness in
men. He refers to Mill s famous saying in this connec
tion as
&quot; words which form one of the turning-points in
the religious development of the world.&quot; This is, surely,
somewhat exaggerated language, and in view of this high
estimate of the sentiment, it strikes one as quaint when
Mr M Taggart goes on to criticise the prudence of Mill s
resolve. It might be wiser after all, he suggests, to com
pound with such a God-monster than to risk the extremes
of his malignity. It must be said that the discussion in
this chapter is, on the whole, rather profitless, because
Mr M Taggart insists on taking omnipotence as implying
the power to make contradictions true. It may be un
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attacking never assert omnipotence in the sense of ability
to override intellectual and moral necessities, the polemic
is rather in the air. It is no pertinent answer, for ex
ample, to the argument that the evil in the universe is
the result of free will, to say that
&quot; a God who cannot
create a universe in which all men have free will and
which is at the same time free from all evil is not an
omnipotent God, since there is one thing which he can
not do.&quot;
Mr M Taggart passes next to consider the alternative
of a creative God who is not omnipotent, referring in this
connection to Dr Eashdall s essay in the volume Personal
Idealism. If God is creative, he argues, nothing exists
unless He decides to create it unless, that is, He prefers
its existence to its non-existence. We cannot, therefore,
in strictness, speak of God s will as thwarted by the exist
ence of evil, for He willed the universe as a whole with
the evil in it. Such a being, he concludes, could not be
a God in the sense in which we have agreed to under
stand the word, because he would not be good. Here
again, however, there seems to be implied in Mr
M Taggart s argument the same interpretation of creative
power as we found in the case of omnipotence. He
understands by it power to compass moral, if not intel
lectual, impossibilities. The contention of those against
whom Mr M Taggart is arguing would be that moral
goodness, or indeed the existence of a moral agent or
a personality at all, is impossible without the risk
(without the practical certainty, we may say) of the
occurrence of evil volitions. But it does not follow
from this, they would maintain, that evil is not repug
nant in itself to the author of the universe. The dis
cussion of the third possibility, that of a non-omnipotent
God who is not regarded as creator but as one person210 M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION.
among others, though indefinitely more powerful, leads to
the less negative, but somewhat equivocal, result already
indicated. To be frank, one sees no reason why this
mythical
&quot;
person of appreciable importance
&quot;
should be
dignified with the august name of God
; and as a descrip
tion of Mr M Taggart s own conclusions the blunt expres
sion in Hegelian Cosmology seems preferable,
&quot; the Abso
lute is not God, and in consequence there is no God.&quot;
The concluding chapter considers the negative result
of the whole discussion in its bearing on human happi
ness. The existence of an omnipotent creator, it is
argued, would give us no reason to expect any goodness
in the universe which we should not have expected other
wise. The existence of a non-omnipotent God would
give us
&quot; no appreciable help towards a cheerful view of
the universe,&quot; seeing that it leaves us uncertain how
much God may be able to do. On the other hand,
&quot;
it
is quite possible without a belief in God to maintain that
the nature of reality is such as to ensure the predomin
ance of good. There might be a God and yet the universe
might be, on the whole, bad. There might be no God
and yet the universe might be, on the whole, good.&quot; The
only way, therefore, of arriving at any certainty on this
point
&quot; would be by the establishment of a complete system
of metaphysics.&quot; Mr M Taggart evidently refers here to
his own theory as sketched in Hegelian Cosmology.
In spite of its acuteness, and in spite of the flashes of
deep feeling which redeem much that is merely clever,
the book leaves me with a distinct impression of unreality.
I may be to some extent disqualified as a critic. When
one does not believe in a creator db extra, whether omni
potent or non-omnipotent, and when the conception of a
finite director of the universe strikes one as frankly
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discussion of these alternatives. But if Mr M Taggart
was going to discuss religious dogmas to any purpose, he
should have spent his time upon the view which is only
mentioned in passing, that
&quot; God is the sole reality.&quot;
Neither religion nor philosophy can seriously entertain
any other alternative. In many cases this view has led
to a denial of the personality of the divine; but even
Martineau, personalist of the personalists, speaks of God
as
&quot; the soul of all souls.&quot; The preliminary difficulty,
therefore, which Mr M Taggart alleges, of conceiving
&quot; how one person could be part of another,&quot; is of a nature
which suggests a reconsideration of the conception of
personality rather than the omission of a thorough dis
cussion of the only vital theory of God and man. If I
may say so without offence, Mr M Taggart s treatment of
the dogmas he discusses seems to deprive them of their
primary reference to the needs and utterances of the
religious consciousness. The doctrines seem, if I may so
express myself, to become finitised and mechanised. I
have already indicated my view of the doctrine of eternal
soul-substances. Similarly, in the case of God, it is
surely not the existence of
&quot; a substance which has
persisted through an infinite past time&quot; that we are
concerned about, or even the existence of another person
to love. When Mr M Taggart speaks of the love of God
as
&quot;
something entirely distinct from reverence and ad
miration and gratitude a feeling of one person for
another, which is not unworthy to bear the same name
as the feeling of friend for friend,&quot; I feel somehow that
Spinoza s description of the amor intdlectualis Dei and




into the practical love of God
are at bottom more religious, and become the situation
better. What does the existence of God, or the person-,212 M TAGGART S SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION.
ality of God, mean for the religious thinker save the
intense conviction of the rationality and the righteous
ness of the universe ? And is it not strange to say, as
Mr M Taggart does, of faith in God (p. 69), that
&quot;
it will
only give us light on one particular dogma, that the world
is wisely and righteously governed
&quot;
? Surely this is the
sum and substance of all religious faith and of all philo
sophical construction. Does it not carry with it the
ultimate answer in regard to immortality as in regard to
every other question ? As Carlyle puts it in one of the




shall all meet Yonder, and the tears be wiped from all
eyes. One thing is no Perhaps ; surely we shall all meet,
if it be the will of the Maker of us. If it be not His
will, then is it not better so ?




as metaphysic, is occupied in deter
mining with increasing accuracy the definitions
and the mutual relations of the three great objects of
thought God, the World, and Man. Religion, in its
current acceptation, implies a certain theory of the
nature of at least two of these God and man and
their relation to one another. Philosophy and religion
are, therefore, and have always been, most intimately
connected. From another point of view, again, religion,
considered as a subjective manifestation, is so universal
a mark of human culture, when it advances above the
lowest stages, that it cannot be left unnoticed by any
philosophy which pretends to give an exhaustive account
of man and his relation to the system of which he forms
a part. Every epoch of culture has derived its specific
form and colour from its relation to certain religious
ideas : difference of civilisation means, in the main,
difference of religious training. In these circumstances,
it is perhaps not too much to say that the capacity of a
1 As explained in the Preface, the chapters which follow were written
in 1881, and appeared in the following year as the second part of a volume
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philosophy to find room for religion in its scheme of
things becomes no unfair gauge of the adequacy or in
adequacy of the system in question.
In Christian times the relations of philosophy and
religion have been mainly determined by the attitude of
reason towards the churchly doctrine of revelation.
Three relations of the human reason to the things
of God are possible.
(1) It may be said that the content of theology is
matter communicated by God in an extraordinary fashion
truths otherwise unattainable, and on which it is
beyond the competency of reason to sit in judgment.
We have thus two spheres arbitrarily separated. As
regards their mutual relation, theology is at first supreme
and law-giving ; reason, as the handmaiden of faith, is
occupied solely in applying the premises which it receives
from the hand of theology. These are the Middle Ages,
the Ages of Faith. Then we have the relation of in
difference, typically represented by a man like Bacon.
When Bacon, in his circumnavigation of the intellectual
globe, comes to theologia sacra, he steers clear of the
subject with the remark :
&quot; If we proceed to treat of it,
we must leave the bark of human reason and pass into
the ship of the Church.&quot; Divinity, he says elsewhere,
&quot;
is founded upon the placets of God.&quot;
&quot; In such there
can be no use of absolute reason. We see it familiarly
in games of wit, as chess or the like. The draughts and
first laws of the game are positive
. . . and not examin-
able by reason.&quot; The position is, in words, the same as
that of the Middle Ages, but it is formulated in a
different interest : the irreverent comparison is significant
of the secular spirit that characterised Bacon and, in a
measure, the whole Elizabethan generation. But the
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is found in Bayle), is necessarily transient: it merely
marks the end of the period of unnatural separation. In
the long-run reason claims the whole man. It is in
virtue of his reason that he is the subject of a revel
ation
; and he is continually being asked to exercise his
reason upon parts of the revelation, even by those who
most strenuously maintain the severance of the two
spheres. It is only because there is a certain reason and
fitness in the conceptions of revealed religion that he has
ever made them his own, and that he continues to use
them and to find in them some kind of meaning and
edification. The external relation of reason to religious
truth cannot, therefore, continue
; nor can the encroach
ments of reason be stemmed by temporary distinctions
between the tmnatural and the supernatural.
(2) A natural movement of revulsion carries reason
into assuming an extreme or purely negative attitude
towards revealed religion, such as we find exemplified in
the current of thought which prevailed during the eigh
teenth century. The dry light of the understanding has
here usurped all the ground to itself
; and the explanation
of the rise of positive religions is sought in the hypothesis
of deceit, ambition, and priestcraft. Keligion is identified
with morality plus an intellectual adherence to certain
dogmas of current philosophy the existence of God and
the immortality of the soul which are dignified with
the title of Natural Eeligion. But it was impossible
that this dry rationalism should survive the moving of
the deeper springs of feeling that marked the close of
the century. The first revival of a sense of historic
probability showed the untenable nature of a hypothesis
which derived man s greatest onward impulse from a hot
bed of corruption and deceit. But to overcome the
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was needed which should give a wider scope to reason
and a more inward meaning to revelation.
(3) This is the third position, as occupied by the best
thinkers of the nineteenth century. It cannot be
attained without the abandonment of the mechanical
philosophy and the unhistorical criticism of the preceding
age. So long as the Deistic view of God and of His
relations to the world and history held the field, a revel
ation necessarily meant simply an interference alt extra
with the established order of things. Deism does not
perceive that by separating God from the world and man
it really makes Him finite, by setting up alongside of
Him a sphere to which His relations are transient and
accidental. The philosopher to whom the individual
self and the sensible world form the first reality gradu
ally comes to think of this otiose Deity as a more or less
ornamental appendage to the scheme of things. In
France the century ended in Atheism, and in cosmo
politan circles in England and Germany the belief in
God had become little more than a form of words. But
if Individualism is provably untenable, all this will be
changed. If man himself be inexplicable, save as sharing
in the wider life of a universal reason, and if the process
of history be realised (in an intimate sense, and not with
a mere formal acknowledgment) as the exponent of a
divine purpose, then revelation denotes no longer an
interference with the natural course of that development,
but becomes the normal method of expressing the rela
tion of the immanent spirit of God to the children of
men at great crises of their fate. The relation is never
broken, the inspiration is never withdrawn, but there are
times at which its nearness is more particularly felt.
To these the religious sense of mankind, not without a
true instinct, tends to restrict the term revelationPHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL. 219
and such a turning-point is, for us, the advent of
Christianity.
It was Lessing who first flung this fertile idea into the
soil of modern thought, where it was destined soon to
bear fruit an hundredfold. In spite of his own imperfect
statement (in the Education of the Human Eace and
elsewhere), he may be said to have founded the Phil
osophy of Religion in the sense in which it is now
understood. Lessing and Kant stand together in
Germany, closing the old age and opening the new.
Every epoch-making mind has two sides. Like Janus,
it looks two ways
: one face is turned to the past, the
other to the future. No one can read Kant intelligently
without perceiving two tendencies that strive for the
mastery. In Lessing the conflict between the old and
the new is still more painful, and communicates an
element of unrest to his whole life. When he is brought
in contact with the manuscripts of Reimarus, the un
mitigated representative of the eighteenth century, he is
driven by a kind of revulsion to elaborate grounds for
the defence of the idea of revelation, and even of certain
dogmas of the Christian faith. But it was after all a
tour de force ; and when he was left alone, without the
stimulus of opposition, he was apt to become once more
a man of the Enlightenment like those around him. But
he never attained their self-complacency. In his life
time he gained only the distrust of both parties ; now we
can sympathise with his struggles, and recognise in him
the pioneer of a new time. This indication of his
position and influence must be enough in a sketch like
the present, which does not aim at going beyond the
limits fixed by the two names Kant and Hegel.
&quot;We
pass, therefore, without further preface, to consider the
treatment which religion receives at the hands of Kant.220 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
CHAPTEK I.
THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.
The foundations of Kant s philosophy are laid in
his ethics. It is only in connection with his ethical
theory, therefore, that his Philosophy of Eeligion
can be understood. The immediate consciousness of
the moral law introduces us to a world of realities,
from which, according to Kant, the categories and
forms of our own thought exclude us in the sen
sible sphere. It is quite possible to accept the
gist of Kant s position here, and at the same time
to hold that we know all the reality of the sen
sible world that there is to know. There is no need
to adopt Kant s mystification about things in them
selves, as different from the things that are known
;
but he is right in saying that the world of sense is
not noumenal, if by noumenon be understood the notion
of that which can be an end-in-itself. The sensible
world is essentially phenomenon ; it exists for reason
and as a means to rational consciousness. If it were
possible to think of Nature out of that reference, it
would be seen to be destitute of anything that could
fairly be deemed to confer permanent value upon it.
Its forms might flit for ever across the inane, without
the suggestion of any end which they were there to
realise, and which reason must pronounce as worthy,
in its own self, of being realised. Without such an
end-in-itself, existence is, literally, to the speculative
mind a vain show. Philosophy may be intelligibly
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supreme end, which shall serve, as it were, to justify
existence something in the contemplation of which a
rational being may find complete and permanent satis
faction, and to the advancement of which he may
unquestioningly subordinate his individual efforts. The
phenomenalness of the sensible world may be taken
to mean simply that it does not supply to reason
such an end. All the forms of its life are ends only
in a relative sense
; they have their true end outside
of themselves. It is evident that, in this sense, there
can be no more than one noumenon. The notion of
end - in - itself implies that whatever is so designated
receives its title because all other ends, relatively so-
called, hold their significance in fee from it, and
because there is nothing beyond itself with which it
can be compared, or to which it can be subordinated.
The idea of a plurality of ends-in-themselves may, at
most, be employed, with a certain laxity, as indicating
the variety of aims which are reduced to unity in the
one central conception. Nor can there be any doubt
where this one noumenon is to be found : reason or
the rational being alone does not require to go outside
of itself to seek its end. If it did, we should be em
barked upon a hopeless progressus in infinitum, and
must despair of any answer to the question, What is
good in itself what is the good
? But reason is self-
centred, and fixes its own end. Even in such a pro-
gressus the objects of pursuit would be, to all eternity,
such as reason dictated to itself as worthy of attain
ment. Sooner or later the acknowledgment is forced
from us that reason must itself be dominant in all
its ends, and that it is impossible to cast off this
sway. For reason, in other words the supreme end,
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must be the realisation of its own nature. Reason,
therefore, or the rational being, as rational, is the
sole noumenon or end-in-itself.
This may be described, without misrepresentation, as
the permanent result of the Kantian Ethics
; and it is
essentially, from another side, the same as the result
of the Critique of Knowledge. Just as the source of
the categories cannot be brought under the categories,
so the source of all ends cannot of itself be subordinated
to any of the ends it sets up. The pure Ego cannot




thought through itself, and all other things through
it.&quot;
So here the ultimate, satisfying good of reason must
be reason itself. In both cases the subject is recog
nised as raised above the sphere of things as deter
mining, not determined. Man bears in his own person
the last principle of explanation, whether in a theoretical
or in a practical regard. The value of Kant s result,
however, depends on the interpretation put upon reason,
and on the relation in which reason is supposed to stand
to the worlds of knowledge and action. The fruitful-
ness of the principle is impaired, in Kant s own system,
by the purely formal or abstract way in which it is
taken. This makes it impossible for him to deduce
either a real world or a concrete system of duties.
In the Pure Reason the unity of apperception remains
a form into which matter is poured from another
source: in ethics, similarly, the result must be an
imperative that commands nothing in particular, unless
reason is seen to have creatively specified itself in the
historical life and institutions of the world.
Kant s ethical position, however, must be put in a
clearer light to be properly understood.
&quot; An intelli
gence,&quot; he says,
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beings, that he fixes his end for himself.&quot;
1 Nature is
governed by mechanical, chemical, and biological laws,
which it fulfils without knowing them. The animal
has its ends fixed for it by recurring instinct, and, of
itself, it does not move out of the beaten circle of
these natural impulses. The mark of a rational being
is that it is raised above the government of a succes
sion of impulses. Intelligence consists in the power
of realising mentally a general law or principle, and
will is the power of determining action accordingly.
By the possession of these twin faculties, man is
differentiated from the brute. Will, freedom, person
ality in its most intimate sense, are all contained in
the initial self - determination. It introduces us, in
short, to the knowledge of good and evil, and makes
us the subjects of another legislation, quite different
from the natural. Intelligence has not been given to
man merely to enable him to satisfy his animal desires
more copiously and exquisitely: happiness is, in fact,
far more effectually secured under the guidance of in
stinct than under that of reason. The possession of
reason intimates another and a higher purpose to be
realised in human life. With the transference of the
reins from the hands of nature to our own, comes also
the responsibility for the course of the driving. A
beast fulfils its instincts, and is blameless; man, en
lightened by consciousness, often abuses them. It is
of the essence of reason to generate the conception of
&quot;
ought.&quot; Morality is founded on this unique concep
tion; and a moral or an immoral life becomes at once




the subjective law or determinator of
1 &quot; Die verminftige Natur&quot; is Kant s phrase here. Werke, iv. 285.
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our will. The relation between the law which reason
lays down, and our subjective freedom to follow the law
or to swerve from it, is the subject-matter of morality ;
the idea of obligation which the relation contains, is
formulated by Kant in the Categorical Imperative.
1
In accordance with his usual custom, Kant proceeds
to consider how such a command is possible whence
it derives its indisputable authority. He finds the ex
planation in a view of reason such as has been already
indicated. The law is binding upon all rational beings,
because it is reason s own law. The aspect of the law
as a command expressing necessitation is due to the
fact that we are not purely rational. We have a sen
sitive nature, and are swayed by sensitive determinants
;
hence our will is not holy, or in perfect conformity to
the law. Nevertheless, it is not a foreign yoke that is
imposed upon us
; we are subject to our own legislation.
Man as noumenon, or purely rational being, gives the
law
; man as phenomenon receives it. This is the prin
ciple of the Autonomy of the Will, by which Kant may
be said to have solved the question of obligation. As
long as the authority imposing the law is separated from
the consciousness to which it appeals, its right to command
may be called in question. The law must be such in its
conception that every man may be, as it were, thrust
back on himself, so as to recognise in it his own law.
1 It is important to remark that the Categorical Imperative is simply
the scientific formulation of the universal recognition, in some shape or
other, of an &quot;ought&quot; and an &quot;ought-not&quot;; to which is added, in the
Kantian Ethics, an account of the conditions under which alone such a
universally binding command is possible. The history of the evolution
of the conception of right, with its meaning always gaining in purity
and complexity, is, therefore, quite beside the question investigated by
Kant. The possibility of the occurrence of a moral action, and, conse
quently, the possibility of Ethics as a science, depends on the existence
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The moral Sollen is his necessary Wollen as member
of an intelligible world, that is, as a will capable of
abstracting from the particular determinants of sense.
The notion of such an absolute law is plainly, from
another side, the same notion as that of an absolute
End by which all action must be conditioned. The
authority of the law springs, on this view, from the fact
that it enjoins the realisation of what we recognise as
our permanent and essential self. The position is, in
ethics, the same as that of the self-conditionedness of
thought in speculation. The End which intelligence
fixes for itself cannot be, Kant says, a material end to
be achieved; for in that case the will would be deter
mined by something beyond itself. It must be an in
dependent end (ein selbststandiger Zweck) ; and
&quot; this
can be nothing else than the Subject of all ends itself.&quot;
*
Or, as he says elsewhere,
&quot;
humanity, as objective End,
ought to form, as law, the supreme limiting condition of
all subjective ends.&quot;
2
Such, then, is the foundation, and probably the most
valuable part, of Kant s ethical construction. The Cate
gorical Imperative, or the pure form of universally
obligatory law, is
&quot; the sole fact of pure reason.&quot;
3 The
rationale of the possibility of such a command is found
in the idea of reason or the rational will as self-legis
lative, and so laying down a law which every rational
being must recognise. In the Groundwork of the
Metaphysic of Ethics, Kant talks of deducing from this
single Imperative
&quot;
all the imperatives of duty.&quot; It
cannot be said, however, that he has succeeded in con-
1 Werke, iv. 285. In the idea of a good will we must abstract, he




Ibid., v. 33, &quot;das einzige Factum der reinen Vernunft.&quot;
P226 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
necting his scheme of duties with his central principle.
If he had paid more attention to the idea of reason as
End, and so the source of the matter as well as the form
of its action, it might have been possible to bring the
particular and the universal more effectively together.
But this would have meant virtually that reconsideration
of the nature of the universal Self and its relations to
the world which we everywhere miss in Kant, and which
even in his ethical scheme remains fragmentary. The
disjunction of the universal Self from the phenomenal
world in this instance, from the historical world of
institutions and customs is the source of the formalism
which succeeding critics have so copiously blamed in the
Kantian Ethics. The notion of End remains for Kant
strictly convertible with the pure form of law. Hence he




condition as an End which
&quot; must be thought negatively,
that is, counter to which we must not act.&quot; This is quite
of a piece with his unsatisfactory method of exemplifying
his formula by taking up particular laws empirically, and
testing them by comparison with its limiting condition.
An absolute End, however, cannot be reached by abstract
ing from all real ends
; it can be got at only by showing
all real ends to be included in one conception. And if
the notion of a universal or noumenal Self is to acquire
positive content, it must not be separated from the reason
that is in the world. Apart from the definite forms of
that development, the Self is no more than an abstract
point of unity. It was the impossibility of finding a real
End in his abstract notion of the rational Self that made
Kant round off his ethical system with a conception of
the summum bonum which is essentially Eudaemonistic in
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It was through the implications of the Categorical
Imperative that Kant reached the completed theory of
the world, which he found denied him in the theoretical
reason. These implications are what he called the Postu
lates of the Practical Reason
; and they correspond to
the three Ideas which he designates in the Critique of
Pure Eeason as the proper object of metaphysical in
quiry God, Freedom, and Immortality. The noumenal,
and therefore unending, existence of the soul
; the possi
bility of a reconciliation between the idea of free causa
tion and the completely determined series of conditions
demanded by reason in accounting for a phenomenon ;
and the reality of the idea of God, are the questions
treated by Kant in the Dialectic under the heads of
Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology respectively. In
the field of pure reason, the Idea of the Ego as noumenal
unity, and the Idea of God as
&quot; the supreme and neces
sary unity on which all empirical reality is based,&quot; are
simply points of view (Gesichtspunkte) by which reason









process of organising experience
: we proceed as if all
the phenomena of the internal sense were unified in one
unchanging subject, and as if all phenomena, subjective
and objective, were grounded in
&quot; one all-embracing Being
as their supreme and all-sufficient cause.&quot; Similarly, we
proceed in Cosmology according to the regulative Idea of
the World as an infinite series of necessary causation
;
but the possibility is still left open of the existence of
an intelligible or noumenal freedom alongside of this
phenomenal determination, should such a conception be
imperatively demanded on other grounds. The demand
comes from the side of Ethics. Freedom, Immortality,228 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
and the Existence of God are involved, Kant maintains,
in the unconditional Imperative of the moral law. They
are the conditions requisite for the observance of its com
mand
; and they lose, therefore, at least, so far as the
practical reason is concerned, their merely regulative
character. They become objects of rational belief (Ver-
nunftglaube). It is true that, just because the Postulates
are reached on ethical grounds, they are not to be treated
as theoretical dogmata.
&quot; Moral theology,&quot; he says,
&quot;
is
only of immanent use, namely, with reference to the
fulfilment of our destiny here in the world.&quot; Indeed,
to treat the Postulates as scientific facts would be to try
to defeat the very object of reason in leaving us in this
comparative twilight
: it would make a disinterested moral






represent Kant s definite
notion of the intelligible unity of the world.
The first of the Postulates to be deduced is that of
Freedom. It is treated, indeed, by Kant less as a Postu
late than as a fact : he calls it the one Idea of Pure
Eeason whose object is a fact to be reckoned among
scibilia.
1 It is immediately deducible from the primary
fact of the moral law. The Imperative is an absolute
&quot; Thou shalt&quot;; and, in such a case, if the command is
not to be quite meaningless,
&quot; We can, because we ought.&quot;
Morality and Freedom thus reciprocally condition one
another : the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of Free
dom, while Freedom is the ratio essendi, or the condition
of the possibility, of the moral law. Hence, in spite of
the inevitable determination of every event in the pheno
menal sphere by antecedent events, Kant maintains the
perfect freedom of the will, in each case of action, to
choose between obedience and disobedience to the law.
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Phenomenal antecedents can furnish no excuse for dis
obedience, for time does not enter into the conception of
the immediate relation which exists between the will and
the moral law. Though all a man s past actions have
been bad, yet every fresh act of volition is an absolutely
new beginning, in which he has a perfectly free choice
between good and evil. He is conscious that he might
have annulled the whole evil past, and acted morally,
even while the actual immoral action which results is
seen to flow with strict necessity from his phenomenal
character, as revealed in his previous actions.
1
1 It is no part of my present purpose to trace the difficulties in which
Kant s conception of Freedom involves him. By way of explaining the
last statement, Kant says
: &quot;A rational being may rightly say of every
illegal act he perpetrates that he could have left it undone, although, as
phenomenon, it is sufficiently determined by the past, and so far in
fallibly necessary ; for the act, with all the past that determines it,
belongs to a single phenomenal character with which he endows himself
(einem einzigen Phiinomen seines Charakters, den er sich selbst verschafft),
and by force of which he imputes to himself, as a cause independent of
every sensuous determinant, the causality of those phenomena.&quot; Simil
arly Kant speaks of the empirical character as the
&quot; sensuous schema
&quot; of
the intelligible. It seems from such passages as if, in each individual
action, the agent were simply reaffirming the original act by which he
took that intelligible character to himself. This is how the matter




act, which contains the seeds of all determination in
itself. The letter of Kant leads directly to such a theory, as well as to
the further application of the same idea by Schopenhauer to his doctrine
of a blind or unconscious Will. Taken as science, Kant s theory of in
telligible freedom seems to me untenable. There is no such separation
between the phenomenal and the noumenal as he supposes, and if man is
not free phenomenally, he is not free at all. In separating the man from
his &quot;character&quot; intelligible or phenomenal an unwarrantable abstrac
tion is involved : Kant seems to be in quest of the phantasmal freedom
which is supposed to consist in the absence of determination by motives.
The error of the Determinists from which this idea is the recoil involves
an equal abstraction of the man from his thoughts, and interprets the
relation between the two as an instance of the mechanical causality which
exists between two things in nature. The point to be grasped in the con-230 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
The second Postulate is the Immortality of the Soul.
The law demands complete conformity with itself : it is to
be the sole determinator of the will. In a being sensitive
as well as rational, this conformity is never more than
partial. Nevertheless, whatever the Imperative demands
must be possible
: if a holy will is not possible in
humanity as a present achievement, it must be realis
able under the form of an infinite progress or continual
approximation to the idea of holiness. In this way the
ethical Imperative guarantees to us an immortality in
which to work out its behest. But the mere subjection
of the will to the form of law represents only one side of
our nature. Man has a phenomenal or sensitive nature,
which cannot and ought not to be wholly left out of
account. Subject to the supreme condition of conformity
to the moral law worthiness man, as a sensitive being,
asks for Happiness, and figures to himself the sumnmm
bonum as the combination of Virtue with Happiness.
Now the moral law simply commands the sacrifice of all
subjective desires or inclinations when duty calls
; it does
not provide for the making good to the individual of
the possible, and even probable, loss of happiness which
he may sustain. There is thus a breach between the
consciousness of moral integrity and the happiness which
consists in the satisfaction of ineradicable and harmless
subjective desires. The consciousness of rectitude is in
itself bare: it is only by a figure of speech that the
troversy is that a man and his motives are one, and that consequently he
is in every instance self-determined. In reference to the Kantian position,
it may be said that, inasmuch as the moral law is a permanent motive re
cognisable as his
&quot;
proper self,&quot; a rational being must in every act acknow
ledge his &quot;responsibility
&quot; to follow after, if haply he may attain to, this
idea of his destiny. The presence of this moral ideal in man as man, and
its infinitely regenerative power in breaking the yoke of the past, are all
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possession of the mens conscia sibi recti can be identified
with perfect happiness. Worthiness to be happy is, of
course, in an ethical legislation, the first requisite ; but
the perfect moral world for whose realisation man works,
and in whose ultimate existence he believes, is one in
which Happiness shall be the necessary consequence of
moral desert.
1 This proportionality, however, is not
realised in the present state of separation between the
ethical will of the individual and the sway of mechanical
causality in nature. The causal determination of nature
by our will is regulated, as to the measure of its success,
&quot; not by the moral disposition of the will, but by the
knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical power
of using them in furtherance of our aims.
2 The ultimate
equation of the two sides, which reason in its practical
function declares to be a
&quot; moral necessity,&quot; is impossible
without presupposing the existence of God as an Author
of nature, whose causality is regulated by a regard to
the moral disposition of His creatures. This, then, is
the third and final Postulate, which completes the edifice
of Kant s Ethical Theology. In other words, the idea
of a perfect ethical legislation, which is contained in
the Categorical Imperative, carries with it the idea of an
ultimate harmony between the sensible sphere and the
practical ends of reason. The moral law, though in itself
without promise of Happiness, imposes upon us the
realisation of this highest good as
&quot; the last object of all
conduct.&quot; But the actual attainment of this object or
end is impossible without the independent existence of
1
Happiness (Gluckseligkeit), it may be noted, is denned by Kant as
&quot; the satisfaction of all our inclinations (Neigungen)
: extensively, as re
gards their multiplicity ; intensively, as regards their degree ; and pro-
tensively, as regards their duration.&quot; Werke, iii. 532.
2
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the idea in God as the union of moral perfection with
perfect blessedness. God, as
&quot; the highest original Good,&quot;
is to Kant the cause of the ultimate adjustment of perfect
happiness to perfect virtue in the world, and so the
necessary condition of the summum bonum.
1
Erdmann points out that all the three Critiques close
with Ethico -
theology, or the system of rational belief
contained in the Postulates of the moral reason. It is
Kant s substitute for the Kational Theology or dogmatic
metaphysic of the schools which he demolished. It is in
the last analysis a system of ethical teleology, and it
represents, as already remarked, Kant s final notion of
the unity and government of the world. Criticism may
be deferred till after consideration of the Kantian Philo
sophy of Eeligion, which stands in the most intimate
connection with the ethical scheme just developed.
Kant has not left us to gather his Philosophy of
Eeligion inferentially from stray references. He has
expounded his view of the necessary content of true
religion in a separate work, which, from the place it
occupies in the development of the German Eeligions-
philosophie, has a fair claim to rank in importance
alongside of the three Critiques. This is the Keligion
within the Limits of Mere Season.
2 The exposition of
1 Kant distinguishes between the existence of God as the highest
&quot;independent&quot; or &quot;original&quot; Good and the summum bonum as &quot;the
highest possible Good in a world,&quot; or
&quot; the deduced highest Good.&quot; Cf.
Werke, iii. 535, v. 135, 138. Speculatively, the distinction may be said
to be, in one aspect, the same as that already drawn between the Idea as
real and the same Idea as a process of realisation in time. But the two
are not connected in this intimate way by Kant. God is simply cause,
and, as such, remains a pure abstraction or dcus ex machina,
2 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Werke,
vi. 95-301.PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL. 233
the doctrines of true or absolute religion necessarily
implies an account of the relation in which the different
positive religions of the world stand to this pure religious
truth. Kant s view of the function of positive religion,
and his interpretation, in this connection, of the leading
Christian doctrines, form, indeed, the most interesting
and important part of the book. The language in which
he expresses his ethico- religious positions is moulded
throughout by a reference to the scheme of doctrines
which the Christian Church has founded upon its sacred
writings.
In the Preface, Kant indicates the relation which
he conceives to exist between religion and morality.
Morality, he says, leads necessarily to religion, the point
of contact between the two being the notion of the
summum bonum, and of the moral Ruler who realises it%
We have seen that the End must not determine the
will. Nevertheless, there can be no ethical action with
out the notion of some result flowing from our rectitude ;
and in a completed theory of the issues of life, such as
religion uniformly professes to give, the notion of the End
or final cause of all things necessarily comes to the front.
1
The content of philosophical theology and of ethics is,
in fact, the same
; but the latter deals with the ethical
consciousness as such, and its foundation in the Cate
gorical Imperative ; the former religion, as intellectually
formulated in philosophical theology presupposes this
consciousness, and concentrates its attention on the
metaphysical implications of morality, as the practical
1 This ethical Idea is here called broadly the
&quot; Endzweck aller Dinge,&quot;
and Kant presents it as the only means of combining the reference to End,
which is the basis of freedom, with a teleological view of Nature. It is
characteristic of Kant that, two pages farther on, he treats the necessity
of the Idea as a species of condescension to the
&quot; unavoidable limitations
of man and his faculty of practical reason.&quot;234 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
reason reveals them in its Postulates. However, in spite
of this difference of attitude, the whole aim of
&quot;
religion
proper,&quot; according to Kant, is moral or practical, and
this must never be lost sight of in expounding it. We
know nothing of the nature of God, for example, except
so far as His attributes (and His actions) bear upon our
conduct. Kant s religion, therefore, is his ethic writ
large ; but it is morality from the point of view, not so
much of the individual consciousness, as of the divine
ethical system of which the individual recognises himself
to be a part. This recognition, with all that it may be
found to imply, constitutes the distinctive mark of the
religious, as opposed to the purely ethical, consciousness ;
so that Kant s theory of religion is often summed up
correctly, perhaps, but somewhat baldly in the state
ment that religion is the recognition and discharge of
duty as the will of God.
The first section of the book places Kant at once in
striking opposition to the easy-going optimism character
istic of the eighteenth century, and of the general move
ment known as the Illumination or Enlightenment. It
is entitled
&quot; Of the indwelling of the evil principle side
by side with the good, or on the radical evil in human
nature.&quot; Kant begins by balancing against one another
two opposing theories of human nature and history.
The first asserts that the world lies in wickedness, and
is going from bad to worse




sees in the course of history a continu
ous amelioration, due to the natural development of the
healthy instinct of humanity. Kant proposes to medi
ate between these conflicting hypotheses by showing
that man is by nature partly good and partly bad.
First, he explains what he means by his terms. A
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not on the quality of his actions taken in themselves,
but on the nature of the intentions which may be
reasonably inferred from the actions. In the Kantian
phraseology, a man is bad when the maxims according
to which he guides his conduct are bad. Now the
cause of evil, if the man is to be responsible for it
(and responsibility belongs to the very notion of moral
evil), must lie in the man himself. In saying that a
man is bad ~by nature, therefore, there can be no talk of
shifting the blame from man s own shoulders, and laying
it upon some inevitable bias. In discussing moral ques
tions we never leave the ground of freedom. The cause
of the evil must lie in the free adoption of a funda
mental maxim or principle of volition. The ground or
motive of such a choice remains of course inexplicable, for
we cannot go behind a free act. But the point to be
borne in mind is, that the bias, if it should be proved to
exist, must be first communicated to the will by an act
of freedom. At the same time, if the adoption of a cer
tain maxim as an underlying principle of ethical choice
is found to be a universal characteristic of mankind, the
ground of the adoption of this maxim and, with it, the
good or evil that it may contain may fairly be said to
be innate in human nature. It is innate in the sense
that the will must be conceived to have given itself
this bias before any opportunity arises for employing










(Gesinnung) ; and, though itself freely
adopted, it must plainly have determining influence upon
the whole series of our actions in time.





(Hang zuin Bosen), that
propensity would deserve to be called natural, even236
though it must be held to consist, as has been explained,
and as Kant repeats, simply
&quot; in the subjective ground
of the possibility of deviation from the maxims of the
moral law.&quot; The deflection of the will from the law
must be due to the fact that the will has taken to itself
another maxim, which runs directly counter to the
primary maxim of implicit obedience
; and this causes a
permanent incapacity to make the moral law the consist
ent maxim of conduct, an incapacity which may fitly
be called, Kant says, in the phraseology of Scripture,
&quot; the evil heart.&quot; Now the adoption of this evil heart
has been described as our own act
; yet it has been as
emphatically declared to precede all acts. The word
&quot;
act,&quot; therefore, must be taken here in two different
senses
; and Kant proceeds to explain that the origin of
the propensity to evil, as the formal condition of all the
immoral acts of experience, must be an
&quot;
intelligible act,
cognisable only through reason without any condition of
time.&quot; It is just as impossible to assign a cause for this
corruption of the supreme maxim of volition, as for any
fundamental property of our nature
; but it may fairly
be called, again in the language of the Church, an act of
original sin (peccatum oriyinarium). The question of
the origin of evil in the human heart is manifestly not a
question of origin in time : time has nothing to do with
the notion of the will or of a moral change. It is,
indeed, a contradiction in terms to seek for the cause in
time of a free action, in the same way as search is made
for the cause of an event in nature. The cause of an
ethical change must be ethical, and must lie, accord
ingly, simply and solely in the will itself. The question
is confined, therefore, to the rational origin (Vernunft-
ursprung) of the morally bad. That is to say, the exist
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reference to time; and what is sought is the rational
bond necessary for the thought-connection of this state
of the human will with the normal (and therefore logi
cally prior) state of complete conformity to the moral
law. Ethically, the passage from the one state to the
other, as taking place within the will, must necessarily
appear as an immediate transition. Man is viewed as
passing directly from a state of innocence to the com
mission of a morally bad action
; and, from the ethical
standpoint, every instance of the morally bad is such a
lapse. The moral law judges every action as an original
use of freedom, and finds no excuse for a man in the
evil of his past, even though it may have become to




departure from the perfect law is represented in Scrip
ture as the Fall of man. As a strictly ethical fact, it is
independent of considerations of time. It may be con
ceived as taking place in every immoral act; or, as
universally characteristic of humanity, it may be con
ceived as taking place once for all.
&quot; In Adam all have
sinned.&quot; The account in Genesis, when stripped of its
narrative form, agrees, according to Kant, in all partic
ulars with the ethical analysis. Even in the detail of
the serpent, as a spirit tempting humanity to sin, we
may see expressed the ultimate inexplicability of the
origin of evil in a creature whose original nature is
good.
Kant thus, in mediating between the two views of
human nature mentioned at the outset, asserts the exist
ence of a radical evil in man. The presence of evil
consists in the fact that man, though conscious of an
obligatory law, has yet adopted as maxim of conduct
the occasional deviation from the same. Its ground is
not to be sought in the sensitive nature of man and the238 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
natural impulses of which that is the root. These have
in themselves no direct connection with evil, and we are,
moreover, not responsible for their existence in us.
1 Nor
can it be found in a corruption of the ethically legislat
ive reason. Such a corruption would reduce man to a
completely devilish condition. No man, however, can
completely throw off allegiance to the moral law: it
belongs to his essence, and refuses to be silenced. The
solution of the problem of evil must be sought in the
relation between the rational and the sensitive nature of
man. The moral law would rule absolutely in his con
duct, were it not that the sensitive nature (in itself
harmless) supplies him with other and non-moral in
citements to action. The evil heart consists in the
reversal of the ethical order of precedence which sub
sists between these two classes of motives. The man
who subordinates the pure motive of ethical obedience
to
&quot; the motives of inclination
&quot; which may be grouped
under the general name of Happiness is, in his intel
ligible character, bad, even though his empirical char
acter, as it appears in his actions, may be blameless.
The tacit adoption of a maxim of occasional deviation
from the law in the interest of personal desires, is the
root of all evil.
&quot; This evil is radical, because it corrupts
the ground of all maxims. Moreover, as natural pro
pensity, it cannot be eradicated ; for that could only be
done by means of good maxims, and inasmuch as the
supreme subjective ground of all maxims is ex hypothesi





it must be possible
1 It is not with flesh and blood, as Kant saj^s, that we have to fight,
but against principalities and powers ; that is, according to his exegesis,
.against the unseen might of a maxim that infects all our willing.
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to gain the mastery over it, seeing that it is found in
man as a freely acting being/ This is the question
which next emerges. How is a man who is thus by
nature evil to make himself good
? Whatever a man is
morally, or is to become, must be his own work
; yet
how can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit ? It is
something that passes our power of comprehension ; but
it must be possible, for the moral law commands its
performance. The tree, happily, is not wholly corrupt ;
otherwise the task would be impossible. The moral law
remains with us, and the susceptibility to ethical ideas
which it implies is indestructible. What has to be done
is to restore the law to the place of supremacy among
motives of action which rightfully belongs to it. But
the restoration, as we have seen, cannot be effected
by any gradual process of amelioration. The supreme
subjective ground of all maxims must be changed, or, in
other words, the man must be renewed in the spirit of
his mind. The passage from corruption to purity of
moral maxim implies a revolution as radical as that of the
original act of sin : by a single unalterable resolve, the
man must undo what was then done. The subject who
has effected this revolution within himself is ethically a
new creature, and is accepted before God from that
moment as good and well-pleasing in His sight. The
change is likened in Scripture to a change of heart or a
new birth. From such a point moral education must set
out
; for all possibility of progress lies in the fundamental,
if often only half-acknowledged, principle of action which
is then adopted. It is vain to enforce upon a man the
performance of special duties so long as he is not, as it
were, born again
: the ground slips like sand from under
our feet. Insight into the possibility of this restoration
is no more attainable here than in any other case where240 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
the moral imperative seems to conflict with the deter
mination of events by their antecedents. But that does
not affect its real possibility. The principle of the
natural depravity of the human will is not to be used dog
matically, so as to exclude the possibility of a regenera
tion. Its ethical function is simply to forewarn us that
all is not right as things stand that the state of nature,
though it may often appear very harmless, is yet,
from the point of view of ethics, bad. A dogmatic
assertion of the futility of effort would, on the contrary,
nip the moral life in the bud. In any case, even though
the change of heart should be impossible without
&quot;
higher
co-operation,&quot; all true religion teaches that only he who
has done all that is in his power he who has not buried
his talent will be the subject of this divine grace.
&quot; It is
not necessary, therefore, for any one to know what God
does for his salvation
; it is essential for him to know
what he himself has to do, in order to become worthy of
this assistance.&quot;
The struggle between the original good in man, as
represented by the moral law, and his present evil
disposition, forms the subject of the second section of
the book. Kant entitles it
&quot; Of the struggle of the good
principle with the evil for the dominion over man.&quot; The
Christian Scriptures represent
&quot; this intelligible moral
relation
&quot;
of two principles in man as persons or powers
outside of him, contending for the exclusive sovereignty
over him. The evil spirit appears, in virtue of the Fall,
as the prince of this world. But in the midst of the
kingdom of darkness, the Jewish theocracy stood as a
memorial of
&quot; the indefeasible right of the first pro
prietor.&quot; Among the Jewish people, in the fulness of
time, appeared a Person who, according to the belief of
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at the same time, as one whose original innocence was
unaffected by the compact which the rest of mankind
had made, in the person of its first forefather, with the
evil principle.
&quot; The prince of this world . . . hath
nothing in me.&quot; By a resolute resistance to temptation,
he declared war to the death against the evil principle
and all its works. In its physical aspect, the strife could
not end otherwise than in the death of him who thus
attacked a kingdom in arms. But his death is itself the
culminating
&quot;
presentment of the good principle, that is,
of humanity in its moral perfection, as example for the
imitation of every
one.&quot; The kingdom of darkness exists
still, but its power was broken by the example of that
death.
&quot; To them that believe in his name
&quot;
that is,
Kant interprets, to those who, upborne by his example,
realise in themselves the same triumph over the assaults
of evil the transgressions of the past have no longer any
terror. A new life has begun within them, and the
fetters of the old have been struck off. Power has been
given them to become the sons of God.





in order to recognise in it an
ethical content valid and obligatory for all time. It
remains, then, to see his interpretation of its
&quot;
spirit
and rational meaning.&quot; In the first place, without any
disparagement of its possible historical truth, the narra
tive form disappears, as such, in a statement of moral
relations.
&quot; The good principle did not descend merely
at a certain time, but from the origin of the human race
it has descended from heaven in invisible fashion upon
humanity.&quot; Of this the presence of a perfectly holy
moral ideal in man alongside of his sensitive nature is
sufficient proof. Humanity or, more widely, rational
existence in its moral perfection, Kant here declares
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without reservation to be the only thing that can make
a world the object of the divine decree and the End of
creation. This Idea of a perfect humanity was in the
beginning with God, and through it, or for the sake of its
realisation, all things were made that were made. It is, in
short, the only begotten Son in whom God is well pleased.
To this ideal and prototype of humanity it is our duty to
raise ourselves; and for this the Idea itself gives us
strength, being present within us, as if it had descended
from heaven. There is no objection to saying that the
ideal is necessarily personified by us in a man, such as is
represented in the Gospel history ; but, in a practical
regard, the reality of the Idea is independent of its exem
plification. The prototype of an example must always be
sought in our own reason.
&quot; Its presence there,&quot; Kant
adds,
&quot;
is in itself sufficiently incomprehensible, without
supposing it hypostatised besides in a particular man.&quot; At
the same time, such a divinely-minded Teacher, if he did
appear, would be able to speak of himself with truth, as if
the ideal of the good were actually manifested by him
;
for he would speak, in such expressions, only of the spirit
which ruled his actions. It is of the
&quot; mind
&quot; which was
in Christ Jesus, and which ought also to be in us, that
account must be taken. The spirit of such a life that
is to say, ideal humanity, whether realised in a definite
individual or not is a complete satisfaction, in the eyes
of supreme justice, for all men at all times and in all
worlds. By identifying ourselves with this perfect mind,
we put away our old heart and purify the ground of our
maxims. It is true the law says
:
&quot; Be ye perfect as
your Father in heaven is perfect,&quot; and the distance that
separates us from conformity to the perfect will of God is
infinite
; so that, in act, this ideal righteousness remains
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germ from which all good is to develop itself, is accepted
in lieu of the deed by God, who is the searcher of hearts,
and who views the infinite progress of the moral life at
once as a completed whole. The righteousness of the
perfect Man is imputed to us, and covers our short
comings.
The reconciliation of this with the principles of divine
justice presents certain difficulties, however, which lead
Kant to go into the theory in greater detail. The new
heart is accepted before God as the earnest of an unrest
ing progress in good, which He is pleased to regard as
equivalent to that perfect righteousness to which, in his
heart, the man clings. But even though the man con
tracts no new debts after his change of heart, yet, from
the point of view of justice, the old remain unpaid. In
avoiding offence for the future he does no more than his
duty, and the doing of his duty to all eternity will yield
no surplus of merit to weigh against the sins of his
former life. The evil heart or disposition which he has
cast off contained in itself, like a corrupt fountain, an
infinity of transgressions, and calls, therefore, for an
infinite punishment. The debt of sin, too, is the most
personal of all obligations, and must in every case be paid
by the sinner himself. Yet one who has laid hold on the
good in the way described cannot be the subject of the
wrath of God. How is this punishment to be borne by
the man, consistently with the complete forgiveness of
sin which accompanies repentance and the new heart ?
The answer is found by Kant in an analysis of the
notion of the moral change that has taken place. The
fundamental principle of the man s action, it must be
noted, is changed, so that he is actually, in an ethical
sense, a new man. Though he is physically the same
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In the language of Scripture, the change consists in
putting off the old man and his deeds and putting on the
new. The sacrifice which this implies crucifying the
flesh and the sufferings which are the inevitable lot of
humanity in this life (and which the old man might fitly
have regarded, from the religious point of view, as the
punishment of his disobedience) are cheerfully assumed
and borne by the new man, not unwillingly as the wrath
of an angry God, but in a spirit of perfect obedience.
The pure mind of the Son of God present within him
bears, as his substitute, the penalty of his past sins,
redeems him by suffering and death, and finally appears
as his advocate before the Judge. Or, if the idea be
personified, it may be said that the Son of God himself
does all this. The only difference between the two forms
of expression is, that when we adopt the personified form,
the death which the new man dies daily appears as a
death suffered once for all by the representative of
mankind. In this way, then, the claims of justice are
satisfied, for the substitutionary office undertaken by the
new man is something over and above the mere punctual
discharge of his duty. At the same time, it is by an act
of grace that this merit is reckoned to our account, inas
much as the ideal of a morally perfect humanity exists
in us as yet only as a set purpose of heart.
This imperfect, or merely germinal, character of the
good within him need not, however, disturb unduly the
man who has undergone this saving change. He must
not permit himself to be tormented by a continual fear
of backsliding ; he must preserve the due mean between
over-confidence and a cowardly distrust of the sincerity
of his repentance. His steadfastness and continuous
progress in the past form his only standard for judging
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who can say, on an honest review of his actions, that his
repentance has stood proof, sees before him the prospect
of an endless future of the same happy progress. On the
contrary, he who has always fallen back into evil, or
sunk from bad to worse, has the outlook into an equally
endless future of wretchedness. The attraction of the
one view Heaven gives calmness and strength to the
former
; the horror of the other view Hell serves to
rouse the conscience of the latter to stem the evil, so far
as that may yet be.
1
Certainty of the unchangeable
nature of our disposition is not possible to man, nor
would it, if attainable, be morally beneficial
; but a good
and pure disposition begets a confidence in its own per
manency, and acts thus as a Paraclete or comforter when
our stumblings might cause us grave anxiety.
The first two sections of the book thus contain a state
ment of the main doctrines of ethical religion, together
with an identification of this creed with the leading
dogmas of Calvinistic Christianity. Kant s method is,
first, to evolve the ethical position, and then, by means
1 Kant emphasises here, it will be observed, the ethical advantages of
the popular conception of an eternal state of happiness or misery in
another life. On the other liand, he points out, in a long note, the dis
advantages of the same conception when taught dogmatically. It is the
same with the doctrine that the reckoning of each man s deeds is closed
inexorably at the end of the present life. The doctrine, he says, is one of
vident practical utility. It is eminently calculated to impress on men
the importance of present repentance and welldoing. But the assertion
of its dogmatic truth is just as little within the province of human reason
as in the former case. &quot;In short,&quot; he concludes,
&quot;
if we limited our judg
ment to regulative principles of practical application, instead of extending
it to constitutive principles of the knowledge of supersensible objects, it
would stand better in very many particulars with human wisdom
; and a
supposed knowledge of what we at bottom know nothing about would
not breed a groundless and too curious reasoning, plausible for a time,
but becoming in the end prejudicial to morality.&quot; See Werke, vi.
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of an allegorical interpretation of the Christian records,
to exhibit its radical identity with this or the other
doctrine of the Church. It hardly needs to be pointed
out, however, that his statement of ethical truth would
never have assumed the form it does in this book but for
the fact that he found this scheme of doctrine already
elaborated and, so to speak, in possession of the field.
This is particularly obvious in regard to the laborious
attempt, just considered, to give an ethical interpretation
of the doctrines of Substitution and the Perseverance of
the Saints. Throughout, it may be said, the real start
is made from the dogma, which is then allegorised, with
more or less success, into an ethical truth. The whole
constitutes an attempt to extract a moral and purely
rational meaning from a generally accepted interpretation
of the Christian documents.
1
This, as will presently
appear, is of the essence of Kant s position towards a
positive religion which is received by us as a heritage
from the past. The two remaining sections of the book
1 In addition to the doctrines already involved in the preceding
account, it may be well, for the sake of completeness, to state Kant s
interpretation of the Trinity. The doctrine represents for him the union
of holiness, benevolence, and justice in the Divine nature ; and the con
templation of God in this triple capacity (as lawgiver, governor, and
judge) is useful, he contends, in a moral view, as forcing us always to
consider any one attribute as limited and conditioned by the others. It
prevents us from regarding Him either as an earthly despot, ruling
according to His mere good pleasure, or as a Being weakly indulgent to
entreaty that has not its basis in moral reformation. The service we
render Him is thus cleared of the anthropomorphic elements that so
readily cling to it. Kant compares this triplicity in the notion of God
with the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions in
the notion of the State. This circumstance seems to him to account for
the occurrence of the idea in so many religions. It ought to be added,
however, that hints towards a more vital notion of the Trinity are con
tained in what has been already said of the Idea of humanity as the true
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are devoted to defining the relation of positive and
publicly established creeds to the moral faith, or, more
particularly, the function of the former in the service of
the latter.
The third section passes from consideration of the
moral conflict within the individual to the definitive
triumph of the good principle, which cannot be real
ised except in an ethical community, in which the
purpose of the individual shall no longer be under
mined, as at present, by the influence of his fellows.
Such a commonwealth, all the members of which are
governed by the same laws of virtue, is, in its very
idea, universal and all-embracing
: its foundation would
be
&quot; the foundation of a Kingdom of God upon earth.&quot;
l
Its necessity is obvious. The isolation and cross-pur
poses of the ethical
&quot; state of nature
&quot;
permit individuals,
even with the best intentions, to act as if they were
&quot; instruments of evil
&quot;
; it is the duty, therefore, of every
one to abandon that state, and become a member of an
ethical community. Inasmuch as this union is neces
sary for the complete triumph of the good, it is
incumbent upon every one who aims at that triumph
in himself and others. This idea of an ethical common
wealth is identical with the idea of &quot;a people of God,&quot;
by whom the laws of virtue are viewed as proceeding
from a Lawgiver who is perfect holiness, and who
searches the hearts of His subjects, so that the in
most secrets of their disposition are open before Him.
The foundation of a kingdom of God is a work which,
as a matter of fact, can be achieved by God alone.
Nevertheless, man must not remain inactive : on the
1 Hence the title of the third section: &quot;The victory of the good
principle over the evil, and the foundation of a Kingdom of God
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contrary, here, as in all ethical matters,
&quot; he must
proceed as if everything depended on himself.&quot;
The idea of a people of God takes in man s hands
the form of a Church. The Church, as it owes its
foundation to man, may be called the visible Church,
to distinguish it from the invisible universal Church,
or the ideal union of all upright men in a morally
governed universe. The only possible foundation of a
universal Church (and, in its idea, every Church is
universal) is the pure faith (der reine Religionsglaube),
which has been already expounded. Those doctrines
alone whose content is purely rational, and which are
in no way dependent on historical facts, can command
universal assent. But the natural need of mankind for
something on which they can lay hold with their senses
some fact of experience which may serve, in a
manner, as a voucher for the ideas of reason has
effectually prevented them, as history testifies, from
ever founding a Church on this purely ethical belief.
It is not easy to convince men that constancy in a
morally good life is all that God asks from them, and
that, in the performance of their duties to themselves
and others, they are
&quot;
constantly in the service of God.&quot;
They persist in regarding God after the manner of an
earthly monarch, who has need of honour and marks
of submission from his subjects. There emerges, accord
ingly, the idea of a religion of ritual observance or a
cultus (eine gottesdienstliche Religion). Morally in
different actions are exalted even above the performance
of duty, because they are supposed to be done for
God. We invariably find, therefore, alongside of the
moral code, a set of statutory or positive commands,
which, as well as the former, are supposed to emanate
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are discoverable by every man in his own reason, and
they constitute for humanity as such the perfect and
sufficient worship of God. It cannot be denied, how
ever, that the addition of a set of statutory commands
seems to be a necessity for man as a member of an
ethical community ; and these imply the form of a
revelation that is, of a historical belief, which, in
contradistinction to a purely rational faith, may be
called the belief of the Church (Kirchenglaube). The
safest depository of this extra-belief, as it may be called,
is found by experience to be a sacred book. But, in
some form or other, a Kirchenglaube is found invari
ably, as if by an ordinance of nature, preceding the
pure Religionsglaube. In the process of breaking in
mankind to an ethical commonwealth, the one serves
as the vehicle for the introduction and propagation of
the other.
This being, then, one of the facts to which we must
accommodate ourselves,
1 the question arises, What is the
proper attitude of reason towards the Church s claim to
be the depositary of a special revelation ? Kant answers
this question with the full measure of Critical caution.
He indicates as his own position that of pure Rationalism,
as opposed to Naturalism on the one hand and Super-
naturalism on the other. The pure Rationalist does not,
like the Naturalist, deny the possibility of a revelation
;
he is ready even to admit that a revelation may have
been necessary for the introduction of the true religion.
But he does not consider a belief in this supernatural
origin and its accompaniments to be an essential part of
saving faith, as the Supernaturalist does. The question
There is a ring of semi-ludicrous resignation about the copious array
of particles in which Kant reconciles himself to the inevitable: &quot;Wenn
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of origin is thus shelved, as a transcendent inquiry which
is beyond the scope of the critical reason, but which is
at the same time of no practical moment. A religion
must be judged, in the end, not by its origin, but by its
content : its capacity to become a universal religion de
pends on the identity of its content with the moral faith
which reason reveals. It is part of Kant s aim in this
book, as we have seen, to exhibit this identity in the
case of Christianity. In this connection he introduces
a distinction which seems almost to contain a reference
to Lessing s leading thought in the Education of the
Human Eace. A religion, he says, which, objectively,
or in respect of its content, is a natural religion, may
yet, subjectively, or in the mode of its first appearance,
be called a revelation. Where the religion is of such
a nature that men might have arrived at it, and
ought to have arrived at it, of their own accord by
the mere use of their reason, but yet, if left to them
selves, would not have reached it so early or so gener
ally, there, and in this specific sense, the term revela
tion cannot be objected to.
1 With this suggestion Kant
leaves the matter, and we are at liberty to infer, if we
like, that this was his personal view of the origin of
Christianity
: it is evident that he considers the sub
jective revealedness of a religion a question of little im
portance, when the religion is once there, and recog
nised as a natural or rational faith.
So far as a religion is objectively a revelation that is,
so far as it contains contingent or non-rational matter
it is, in Kant s view, temporal and local, and destined to
pass away. The value of such positive creeds is not to
be depreciated. They serve as vehicles for the ideas of
true religion, and they are not to be rudely or thought-
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lessly attacked.
1 On the contrary, it is our bounden
duty to utilise whatever historical Kirchenglaube we find
in general acceptance around us. The
&quot;
empirical belief,&quot;
however, must be interpreted throughout in a practical
or ethical sense. The theoretical part of the Church s
creed has no interest for us, except so far as it aids us
in realising our duty as the divine will, and in perform
ing it as such. This is the supreme canon of interpreta
tion :
&quot; All scripture is profitable for doctrine, for reproof,
for correction, for instruction in righteousness.&quot; The in
terpretation may often appear forced, as regards the text
of the revelation
; nay, it may often really be so. But
the interpreter is not, therefore, to be reckoned dishonest,
as long as he does not pretend that the moral sense
which he attaches to the symbols of the popular belief or
its sacred books is the original sense in which they were
intended by their authors.
2
Alongside of this inter




historical interpretation may of course assert its place,
as necessary for the systematising of the belief of the
Church as a definite organisation within certain limits of




; it is only by the comparative ease with which
a revelation lends itself to an ethical exegesis that it
justifies its claims to a divine origin. Historical belief
is, in fact, in every case merely a leading-string to bring
us to pure religion, and ought to be employed with the
1 As Kant says in a note elsewhere :
&quot; All deserve the same respect, so
far as their forms are attempts of poor mortals to body forth to themselves
the Kingdom of God upon earth
; but all deserve the same blame, when
they take the form in which they represent this idea for the thing itself.&quot;
Werke, vi. 274, n.
2 Kant refers approvingly, in this connection, to the philosophic
allegorising of the pagan myths in later antiquity ; which forms, indeed,
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consciousness that it is nothing more. That Church is
a true church whose creed contains the principle of
continual approximation to this pure belief, so as to
enable us eventually to dispense with the leading-string.
There are two articles of a
&quot;
saving faith,&quot; Kant pro
ceeds, resuming in effect what he had said in the first
two sections. These are the belief in a satisfaction due
for sin and the belief in the possibility of finding accept
ance with God by perseverance in the good life. Kant
again points out that a belief in satisfaction or substitu
tion (in the sense already explained) is necessary only
for the theoretical explanation of salvation
; whereas the
unconditioned command attached to the second article
makes the improvement of a man s life the supreme
principle of a saving faith. But so far as belief, in the
case of the first article, is fixed simply on the idea of a
perfect humanity, it is itself ethical
; and the two articles
represent
&quot; one and the same practical idea,&quot; in which
the standard of holy living is contemplated from two
opposite sides. But the same cannot be said if the
-article be taken to mean an empirical belief in the
historical appearance of the ethical ideal in a definite
individual. In this form, the idea is closely connected
with the non-moral notions of expiation which are to be
found in all religions.
&quot; But in the God-man,&quot; Kant
says,
&quot;
it is not what the senses apprehend, or what can
be known of him through experience, but the prototype
which lies in our reason, that is properly the object of
saving
faith.&quot; It is a necessary consequence of our
natural development, he concludes, that religion should
be gradually severed
&quot; from all empirical grounds of de
termination, from all statutes which rest on history, and
which provisionally, by means of a Kirchenglaule, unite
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rational religion will reign universally, that God may be
all in all. . . . The leading-string of sacred tradition
which did good service in its day becomes gradually no
longer necessary, and is felt at last as a fetter, when
humanity arrives at manhood. When I was a child, I
understood as a child
; but when I became a man, I put
away childish things.
&quot; l
In considering this process as exemplified in the
historic religions of the world, Kant restricts his view
to Christianity. He is apparently unable to trace any
uniformity of development in the other faiths of man
kind. In particular, it is worth noting that he emphati
cally denies to Judaism any connection with the Christian
Church. The political and positive aspect of Jewish
religion, the national exclusiveness which found expres
sion in it, and the want of reference to the immortality
of the soul, combine to make Kant do less than justice to
the religious elements which the Hebrews undoubtedly
possessed. The trouble which the first teachers of
Christianity took to connect the new belief with historical
Judaism, he considers to be a natural expedient on the
part of men anxious to spread their principles among
a prejudiced and exclusive race, but as in itself proving
nothing. Of the actual history of Christianity Kant
takes a very gloomy view. Its origin is obscure, for it




: we do not know, therefore, the effect of its
doctrines upon the life of its early professors. But its
later history, as exemplified in the Eastern and Western
Empires, in the Crusades, and in the ambitious intrigues
of the Popes,
&quot;
might well justify the exclamation
Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum !
&quot; Such a fate
was not to be escaped, so far as Christianity was founded
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on a historical belief
; but, in spite of this miscarriage,
&quot; the true first intention
&quot;
of its institution was evidently
&quot; the introduction of a pure religious belief, about which
there could be no conflicting opinions.&quot; If asked what
period in the whole known history of the Church is the
best, Kant says he has no hesitation in answering the
present. The universal Church is already bursting the
bonds of special doctrine in which it has been confined.
As evidence in support of his opinion, Kant instances the
general spread of a spirit of modesty and tolerance
towards the claims of revealed religion, together with
a firm conviction that in ethics lies the core of the whole
matter. In the universal acknowledgment of these
principles consists the coming of the Kingdom of God,
which, in the sacred records, is represented chiliastically
as the end of the world. But the universal Church will
not come with violence and revolution : it will be the
result of gradual reform and of ripe reflection.
&quot; The
kingdom of God cometh not with observation.&quot; Empiri
cally we cannot see to the end of this development,
1 but
intellectually we must regard ourselves as already citizens
of such a kingdom.
&quot;




&quot; Of service and spurious service
under the dominion of the good principle, or of religion
and priestcraft,&quot; is more of the nature of an Appendix ;
and most of what is important in it has been already
anticipated. Kant s object is to contrast the pure service
of God, which consists in a moral life, with the spurious
1
Indeed, in a note at another place Kant treats the idea of a universal
Church as an Idea of reason, which can never be realised, but which is
indispensable as a &quot;practical regulative principle.&quot; Every Church, like
every kingdom, strives after universal dominion
; but always when it
seems in a fair way to make good its pretensions, a principle of dissolution
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notions of service that are the natural growth of a
statutory system. He maintains the essential identity
of Christianity with the moral religion ; and, by a some
what copious reference to the teachings of Christ in the
Gospels, he has little difficulty in showing their exclusive
reference to purity of heart and life. Even where the
form of expression is accommodated to the traditions of
Judaism, there shines through, according to Kant,
&quot; a
doctrine of religion universally intelligible and universally
convincing.&quot; But the
&quot;
episodic means of recommenda
tion
&quot;
employed by Christ and the first teachers of His
religion have been exalted by theologians into essential
articles of faith, just
&quot; as if every Christian were to be
a Jew, whose Messiah has come.&quot; By so doing, the
doctors of the Church do their best to defeat the inten
tion of the Founder of the religion, by imparting to it
a statutory character. A religion so conceived is the
natural soil in which false ideas of the service due to
God spring up. Spurious service consists essentially in
the notion of winning the divine favour by other means
than by uprightness of moral will. Whether it be sacri
fices, or castigations and pilgrimages that we lay on our
selves, or ceremonies, solemn festivals, even public games
(as in Greece and Rome), the idea is the same : something
is done specially for God, by way of proving our entire
submission to His will, and inducing Him to look with a
kindly eye upon His servants. Usually the more useless
the action, the more efficacious is it supposed to be. The
secret motive of such service is the hope of influencing
to our advantage the unseen power that directs the des
tiny of man. In all its phases, therefore, it is Fetichism.
The man supposes himself to influence God, and so em
ploys Him as a means to produce an effect in the world.
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nothing to do but to cultivate a dutiful disposition. To
such a disposition all things that are lacking in its
righteousness will be added by Supreme Wisdom in some
way it matters not how. Everything, in short, depends
on the order in which the two ideas of morality and the
service of God are taken. We must begin with virtue,
and end with the conception of our duty as a continual
service of God by obedience to His will. Otherwise we
make God himself an idol.
CHAPTER II.
CKITICISM OF THE KANTIAN STANDPOINT AND TRANSITION
TO HEGEL.
There are two points in which Kant s treatment of
religion differs from that of the Aufkldrung viz., in its
recognition of the important function of positive creeds
in leading men towards the true faith, and in its repudi
ation of the easy-going Optimism which is repugnant to
the very genius of religion. The Aufkldrung was pro
foundly unhistorical in its spirit, and was content, for the
most part, to consider the genesis of positive religion as
sufficiently accounted for by priestcraft and deceit. The
doctrines, symbols, and sacred books of the historical
faith appear to it, therefore, in a merely obstructive light.
They are weeds which have to be pulled up ; and when
the ground is cleared, the doctrines of natural or of
rational religion will have free course. Man is man
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character of his reason
; and reason reveals to him, by its
natural light, the existence of God and the immortality
of the soul. Any addition to this creed is superstition,
and fires the iconoclastic zeal of the century. The atti
tude of the Aufkldrung towards historical religion, or,
what for it is the same thing, historical Christianity, is
thus one of assault : it is purely negative. Kant s Phil
osophy of Eeligion, defective as it may be in many
ways, represents a break with this spirit, and the dawn
of something like a historical sense.
To begin with, the mechanical view of religion, as a
contrivance of priests and lawgivers, is definitely given
up. Positive or statutory religion is recognised as the
leading-string which guides the race towards the realisa
tion of the Kingdom of God. The leading-string is
acknowledged to be necessary, if humanity is to attain
this end
; and a necessary means may fairly be regarded
as of divine appointment. This implies an entire change
of tone in the criticism of historical systems. They
are no longer subjective delusions to be rudely brushed
away
: they are the steps on which the human spirit has
mounted to its present elevation. They may express the
pure religion imperfectly, and with much admixture of
error
; but the ladder which has served the childhood of
thought, and which, it may be, still serves many of our
fellow-men, is not there simply to be kicked contemptu
ously aside. Destructive criticism finds no favour with
Kant. It is not that he himself holds to the literal sense
of the Church s doctrines : on the contrary, it is pretty
plain that his personal conclusions on these points were
not very different from those of the Aufkldrung gener
ally. But the prevalent style of negative criticism (as
exemplified, for instance, in the Wolfenbiittel Fragments),
with its delight in demolishing miracles and laying bare
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discrepancies in the Biblical narratives, seemed to him to
place altogether too much stress on the historical. Kant s
whole aim was to separate what he conceived to be the
true and eternal content of Christianity from the
&quot; husk
&quot;
of circumstance in which those truths were first presented
to the world. His own canon of interpretation is, as has
been seen, exclusively ethical
; and all questions of the
original sense or historical accuracy of the sacred writings
are simply left on one side.
&quot; We must not dispute un
necessarily over the historical weight to be attached to
anything, if (whatever construction be put upon it) it
contributes nothing towards making us better men. . . .
Historical knowledge, which has no such universally valid
Inward reference, belongs to the aSia^opa, concerning
which each may believe what he finds to be for his own
edification.&quot;
l He speaks with something like contempt
of the mode of dealing with Scripture which gets from it
nothing more than an
&quot; unfruitful enlargement of our
historical knowledge
&quot;
; and in the same breath he places
the truths of religion above historical proof. There is no
point, indeed, on which Kant is more explicit than that,
when we are once in possession of true religion and of
the rational grounds on which it is based, it can be nowise
fruitful to dispute the Biblical narratives and the popular
interpretation of them. He applies this especially to the
case of miracles, which constitute the crux of ordinary
rationalism. The Christian miracles, for instance, may
all be true, he says, as well as the miracle of inspiration,
which guarantees the account of them.
&quot; We may let
them all rest on their merits, and even continue to
reverence the husk which has served to publish and to
spread such a doctrine
; but the credentials of the doc
trine rest on a document preserved ineffaceably in every
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soul, and requiring no miracles to attest it.&quot;
* This
theoretical possibility of the miraculous, however, has
nothing to do with religion, as we now understand it.
Eeligion is degraded by being made to rest on such
evidence
; and practically, he adds somewhat ironically,
the belief is harmless, for rational men never allow for
the possible recurrence of such phenomena in the busi
ness relations of life. But, just because the historical
is so unimportant in his eyes, Kant deprecates useless or
wanton attacks upon the contents of the sacred books.
&quot; It is the most rational and equitable course, in the case
of a book which is once for all there, to continue to use
it as the foundation of instruction in the Church.&quot;
2 It
is understood, of course, that in doing so we labour to
bring out its really religious side, and endeavour to let
the adventitious matter fall, as much as may be, out of
sight. This attitude, we shall see, is shared by Hegel,
who defends his position on very similar grounds.
The other point on which Kant parts company from
the eighteenth century is his renunciation of the Optim
istic view of life and of human nature. This brings him
at once much nearer to a distinctively religious stand
point. It is a commonplace to say that the element of
religion is not light-hearted satisfaction with the present,
and a belief that all is going well. It is the need of
some explanation for the cruel riddles of destiny that
drives men to religion ; and though its issue, as a cele
bration of the victorious purpose of God, is necessarily
optimistic, yet the pain and the wrong of the present are
an essential element. The root of religion may even be
said to be a consciousness of present sin and misery.
The human consciousness, as Kant remarks, seems
instinctively to connect suffering with sin. When mis-
1 Werke, vi. 181. a
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fortune comes upon him, man forthwith, as if by an
impulse of nature, examines himself to see by what
offence he has deserved the chastisement. Religion
takes its rise in the consciousness of sin which is the
result of this introspection. For the savage is sure
to discover some neglect or transgression which has
laid him open to the anger of his god, and his next step
is to devise some method of atoning for his guilt. The
mental analysis of the savage may be at fault, and his
expiation immoral
; yet the notions which his conduct
involves are the germ of religion. Religion always goes
within for its explanation, and the unsophisticated voice
of the religious consciousness is invariably a cry of infinite
unworthiness. Man is forced to acknowledge the justice
of his punishment, and to admit that he has no right
even to the measure of happiness and wellbeing he
enjoys. The notion of
&quot;
sin,&quot; which is peculiar to
religion, contains more than that of wrong
-
doing.
Wrong-doing is external and legal in its application, or,
if the expression be allowable, it is a finite notion.
Each action is viewed separately, and compared with
an external standard. But religion, because it moves
entirely in an inward or spiritual sphere, recognises no
such separation. Action even a single action is the
expression of the whole character. There can, therefore,
be no measurement of guilt
: the man sees only an infinite
alienation of his whole being from holiness, and there
comes the despairing question How, then, can man be
justified before God ? The consciousness of sin, in other
words, is the consciousness of the need of a reconciliation
or atonement. These twin notions of sin and recon
ciliation are at the root of all that is distinctively
religious. But both ideas were in abeyance in the
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was a failure to fathom the religious consciousness and
its manifestations in the historical religions of mankind.
The eighteenth century was convinced that man was on
the whole good ; and its God was a species of Ion Dieu,
who could not find it in his heart to be an exacting
master. Hence the significance of Kant s emphatic
assertion that man is by nature not good, but that, on
the contrary, there is a radical taint in the human will.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to regard Kant s treat
ment as wholly satisfactory, whether as regards the cause
of evil or as regards the rationale which he offers of the
nature of redemption. There is a wire-drawnness in his
interpretation of the dogmas of the Church which is the
result, in part, of a tendency, constitutional in Kant, to
carry out his scheme too much into detail ; in part, of
the peculiarly elaborate and juridically conceived theory
of Christian doctrine, which he assumed as his basis of
operations. Hence, though there can be no doubt of the
ingeniousness of the ethical interpretation, this, rather
than its soundness, is apt to be the quality which most
impresses the reader. Of course, to have any value at all,
the interpretation of religion must be ethical
; but the
unconvincingness of Kant s theory is due to the separation
of ethics from metaphysics. Hence the ethical problem
appears as a problem of the individual alone, and to be
worked out by the individual himself
; and the consequence
is that Kant hardly seems to regard his own construc
tion as vital, and occasionally shows a tendency to cast
it all to the winds, and to return with a fling to the
simple moral command. In these respects, the Hegelian
Philosophy of Eeligion, though essentially based upon
the Kantian, has manifest advantages over it. It possesses
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religion. Hegel s Keligionsphilosophie may even be said
to be, in a sense, the centre of its author s thinking.
On the cardinal point of original sin, it must be
admitted, I think, that Kant s theory of an &quot;intellig
ible act,&quot; as the explanation of the origin of evil, is both
mystical and unintelligible. It is useless to speak of
the act as timeless, for the word
&quot;
act,&quot; and the notion
of evil as originating, are not thinkable by us except in
terms of time. To a certain extent, however, Kant s
language here may perhaps be viewed as an accommoda
tion to the narrative form in which the Church presents
the necessary implication of evil in the human conscious
ness. In describing himself as seeking, not the origin
in time, but the Vernunftursprung, of evil, he -seems to
indicate that he is showing, not how a creature, sup
posed to be originally good, passed into evil, but how
evil is essentially bound up with the notion of the
human will. This is borne out by a comparison of the
theory of the Fall given in this book with a suggestive
interpretation of the Mosaic story in a small treatise
belonging to the year 1786, entitled Probable Begin
ning of Human History.
1 The loss of Paradise is there
interpreted as the transition from mere animality to
humanity
&quot; from the go-cart of instinct to the guidance
of reason.&quot; The career of rational progress which was
then begun is &quot;for the race a progress from worse to
better, but it is not the same for the individual. Before
reason awoke, there was neither command nor prohibi
tion, and therefore no transgression. But when reason
began its work, and, weak as it was, came into conflict
with the whole strength of the animal nature, evils, and
what is worse when reason became more cultivated,
1
&quot; Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte,&quot; Werke, iv.
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vices, could not but arise, which were unknown to the
state of ignorance. The state of ignorance was a state
of innocence. . . . The history of Nature, therefore,
begins with good, because it is the work of God; the
history of Freedom begins with evil, because it is the
work of man. For the individual, who, in the exercise
of his freedom, looks only to himself, the change meant
loss ; but for Nature, whose aims are for the race, it was
gain.&quot; The Fall from a state of animal innocence is
thus at the same time the condition of the possibility of
a life of rational freedom
; and as humanity in this
capacity is the only thing of
&quot; worth
&quot;
in the world or,
to repeat Kant s phrase, the only possible object of the
divine decree, the Fall appears as a necessary part of
that purpose, and as an advance upon the foregoing stage.
Nevertheless, it consists essentially in the assertion of self,
and in the setting up of ends other than those which
Nature seems to have with the animal creature. It is
viewed accordingly, in each case, as being, in the most
intimate sense, a free or personal action. It must also
inevitably appear as a transgression, for the first form of
freedom is arbitrary selfishness. Consequently responsi
bility and the consciousness of evil are inseparably bound
together, the one being possible only through the other.
Whether we choose to identify the &quot;intelligible
act
&quot; with such a transition from instinct to reason or
not, the fact that Kant is formulating is simply this
inevitable implication of evil in the moral consciousness.
The fact is, after all, what we must stand by; for an
actual genesis of reason and morality out of instinct is(
just as impossible to construct as a supposed intelligible
act. The man (or animal) must have been morally
accountable before the primal act, it may be argued, if
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wards, and so on ad inftnitum. Consciousness cannot be
treated in any of its phases as something which comes
into being. The idea of an absolute beginning, in short,
has no place in philosophy, because philosophy does not
deal with a series of events : it deals with the notions
which these events imply, and is content with showing
how one notion is connected with another and with all
others. The point in question here is the relation of the
consciousness of evil to morality, and to the whole struc
ture of human progress. The relation of reason to sense
may certainly constitute the basis of morality, whether
the inconceivable transition from a merely natural to a
rational life was ever actually made or not. In Hegel
we find substantially the same view as in the Muthmass-
licher Anfang/ combined with the same curious allegoris-
- ation of the Biblical story. Hegel is at pains to show
that the breach of the merely natural harmony carries
with it the promise of a higher reconciliation in reason.
By the conception of such a reconciliation as involved in
the divine purpose, that is to say, philosophically, as
eternally complete in God, he is able, without resorting
to Kant s artificial doctrine of substitution, to put a
more vital meaning into the leading tenet of historical
Christianity.
Kant s whole theory of religion suffers from the limit
ations of his Critical standpoint. The central idea in
religion, to which all others return, is the idea of God
;
and it is just here that the breakdown of Criticism be
comes most apparent in the hands of its author. It
must be remembered that, in spite of the ample materials
which Kant supplies for the construction of a new the
ology, he never got fairly outside of the old-fashioned
mechanical construction of Deism. God is, according to
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sary relations attach
; but He is supposed, by an exercise
of &quot;will,&quot; to have &quot;created&quot; the world, and, with it,
finite intelligences. The manner or the meaning of this
creation is not explained, and so its assertion becomes
simply a word. That is to say, reason, in its search for
the causes of individual things, extends its range, and
ends by asking for the cause of the collective fabric of
things. As a temporary satisfaction, this causation is
thrown back upon a Being postulated in hunc effectum,
and called, in virtue of his function, the Great First
Cause. The designations of Supreme Being, or Absolute
Being, give no additional information as to his nature
;
and the inferential knowledge which Deism professes to
have of its God will always be found to dwindle down
to the bare assertion that he exists. It is against the
possibility of proving the existence of such a deistic God
that Kant does battle in the Pure Eeason ; and, in that
regard, his arguments and those of others must be ac
knowledged to be conclusive though only in that regard. -
Take, for example, his famous illustration of the hundred
dollars. I may have an idea of a hundred dollars, but
my pocket may be empty enough for all that. In like
manner, Kant argues, I may have an idea of God, but
that is far from proving, as the supporters of the Onto-
logical argument would have us believe, the objective
existence of a Being corresponding to my idea. Clearly,
Kant s reasoning depends for its validity on the measure
of analogy between God and the hundred dollars. If
God is a Being or thing as separable from me as the
hundred dollars are, then certainly there is no passage
from idea to reality. Deism puts God at a distance in .
this way ; and Deism, therefore, succumbs to Kant s
illustration. But if God cannot be, in any sense, a thing
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same time His real existence. If the idea of God is in
separable from consciousness as such is, in fact, the
perfect rational synthesis of which every consciousness is,
and recognises itself to be, the potential form, then this
existence
&quot; in thought
&quot; seems to give all the reality that
can be asked for. Unless, indeed, we are determined to
materialise God into an object of our present or future
- senses, this is the only existence of which we can speak.
If this idea be substituted for the deistic conception, it
will be found that the utterly bare and self-contradictory
notion of a First Cause must be exchanged for that of a
- final cause or End. In other words, it is absurd to seek
a cause of the universe as a whole. The universe exists,
that is all we can say about it. But though a cause
\ cannot be assigned, there is a sense in which a reason
may. This will be found in the Idea, should this be dis
coverable, which the universe realises. The Idea is then
the purpose or raison d etre, or simply the
&quot;
meaning,&quot; of
the universe. For the word purpose must not be held to
imply a separation of the Idea (as in a scheming intel
lect) from its actual realisation.
This notion of the Divine existence, however, can
hardly be said to have been definitely formulated in
Kant s time, and accordingly it does not affect the course
of his reasoning. In the sphere of Pure Keason, God
remains, according to Kant, unknowable and unprovable.
But Kant did not leave things so
; for the existence of
God is, as has been seen, a Postulate of the Practical
Keason. What is more, it is postulated precisely in
the old deistic sense. It is true, there is the saving
clause, that what is reached on ethical grounds has,
so far as we are concerned, only an ethical content,
and is to be employed solely in an ethical interest.
And for Fichte, accordingly, the notion became at
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universe. But by Kant the moral order is conceived,
in the spirit of the baldest Individualism, as the final
adjustment of happiness and virtue
; and God becomes
purely a Deus ex machina to effect this combination.
The indignity of the position is obvious, for He is
treated in the scheme primarily as a means towards
the happiness of the particular individual. Once there,
He is clothed, of course, with the qualities of moral
Lawgiver; but the motive of His introduction at all
is the one just indicated. The law and its authority
are sufficiently explained, Kant admits, by the notion
of the noumenal Self, and so the knowledge of duty
as the will of God seems, in the Kantian scheme, a
somewhat superfluous duplication of what we already
possess. The noumenal and self -
legislative Self is,
indeed, when properly conceived, identical with the
will of God, and leaves no room for any extraneous
Deity. But the thoroughly mechanical idea of such
a Power weighing happiness against virtue cannot be
charmed out of the letter of Kant s theory. This
has been the stumbling-block which has caused many
to reject his Ethics in toto, and to identify the true
Kant exclusively with the Critical scepticism of the
intellectual theory. This, however, it has been already
pointed out, is a mistake. Kant was not unfaithful
to his method in the moral sphere
: it is his method
itself which is defective. It may be readily admitted
that the great excellence of the Critical standpoint is,
that it explodes the pretended knowledge of tran
scendent realities in which Dogmatic metaphysic had
dabbled. But the weakness of Kantianism, in the
hands of its author, is that the ghost of transcendent
reality is not laid : it cannot be seen, but it is sup
posed still to stalk on the other side of knowledge.
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perfectly removed, except by a philosophy which is
able to view experience as a whole, and to see realised
in the synthesis of the actual the true sense of the
objects which such speculation overleaps itself to reach.
What is known, in a broad sense, as Hegelianism, is
at least an attempt at such a complete and rounded
philosophy; and in it the dualisms which vex us in
Kant disappear. The ideas of God and man are still
so far mutually exclusive for Kant, that what is done
by man in history appears to be necessarily done
without God. What is done by God, on the con
trary, as, for example, a revelation, appears like a
hand from behind the clouds thrust suddenly into the
web of human affairs. Hence the antithesis between
Naturalism and Supernaturalism, and the non liquet,
which is the last dictum of the Critical reason. Hegel
ianism abolishes the antithesis, by conceiving the whole
. process of history as the work of God, and a growing
revelation of His nature and purpose. It remains now
to sketch very shortly, more by way of indication
than of exhaustive exposition, some of the leading
features of the Philosophy of Eeligion, as they appear
from such a standpoint.
CHAPTER III.
THE HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY OF KELIGION.
The metaphysical position of Hegel may be summarily
distinguished from that of Kant, by saying that in the
later philosophy Ahonght is reo.ngn^pd as a&amp;gt;j}Q]ute-Qr..afllf--.
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all oppositions are only relative. Thought is, therefore,
the source of all the distinctions which make up the
knowable universe even of the distinction between the
individual self and the objective world to which it is
related. Thought itself becomes the object of philosophy,
and the search for something
&quot;
real,&quot; bejoadLand apart
from thought, is definitely abandoned. The business of
philosophy is henceforth the explication of the distinctions
which belong to the nature of thought, and this is other
wise definable for Hegel as
&quot; the explication of God.&quot;
Philosophy thus becomes identical in its object with
religion ; for the constant aim of religion is to deter
mine the nature of God, and His purpose in the in
dividual and in the world. It is impossible to deny
this metaphysical character to religion, and to present
it simply as a set of empirical rules for conduct.
&quot; From the beginning of the world down to the present
day,&quot; says Fichte,
&quot;
religion, whatever form it may
have assumed, has been essentially metaphysic.&quot; In
other words, it is the need of a final synthesis, which
both philosophy and religion strive to satisfy, the one
predominantly on the side of the intellect, the other pre
dominantly on the side of the heart and life. Religion
is never content till it apprehend the working whereby
God is able to subdue all things unto Himself. After
a more or less sufficient probing of the imperfection
and wrong in the world, it will invariably be found
putting forward some conception or theory, as the
solution of the contradictions that baffle us from day
to day. The conception may, or it may not, be
adequate to the difficulties of the case, that is ac
cording to circumstances. But it is the presence of
this conception that imparts to religion the joy and
confidence which are lacking in morality as such. Ee
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touched by emotion.&quot; The definition, as applied by
its author, is both suggestive and beautiful; but it
is still necessary to inquire into the source of the
emotion. This, I think, is always derived from a
certain view of the world as a whole, that is to say,
more or less articulately, from a metaphysical con
ception. It is the subject s identification of himself
with a divine world-order, that is the perennial source
of the religious emotion which lifts him who experi
ences it above the lets and hindrances of time. With
out this, he is an atom struggling in vain with the
evil of his own nature, and possibly, too, with the
misery of surrounding circumstances. If he is to be
successful in the struggle, he must be persuaded that
he is not alone, or, in the language of religion, that
God is for him, and that nothing, therefore, can be
ultimately against him. The triumph that he only
anticipates in himself and others he must conceive as
secure of fulfilment in fact, as already fulfilled in the
eternal purpose of God. The peace which this con
viction imparts is itself, in a sense, the realisation of
that triumph in the individual, his present recon
ciliation with God. It is also the most powerful
dynamic that can be supplied to morality.
Kant himself was not able to eliminate the meta
physical side of religion entirely, though he considers
it necessary only for
&quot; the theoretical explanation of
salvation,&quot; and always returns by preference to the un
varnished religion of right -doing. In the notion of
moral perfection as the End of creation, an End
realised in God, and destined to be realised in man,
and in the notion of the Church as a corporate unity for
the expression of this idea, the world is represented by
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for the sins of the individual and of the moment. This
appears much more emphatically in Hegel.
1 The attain
ment of reconciliation with God is the motive of all
religions ; the fact of an accomplished reconciliation is,
according to Hegel, the deepest religious truth. It is
revealed in the Christian religion. It is at the same
time the profoundest insight of philosophy, for it is the
expression of the essential nature of Spirit. True
religion and true philosophy coincide, for
&quot; the absolute
content,&quot; as Hegel says, must be the same. The notion
of Spirit is not the absence of contradiction, for that
would mean absolute sameness, which is equivalent to
pure nonentity
: it is the solution of contradiction, by
exhibiting the opposite as held in its own unity. Spirit
lives by difference, but in all difference it is still identity
with itself. God was first known as Spirit, Hegel says,
in the Christian religion, and this is the meaning of its
central doctrine of the Trinity. The determination of
God as Triune is not to be taken, as Enlightenment
takes it, with reference to the number three. Rightly
understood, it is a reading of the nature of God, which
is fatal to the abstract unit which deistic freethought
deems so easy of acceptance. This God-in-himself, as
the idea may be styled, has a connection with the world
that is purely arbitrary, and serves reason merely as a
point d appui. He is nothing more than a name upon
our lips ; we know nothing of his nature, because, as so
conceived, there is nothing to know. To say that God
is unknowable, and to say that He is the Supreme Being,
are, according to Hegel, identical propositions. God
cannot be known apart from the world
; He cannot be
1
Hegel s Lectures on tbe Philosophy of Religion are contained in
vols. xi. and xii. of the Werke, but references to religion occur in almost
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said to exist out of that reference.
&quot; Without the world,
God were not God.&quot;
&quot; God is the Creator of the world
;
it belongs to His being, to His essence, to be Creator.
. . . That He is Creator is, moreover, not an act under
taken once for all: what is in the Idea is the Idea s
own eternal moment and determination.&quot;
l This is
expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity, Hegel con
tinues, by saying that from eternity God has begotten a
Son, or that He produces Himself eternally in His Son.
But this absolute diremption or distinction of Himself
from Himself is at the same time perfect identity ; and
the knowledge of God as the unity of Father and Son is
the knowledge of Him as Spirit or as the Triune God.
The Holy Ghost is the
&quot; eternal love,&quot; which expresses
this unity this distinction in which there is no differ
ence. Here is the
&quot;
still mystery,&quot; which is the source
of the world s life. It may be otherwise expressed, by
saying that it is a necessity of the Absolute to create a
world of finite spirits. God is, in the strictest sense,
neither more nor less than this self-revelation. Man is
as necessary to God as God to man. The true infinity of
Spirit is realised in the knowledge of the Infinite as in
the finite, and of the finite as in the Infinite, or, as
Christianity says, in the oneness of God and man. God
is this eternal process or history.
But, so far as we have gone, there seems no room for
the disturbance or alienation from God, which is the
subjective root of religion. Where there is no estrange
ment, reconciliation, in the ordinary sense of the term,
can have no function. It may fairly be objected to
Hegel s account given above, that it moves too much in
the clear aether of the Idea, in which distinction is not
difference. As Hegel says in the Phaenomenology, the
1
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notion of the divine life as a play of love with itself, even
though true, sinks to insipidity if
&quot; the seriousness, the
pain, the patience and labour of the negative
&quot;
are not
allowed for. The first may be said to be the notion of
the universe from the divine standpoint
: it is, in fact,
in Hegelian terminology, the Idea. The second is the
human side of the relation, the Idea as it appears in
history. Here the world is viewed not in its ideal com
pleteness, as the Son who is eternally and essentially one
with God, but as the world in the more proper sense of
the term, in which the otherness of the relation is
accentuated and comes to its right. We have here the
other, as the other
; the world (of nature and of finite
spirit) appears as something independent of God and free
in itself. It is a mark, Hegel characteristically adds, of
the freedom and security of the Idea, that it permits this
relative independence without detriment to its ultimate
synthesis. Nevertheless, he is somewhat at a loss to
find a motive for passing from the perfect Son to the
imperfect world. For it is, of course, necessary to suppose
that with the freedom there comes also the weakness





that calls for explanation. This is
the point where Hegel approximates most nearly to
Schelling. He seems to treat the origin of the finite
system of things as a species of Abfall or primal
apostasy ; and as Plato has recourse to the mythical form
where clear thought fails him, so we find Hegel falling
back on Jacob Bohme. The first begotten, he quotes
from Bohme, was Lucifer, the light-bearer, the bright, the
clear one
; but Lucifer lost himself in his imaginings, and
asserted his independence, and fell. &quot;So we pass into
the determination of space, of the finite world, of the
finite spirit.&quot; That, at least, is Hegel s complacent274 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
continuation. The whole reminds the reader very
much, not to go farther afield, of Schelling s treatise
on Philosophy and Keligion. But the point is only
touched on by Hegel, and the net result is simply
that the finite world, as finite, is due to a holding
fast of the form of difference. So far as this finitude or
difference exists, the restoration of unity appears as a
process in time something to be gradually worked out.
Here properly comes in the need of reconciliation and,
with the need, the idea.
Keconciliation can be effected only in the sphere of
Spirit ; and as religion exists only in relation to man or
finite spirit, we may concentrate attention on the way in
which Hegel interprets alienation here.
&quot; This is the
place of the conflict of good and evil the place, too,
where this conflict must be fought
out.&quot;
1 For the rest,
we know that Nature is but the theatre or sphere of spirit.
But man, as he first appears on that theatre, is simply a
part of Nature. Man in a state of nature is a complexus
of animal desires, which he fulfils in turn as they arise.^
But the notion or destiny of man is to be intelligent and
free
; therefore his existence as a merely natural being





is simply a starting-point, which
is to be left behind. Consciousness brings the knowledge






and with knowledge comes guilt. In this connection
we have the well-known Hegelian interpretation of the
Fall, which occurs in various parts of the Works. The
connection between evil and knowledge in the story is,
according to Hegel, essential. Man was evil in his
merely natural state i.e., he was not as he ought to be
;
but with the dawn of consciousness he knows that he is
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evil. The knowledge of his state opens up to him the
possibility of escape from it, and he becomes responsible
for further continuance in it. The
&quot; absolute demand
&quot;
made upon man is, that he do not continue in this state
;
and though the content of the newly awakened will is, to
begin with, simply the full play of the man s animal
desires, yet the conviction grows that this ought not so
to be. In other words, consciousness brings with it a
separation between the subject and the natural basis
of desires with which he was formerly identical ; and the
separation means (in the long-run) the knowledge that
the true will or self is not to be found in the mere
satisfaction of the wants of the natural individual. It
means the knowledge of a higher rational Self, of an
obligation to realise it, and an infinite falling short of
attainment. The breach between the natural man and
that which he necessarily regards as his essence or
destiny, is the source (also in the long-run) of an infinite
pain ; and out of pain and unworthiness springs religion
with its conception of reconciliation.
Hegel turns to history for the verification of his thesis.
The sense in man of failure to realise his vocation, and
the consequent misery of alienation from his true good,
is what religion calls the consciousness of sin. This
consciousness continued to deepen in the human heart;
and of the various religions that appeared on the earth
none had more than a partial cure for it. It was
necessary that the lowest depths of suffering should be
fathomed, before any healing could be effectual
; for it is
a principle of universal application, that a contradiction
must be strained to its utmost before it can be successfully
solved. So it was with the religious consciousness. The
extreme of abandonment and despair was reached in the
Eoman world before
&quot; the fulness of time
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word of reconciliation could be spoken. Profoundly dis
satisfied with the existent world, men tried, in Stoicism
and kindred systems, to escape from it by withdrawing
wholly within themselves. But this flight from the world
could not be the world s salvation
; it is in itself merely
a confession of discomfiture. In my relation to the world
consist my duties
; Stoicism is the renunciation of these,
and so remains barren. The principle that is destined to
transform the world bears another aspect.
&quot; I pray not
that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but
that thou shouldest keep them from the evil.&quot; To a
distracted humanity Christ whispers the tidings of the
nearness of God. In the midst of unworthiness and
helplessness there springs up the new consciousness of
reconciliation. Man, with all his imperfections on his
head, is still the object of the loving purpose of God.
God is reconciled, if only man will strip off his painful
individuality and believe it. There is a victorious purpose
in the world, if only he will find himself in it, and work
joyfully in its light. With this assurance in the depth
of his heart comes the peace of essential unity with
what, to his individual effort, is still a flying goal. His
subjective frailty and shortcomings simply do not
count, when weighed against the active perception of
unity with God which is the substance or element of
his life.
As a matter of fact, the reconciliation must still be
worked out on the stage of the individual life and of
universal history. Faith without works, as we know, is
dead
; it is an idea which lacks its embodiment in reality.
But the faith must be there, if man is to work from
a proper vantage-ground. Hence Christianity teaches
God s reconciliation of the world with himself as a fact
or as an eternal truth
; and this becomes a presuppositionPHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL. 277
for the individual. It is something that is
&quot;
finished,&quot; and
in the strength of which he works. This accomplished
reconciliation is the basis of the Church or the Christian
community (Gemeinde); it is taught in the Church s
doctrine, and the Church is itself the outward expression
of the truth. The relation of the subject to the problem
of salvation is, therefore, essentially different, according
as he is, or is not, born within the pale of the Christian
community. This is expressed by the Church in the
sacrament of Baptism. Baptism says in symbol that the
child is not born into a hostile world, but that his world,
from the beginning, is the Church, which is built upon
the consciousness of reconciliation. The Church is, in
its notion, a society where the virtual conquest over evil
is already achieved, and where, therefore, the individual
is spared such bitter conflict and outcast wretchedness
as preceded the formation of the community. The
education which the Church bestows smooths his path
for him
; and, in every respect, he essays the individual
problem under more favourable conditions. The last and
most solemn expression of the Church s life is in the
Eucharist, or the sacrament of the Supper. Here the
Church celebrates its sense of present reconciliation, and
the conscious unity of the subject with God.
But so long as this unity is realised only in the Church,
there remains an opposition between the Church and the
world. The Church, in these circumstances, may be said
to represent rather the idea than the reality of recon
ciliation, inasmuch as it is faced by a hostile power in
which its principles have no application. This opposition
is the distinctive mark of Mediaeval Christianity, in which
Christianity resembled rather a flight from the world than
the subjugation of the world to God. The virtues of
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denounced as unholy ; and, as a natural consequence o.f
the stigma set upon it, it actually was unholy. Men s
consciences convicted them of sin, when they tampered
with the accursed thing. But this unhealthy dualism
could not last, and, in the end, the spirit of world-
liness possessed itself also of the Church. Instead of
universal corruption, however, this was the signal for the
appearance of the true conception of reconciliation, on
which modern life is built. The Reformation is, in one
aspect, the denial of that dualism between the Church
and the world, between religion and secular life, which is
the mark of Medievalism in all its forms. The relations
of the Family and the State are restored to the divineness
that belongs to them
; or rather, their divineness is, for
the first time, consciously realised. In the laws and
customs of the rational or freely moving State, the
Church first penetrates the real world with its principles.
The State is
&quot; the true reconciliation, whereby the divine
realises itself in the field of reality.&quot; This final stage of
realisation in the world must not, of course, be held to
supersede the inward function of religion ;
1 but we
recognise here the point to which Hegel always returns.
As he says in the Philosophy of History,
&quot; The State is
the Divine Idea as it exists on earth.&quot; The secular life
1 It would be a misinterpretation of the Hegelian law of stages to
suppose that the final stage abolishes those that dialectically precede it.
Hegel s positions are often represented in a false and repulsive light under
the influence of this idea. The Philosophic des Rechts, for example, is
represented as if the ultimate stage of Sittiichkeit were meant entirely to
supersede the subjective function of Moralitdt or conscience. It is obvious
that the two sides must continue to co-exist ; the only thing that is super
seded is the abstract conscience that ignores the actual, and insists on
judging everything anew. So here, the objective reconciliation effected
in the true State is not intended to supersede, for the individual, the
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of the modern world has been built up by Christianity ;
it is founded upon Christian conceptions of the dignity
and the rights of man. The secular, therefore, is itself
divine. This is, in Hegel s view, at once the principle of
Protestantism and the last principle of thought.
As may be imagined from the elaborate parallelism, or
rather identity, which he seeks to establish between his
own philosophical positions and the leading doctrines of
the Christian Church, Hegel has no sympathy with the
prevalent modern aversion to theological dogma. He
aims rather at a philosophic rehabilitation of dogmatic
Christianity ;
l and he is never more in his element than
when running out his heavy guns against the theology
of feeling. The basis of a Church must be a system of
doctrines, and with their withdrawal the community
lapses into an aggregation of atoms. It is only prin
ciples or beliefs that can be held in common ; feeling, as
such, is purely subjective, and can afford no bond of
union. Feeling is certainly indispensable in religion.
Religion must be realised in the element of feeling, if it
is to have active force in the life. But feeling is in
itself a mere form
; it is indifferent to its content, and
will attach itself, for the matter of that, to any content.
It is of the utmost importance, then, to understand that
religion, like philosophy, must found upon
&quot; a substantial,
1
&quot;Die Wiederherstellung der iichten Kirchenlehre muss von der
Philosophic ausgehen,&quot; Werke, xi. 10. Elsewhere he deplores the
state to which theology has sunk, when it becomes necessary for philo
sophy to undertake the defence of the dogmas of the Church against the
orthodox theologians themselves. There is a flavour of the humorous
perceptible in the unction with which he takes Tholuck to task for the
slackness of his zeal in defending the doctrine of the Trinity. See in
particular the Preface to the second edition of the Encyclopaedia,
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objective content of truth.&quot;
* This content, as the theory
of the relations of God and man, is the absolute content
;
that is to say, it is an expression, in its last terms, of the
process of the universe, and, as such, is necessarily ident




content of religion, it is evi
dent that the doctrines of ordinary Christianity undergo
a considerable transformation in the process of philosophic
interpretation. And this, according to Hegel, is no more
than we need expect ; this is, in fact, Hegel s fundamental
distinction between Vorstellung and Btgriff, Eeligion
is truth for all
; it is easy of comprehension.
&quot; The
poor heard Him gladly.&quot; Philosophy is truth for those
who are capable of the prolonged effort of thought which
it implies. Philosophy presents truth essentially for the
intellect truth, therefore, in its exact, scientific, ultimate
form. Keligion presents the same synthesis, but primarily
for the heart presents it, therefore, in a form calculated
to affect the feelings, and through them to work upon the
moral will. Religious enlargement speaks the language
of imagination ; it is saturated with feeling. But its
statements cannot be pressed as scientifically exact.
Religion, Hegel says, is reason thinking naively? It has
got hold of vital and eternal principles ; but the form in
which it presents them, while best suited to its own
purpose, is not adequate to the principles themselves.
Facts of the Notion, constitutive of the universe as such,
it treats as pieces of contingent history, which have been,
1 Werke, xvii. 299 (Preface to Hinrich s Religionsphilosophie ). This
Preface, written in 1822, and now printed among the
&quot; Vermischte
Schriften,&quot; throws much light on Hegel s attitude towards religion,
towards the historical element in Christianity, &c. It contains also a
bitter polemic against Schleiermacher, without, however, mentioning
names.
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and are no more. So with the Fall, so again with the
Keconciliation ; its form is throughout pictorial and
narrative. All this Hegel means by saying that religion
appears in the form of Vorstellung. The distinction
between the Vorstellung and the Begriff is all-important,
he contends, for it keeps us from confounding the living
principles of religion with the historical form in which
they are conveyed. A certain historical form is neces
sary ; but the historical, as such, is contingent, and can
not, therefore, form part of the essential religious content.
That content, when separated from its contingent setting,
is found to be identical with notional truth, or with the
Begriff. The Begriff, however, Hegel seems to say, can
never, for the mass of mankind, supersede the Vorstellung.
This opens up the whole question of Hegel s relation
to historical Christianity. A memorable utterance of
his own may be taken as the authoritative text of what
follows : Eeligion must contain nothing but religion ; it
contains, as such, only eternal truths of the spirit.
1 A
certain historical form, as just mentioned, is necessary.
The true religion must appear, must be. The idea must
have the side of reality, otherwise it is a mere abstrac
tion
; and reality implies the circumstantial surroundings
of space and time. Or, to put it less abstrusely, the
historical or sensuous form was essential, if the truth was
ever to become a common possession of mankind.
&quot; The
unity of the divine and human is the thought (Gedanke)
of man ; but it was necessary that this should first be
believed as true of one individual Man.&quot;
&quot; The con
sciousness of the Absolute Idea is produced, in the first
instance, not for the standpoint of philosophical specula
tion, but in the form of certainty for mankind.&quot;
2
It is
a universal rule that we set out from sensuous certainty,
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from something given, something positive. But the given
has always to be intelligised ; its meaning has to be
reached. So the external world is given to us in sensa
tion
; but it is not a world till we have constructed
sensations into a rational system. Eeligion also comes
to us as something given, something positive, to the
child in the form of education, to the race in the form
of revelation. But the attitude of thought to sense, or
to what is merely given, is always negative
: we pass
from it, and retain only the rational content of which
it is the bearer. By the fact of a historical appearance
(recognised as a necessary element of the truth) we must
not, therefore, be misled into elevating the particulars of
that history to the rank of divine verities. The frame,
though necessary, does not stand on the same level as
the work of art that it encloses.
1 The particulars of
history are always contingent that is, they may be so
or they may be otherwise
; no truth of reason is involved
in their being either. In this way, Hegel says, the whole-
question of miracles ought not to trouble us. We neither
attack them nor defend them
; but the testimony they
could afford to religious truth was confined to the age in
which they are said to have been wrought. The spiritual
cannot be attested by the external or unspiritual, and, in
regard to miracles, the main point is that we set them
aside.
2 The demonstration of the spirit is the only testi
mony that can be ultimately accepted.
The sensuous history in which Christianity first ap
peared is thus merely the point of departure (Ausgangs-
punkt) for the spirit, for faith. The doctrine of the
Church is neither the external history of its Founder, as
1 Werke, xvii. 283.
2
Ibid., xii. 160,
&quot; Die Hauptsache in clieser Seite der Wunder ist, dass
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such, nor His own immediate teachings.
1
It is the mean
ing of the history, as apprehended in the consciousness
of the Christian Church. It is not to the point to say
that this meaning is contained in the Bible, and that the
whole doctrine is, as it were, spelled out of this text. The





soon as we depart from the words of the sacred text, we
have transformed it. Here, as elsewhere, the spirit is
active in its receptivity. It is the Church s exegesis of
the Bible that is the foundation of faith, and not the
words of the Bible, as such. The necessity of this pass
ing away of the sensuous, or, at all events, of its trans
formation by the spirit, is clearly perceived by the author
of the Fourth Gospel. The Johannine Christ expresses
this insight in pregnant words, when he makes the growth
of the Church dependent on his own departure.
&quot;
It is
expedient for you that I go away.
. . . The hour is come
that the Son of man should be glorified. Verily, verily,
I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the
ground and die, it abideth alone : but if it die, it bringeth
forth much fruit. . . . Greater works than these shall he
[the believer] do, because I go to my Father.&quot; Hence,
according to Hegel, the importance of so far detaching
the content of Christianity from its first sensuous present
ment as to regard it in itself as
&quot; eternal truth.&quot;
&quot; The
true content of Christian faith is to be justified by phil
osophy, not by history.&quot;
2
Why, then, should we be
always returning to the garments of flesh from which the
spirit has passed ? We get thus but a dead Christ
;
the living Christ is to be found in the Church
that He has founded, and in the doctrines of the
1
&quot; Christus Lehre kann, als diese unmittelbare, nicht christliche Dog-
matik, nicht Lehre der Kirche sein,&quot; Werke, xii. 241.
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relation of God and man, of which it is the visible
symbol.
The whole position may perhaps be put more generally.
From the religious point of view, the value or worth of a
history lies solely in the circumstance that it is the vehicle
of such and such truths. Strip it of this significance and
the history is no more than any other bit of fact
; it ceases
to have any religious bearing at all. A history affects
us only when read in the light of the eternal purpose of
God. It is that purpose, therefore, which moves us, not
the bare recital of events
; and by any events the divine
purpose must be inadequately represented or set forth.
All spiritual effects must have spiritual causes. It is by
eternal principles or truths that the mind is influenced
;
and though certain narratives may have proved them
selves specially efficacious in bringing home these truths
to men s minds, still that is no reason for insisting that
the narratives, as they stand, are scientifically maintain
able in all their particulars. That the majority of men
find their account in holding to the original sense of the
narratives, is likewise a very inadequate reason for be
lieving this to be the ultimate form of the truth. The
mass of men are habitually unaware of the true theory of
what they nevertheless perform with sufficient correctness.
The truth which the narratives convey reaches them and
influences them, without their being able to indicate
exactly how it does so. The rationale of the process
remains obscure, but the edification is a fact. Beyond
this fact the ordinary man does not, as a rule, travel
;
and when he does, his reasonings on spiritual causation
are as likely to be wrong as his reasonings on natural
causation. The post hoc ergo propter hoc is the prevalent
form of argumentation in both cases. He does not sift
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preceded the spiritual phenomenon are massed together
as its cause
; and he is as likely as not to point out as
the essential element in the causation precisely the most
contingent and indifferent circumstance. Spiritual in
stinct is unerring in the choice of its proper food ; but
it is helpless when asked to explain how that food
nourishes it.
Nor is it anything to the point that a great number of
those who derive benefit from the narratives and religious
symbols in question perceive no conflict between their
literal sense and the prerogative of reason in other
spheres. The ordinary man, as Spinoza says, is slow
to perceive contradictions, because he does not bring
them together. His thinking is not continuous
; it is
often, indeed, interrupted and casual to the last degree
here a little and there a little. And so it comes
that he passes from the religious half of his life to the
secular half without observing any inconsistency between
his presuppositions and general habit of thought in the
two spheres. But sooner or later the contradiction comes
to light. So long as a spirit of simple, unaffected piety
prevails, it does not appear ; for piety passes, as if in
stinctively, to the inner content, and really lays no stress
on the finite particulars. They are there, and the
thought of calling them in question has not arisen
;
but to the unsophisticated religious consciousness they
in no wise constitute the foundation of faith. In one
aspect, it is their unimportance which has saved them
from question. But when the genuine spirit of re
ligion fades out of the Church, its place is taken by
an abstract logic and a philosophy of the understand
ing without insight into the things of God. Orthodoxy
in this form, having no root in itself, begins to lay a
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It insists on making all these indifferent details a
matter of faith. But here it is met by the Aufklarung,
or the spirit of scientific enlightenment and historical
criticism. In a historical reference, this is the move
ment specially associated with the activity of the
eighteenth century, though it goes on still, and in
many quarters may be said to be only beginning.
It is to be noted that Hegel does not dispute the
place and function of the negative here. He speaks
of the Enlightenment as
&quot; the better sense
&quot;
of man
kind rising in revolt against the pretensions of a
pettifogging orthodoxy; and as regards the contingent
matter to which this orthodoxy would pin our faith,
he unhesitatingly acknowledges the victory of the
Aufkldrung over its adversary.
1 Individual utterances
in this connection may be ambiguous sometimes, per
haps, studiously so, but the general tenor of Hegel s
thought is, I think, not to be mistaken. The calm
ness with which he regards the Aufkldrung is due to
the fact that, on one side, he is prepared to admit all
its contentions. What he disputes is the inference
which Enlightenment draws from these admissions. He
complains that it knows only the negative, and makes
no distinction between the external or circumstantial,
and the true or divine. In short, he denies the pre
supposition on which both ordinary orthodoxy and
ordinary rationalism proceed viz., that the peculiarly
Christian doctrines stand or fall with the provable
extra-naturalness of certain facts. The condemnation
of the Avfkldrung in an absolute regard is that its
tendency is to sweep away religion altogether along
with its finite forms. Mere enlightenment is no sub
stitute for religion, and the inquiries on which its
1
&quot;Diese [die Aufklarung] ist Meister geworden iiber diesen Glauben,&quot;
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champions spend their energies are likewise essentially
non-religious. Hence Hegel considered that the Auf-
kldrung had done its work : it had given its gift to
the world, and was henceforth barren. Like Kant,
therefore, he deprecates, in a religious interest, the
perpetual renewal of useless controversy. Wanton at
tacks upon the sacred books of Christianity indicate
a defect in culture quite as much as in religious
sense. The Church is right, he holds, from its own
standpoint, in fighting shy of investigations into matters
of fact undertaken in a non- religious interest.
1 The
reason is, that such investigations lend an exaggerated
importance to the merely historical an importance
which it does not possess as treated by the Church.
This is, of course, not the way in which the Church
formulates its opposition
: it is Hegel s sympathetic
interpretation of her attitude. Hegel s sympathies are
essentially religious, and this sometimes communicates
a tone of undue depreciation to his remarks on the
Aufkldrung. But, as we have seen, he does not send
Enlightenment away without the portion of goods that
falls to its share. He considers his own position as
a vantage-ground beyond both traditional orthodoxy and
ordinary rationalism. In the strife, therefore, which still
goes on between these two, Hegel can be invoked on
neither side. His thoroughgoing distinction of Vorstell-
ung and Begriff absolves him from descending into the
noisy arena.
&quot;
Thought justifies the content of re
ligion, and recognises its forms, that is to say, the
deterrninateness of its historical appearance ; but, in
the very act of doing so, it recognises also the limita-
1 \Verke, xii. 260,
&quot; So thut die Kirche insofern Recht daran, wenn
sie solche Untersuchungen nicht annehmen kann.&quot; He instances the
case of investigations into the reality of the reported appearances of
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tions of the forms.&quot;
l This sentence from the con
clusion of the Philosophy of Religion is well adapted
to summarise the whole attitude of the Hegelian phil
osophy towards the question at issue.
Such, then, in outline, is the Hegelian Philosophy
of Religion. So far as it trenches on technically
theological ground, I am not called upon to criticise
it here. Historically, its direct affiliation to the Kantian
position is not to be mistaken. The relation of Hegel
to Kant in his theory of religion is, indeed, an exact
parallel to the relation between them in respect of
the doctrine of knowledge. In both cases the same
ness is more striking than the difference. Kantianism
seems everywhere on the point of casting off the pre
suppositions which bind it to the old metaphysic. In
evidence of this it is only necessary to specify, in the
present case, Kant s whole attitude to positive religion,
his treatment of the Fall, and even, to some extent,
of the idea of Reconciliation. But the new metaphysic
developed by Hegel out of Kantianism does away with
the abstract distinction between God and man which
still remains at the Kantian standpoint. God is recog
nised, Hegel says,
&quot; not as a Spirit beyond the stars,
but as Spirit in all spirits
&quot;
; and so the course of
human history is frankly identified with the course
of divine self-revelation. The culmination of this re
ligious development
2
is reached in Christianity ; and
1 Werke, xii. 286.
2 The limits and the plan of this sketch make impossible even an
outline of the course of this development in the historical religions of
humanity. Hegel s characterisations of the different faiths are mines
of thought, especially in the later stages, where he comes to compare
Judaism, Hellenism, and the prosaic secularism of Rome, with &quot;the
absolute religion
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Christianity reveals nothing more than that God is
essentially this revelation of Himself.
1 In this con
nection it is that a new significance is given to the
doctrine of the Trinity, which thereby becomes funda
mental for the Hegelian Philosophy of Eeligion. This
attitude towards the course of history, and towards
Christianity in particular, is the only one which
is permissible to an Absolute philosophy. However
fenced about with explanations, the thesis of such
a philosophy must always be &quot;The actual is the
rational.&quot;
The difficulties of such a system are always found in
accounting for contingency, for imperfection, for suffer
ing and evil. It would not be fair to leave the subject
without pointing out in a word or two where the strain
comes upon Hegelianism, when it is conceived as such
a final and absolute system. Hegelianism, it may be
premised, has, in the individual reflection of its author,
no other basis than the bit-by-bit experience on which
empiricism builds. This is a matter of course, which
ought not to require stating; nevertheless, owing to
the form which Hegel has given his thoughts, it is
frequently ignored. Though the particulars, or the
&quot;
given,&quot; must necessarily come first in ordine ad in-
dividuum, yet, the principle of synthesis having been
divined, the Hegelian method does not present its results
as a collection of inductions or deductions, more or less
fragmentary, from experience. The subjective process
by which the results are reached is, as it were, sup
pressed; and an attempt is made to lay before us the
system of the actual the actual as it exists in ordine ad
univcrsum, or from a divine standpoint. It is essential
to the success of such an undertaking that the system
1 Werke. xii. 158.
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round itself in itself. What we get must be a perfect
system of mutual relativity, and like the Divine
Labourer we must be able at the end to pronounce
all things very good. That is just equivalent to saying
that it must actually be a system, and not the disjecta
membra of one. The idea of perfection Optimism,
not as a hope, but as a reality is the very nerve of
such a synthesis. The world must be seen, as it were,
to have its genesis in divine perfection, and it must
be sealed up there again at the close. In other words
(that all suspicion of an emanation hypothesis be avoided
in the expression), there must be no hitch, no flaw, in
the system, which might be inconsistent with the per
fection of the whole.
Now the objections to which Hegel s synthetic or
genetic mode of presentment has given rise that his
philosophy is an a priori system, a metaphysical cobweb
spun in flagrant disregard of experience, and so forth
may be summarily dismissed, for they have their root in
misconception and ignorance. But it is impossible to
deny that it is precisely when Hegelianism presents
itself in system, as a self-cohering explanation of the
whole, that we are apt to be least satisfied with it. The
thoughts of the reader will revert instinctively, in the
present case, to the hardly disguised failure of the trans
ition from the Son to the world of finite men and things.
1
Hegel is perfectly at home in describing the triune
relations of the Idea
; but as soon as their transparency
or pellucidity is blurred by real difference, the strain
comes upon him. The transition here is, in its way, an
instructive counterpart to the unsatisfactory phrases in
which the passage is made, in the Encyclopaedia, from
the necessity of the logical Idea to the contingency of
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Nature. In its general aspect, the problem is no less
than to show how the existence of an imperfect world is
compatible with divine perfection ; and, of course, when
we start from the perfect, the difficulty of explanation is
enhanced. Hegel seems to gain the imperfect by a leap.
When he has once gained it, he is much more successful
in exhibiting the process of regeneration. His treatment
of evil as an essential element in the consciousness of a
sensuous being, for example, is profound and funda
mental; but it manifestly presupposes the fact of the
manifestation of reason in a sensuous creature like man.
All imperfection may flow from the combination, but
why should this combination itself be necessary ? So,
too, there is no point which Hegel is fonder of emphasis
ing than the labour of the Spirit. The world-spirit, he
says, has had the patience to undertake
&quot; the prodigious
labour of the world s history
&quot;
: only subjective impati
ence demands the attainment of the goal without the
means. His reference to
&quot; the seriousness, the pain, the
patience and labour of the negative,&quot; has been already
quoted. It would be an egregious mistake, therefore, to
suppose that Hegel s Optimism is born of a superficial
glance that ignores the darker sides of existence.
Throughout, indeed, it takes the shape much more of a
deliverance from evil than of the unimpeded march of
a victorious purpose. In this respect, it is a much
closer transcript of the course of the actual than most
Optimistic systems are. But the inevitable question
rises Whence the necessity of this pain and labour
in the all-perfect ? And if we lose our grasp of this
idea of an all-perfect whole, can we be said still to
possess the imposing synthesis which Hegel lays claim
to ? Hegel might answer, that our difficulty is created
by the abstract idea of perfection with which we start.292 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN KANT AND HEGEL.
Such pure perfection would be colourless nonentity
: there
is no victory possible without an adversary, and exist
ence is, in its very essence, this conflict of opposites.
Hia own position, he might say, is demonstrably identical





for the sake of the greater good, or, as philosophy
expresses it, is involved in its possibility. Evil that is
the means to good, a dualism that yet is overcome,
Optimism upon a ground of Pessimism, such, he might
say, is the character of existence as it reveals itself to us.
God is this eternal conquest or reconciliation. We have
no right to make unto ourselves other gods, or to con
struct an imaginary world, where good shall be possible
without evil, result without effort. Whether Hegel
would accept what is here put into his mouth, and
whether, if he would, the position amounts to an abso
lute philosophy, are questions too wide to discuss further
in a work whose object is mainly expository. But I
probably express the conviction of many students when
I say that the strength of Hegelianism lies not so much
in the definite answer it gives to any of the questions
which are supposed to constitute philosophy, as in its
criticism of history. In history, whether it be the
history of philosophies, of religions, or of nations, Hegel
is like Antseus on his mother earth: his criticisms are
invincible, and his interpretations are ever fresh.PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
AHUNDKED
years have passed
1 since Kant, in a
note to the preface of the first Critique/ declared
his age to be pre-eminently the age of an all-embracing
criticism, and proceeded therewith to sketch the outlines
of what he called the Critical philosophy. The latter
has grown to be a great fact even in that dim general
consciousness in which humanity keeps record of the
deeds of its past. But a hundred years have apparently
not been long enough for commentators and critics to
make clear to a perplexed public the exact import of
what Kant came to teach. And if Kant had survived
to dip into the literature of the centenary and see the
different doctrines with which he is credited, one can
fancy the indignant disclaimers that would have filled
the literary journals. The agreement is general that
Kant s contribution to philosophy forms a bridge between
one period of thought and another
; but opinion is sadly
divided as to the true philosophic succession. Hence it
is probably better, in any treatment which aims at
philosophical persuasion, to regard Kant not so much
with reference to the systems of which his own has
been the germ, as with reference to the whole period
1 This essay was published in 1883 in the volume Essays on Philo
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which he closed. If we get in this way to see what
notions it was that he destroyed, then we may possibly
reach a certain unanimity about the principles and out
lines of the new philosophy. When we know on what
ground we stand, and what things are definitely left
behind, we are in a position to work for the needs of our
own time, taking help where it is to be found, but with
out entangling ourselves in the details of any particular
post-Kantian development.
An unexceptionable clue to the way in which Kant
was accustomed to regard his own philosophic work is
furnished by the use he makes of the term criticism.
Criticism, as every one knows, is generally mentioned
by Kant in connection with Dogmatism and Scepticism,
as a third and more excellent way, capable of leading us
out of contradiction and doubt into a reasoned certainty.
The term thus contains, it may be said, Kant s own
account of his relation to his predecessors. That account
often repeated in the Kantian writings bears a
striking similarity, at first sight, to Locke s description
of his discovery that most of the questions that perplex
mankind have their source in the want of
&quot; a survey of
our own understandings.&quot;
&quot; Were the capacities of our
understandings well considered, the extent of our know
ledge once discovered, and the horizon found which sets
the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of
things between what is and what is not comprehensible
by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce
in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their
thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satis
faction in the other
&quot;
( Essay/ Book L, chap, i., 7).
But Locke was a man of the world rather than a
philosopher by profession ; and, being an Englishman, he
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builders. Kant, on the other hand, has the latter con
tinually before his mind :
&quot; the celebrated Wolff,&quot; in par
ticular, had made a deep impression upon him. But he
perceived that not one of the metaphysicians was able
to establish his system as against the equally plausible
construction of others, or in the face of the sceptical
objections brought against such systems in general. The
disputes of the Schools seemed best likened to the blood
less and unceasing combats of the heroes in Walhalla.
A scepticism like David Hume s appeared the natural
end of these ineffectual efforts to extend our knowledge.
Profoundly convinced, however, that scepticism is not a
permanent state for human reason, Kant tried to form
ulate to himself the necessary causes of the failure of the
best-meant of these attempts to construct a philosophy.
This is how he differentiates his own work from Hume s.
Hume, he says, was satisfied with establishing the fact of
an actual failure on the part of metaphysics, but he did
not show conclusively how this must be so. Hence, in
the general discredit which he threw upon the human
faculties, he involved much of the knowledge of the
natural world which no one disputes, but which it is
impossible to vindicate on the principles of Humian
scepticism. Besides, though an effectual solvent of pre
ceding systems, Hume s method offers no guarantee that
other philosophers will not arise, more subtle and per
suasive, winning many to accept their constructions, and
calling for a second Hume to repeat the work of demoli
tion. What is essential is to set the bounds between
our necessary knowledge and our equally necessary
ignorance. We must submit to critical evaluation, not
facta of reason, but reason itself. Proof must be had
not merely of limitation or finitude in general, but of a
determinate boundary line that shuts off knowledge from296 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
the field of the unknown and unknowable. That is, we
demonstrate, on grounds of principle, not only our ignor
ance in respect to this or that subject, but our ignorance
in respect to all possible questions of a certain class.
There is no room for conjecture. In the region of com
plete certitude alone can reason take up its abode, and
to mark out the firm
&quot; island
&quot;
of truth is the task of
Criticism.
1
All the conclusions of the system-builders are vitiated,
Kant explains, by the fact that they have not submitted
the conceptions and principles which they employ to a
preliminary criticism in order to discover the range of
their validity. Conceptions which are familiar to us
from daily use we assume to be of universal applic
ability, without considering what are the conditions
of our present experience, and whether these condi
tions may not be of essential import in determining for
conceptions the range of their application. Conceptions
quite unimpeachable under these conditions may be
quite unmeaning when these conditions are removed.
A metaphysic which is oblivious to such considerations
Kant calls Dogmatic. Thus when philosophers conclude
that the soul is immortal because it is a substantial
unit and therefore indiscerptible, their argument is alto
gether in the air, for they have omitted to consider
whether such a conception as substance can have any
meaning except as applied to a composite object in
space. Similarly, when Locke attempts to prove the
existence of God by the
&quot; evident demonstration that
from eternity there has been something,&quot; he is importing
the conceptions of time and causality into the relations
1 Cf. Kant s
&quot; Methodenlehre
&quot;
at the end of the Critique of Pure
Reason. The special reference is to the second section of the first
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between God and the universe, without reflecting whether
time and causality are available ideas when we venture
beyond the context of our sense-experience.
Nothing could well be more satisfactory than this.
But in such an undertaking everything depends upon
the thoroughness with which the idea of criticism is
applied, and Kant, unfortunately, left the most funda
mental conception of all uncriticised. He dogmatically
assumed the conception of the mind as acted upon by
something external to it. In other words, the mechanical
category of reciprocity, which psychology and ordinary
thought may justifiably employ for their own purposes,
was taken by him as an adequate or philosophic repre
sentation of the relation of the knowing mind to the
objective world. The distinction between mind and the
world, which is valid only from a certain point of view,
he took as an absolute separation. He took it, to use
a current phrase, abstractly that is to say, as a mere
fact, a fact standing by itself and true in any reference.
And of course when two things are completely separate,
they can only be brought together by a bond which is
mechanical, external, and accidental to the real nature
of both.
Hence it comes (in spite of the inferior position to
which Kant explicitly relegates empirical psychology)
that the Critique of Pure Reason sets out from a
psychological standpoint and never fairly gets beyond it.
&quot; In what other fashion is it to be supposed that the
knowing faculty could be roused to exercise, if not by
objects which affect our senses ?
&quot; Kant hardly waits to
hear the answer, so much does it seem to him a matter
of course. Such a self-revelation is too naive to be got
rid of by saying that this sentence in the first paragraph
of the Introduction expresses no more than a provisional298 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
adoption of the standpoint of ordinary thought, in order
to negate it and rise above it by the progressive criticism
of the remainder of the book. That this point of view is
negated and surmounted in the Critique I do not in
the least doubt
; but it is just as certain that Kant did
not mean to express here a merely provisional standpoint
from which he could intelligibly launch his own universe
upon the reader. The passage may be matched by many
others taken from any stage of Kant s speculations.
They recur too often to be explained otherwise than by
the admission that, while his new method is the con
clusive refutation of the claims of psychology to function
as philosophy, Kant himself never consciously called in
question the fundamental presupposition of psychological
philosophy, much less subjected it to the criticism which
his principles demanded.
Many untenable Kantian distinctions, to which students
and especially students trained in English philosophy
take exception at the outset, are connected in principle
with this initial psychological dualism. Such are, for
example, the sheer distinction drawn between the form
and the matter of experience, between a priori and
a posteriori, and the equally abstract way in which Kant
uses universality and necessity as the criteria of formal
or perfectly pure cognition. Since the whole of Kant s
scheme of thought appears to rest upon these distinctions,
it is not to be wondered at if many conclude that the
rest of the system must be entirely in the air. It is not
the less true, however, that this is a case in which the
pyramid does not stand upon its apparent base.
Such disjunctions in Kant are due to the effort of
reflection to escape from the imlimited contingency of
the Humian position, while retaining the ultimate pre
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from which the scepticism of the earlier thinker resulted.
What the mind learns from things must necessarily, on
this hypothesis, be so many bare facts or atoms of im
pression cohering simply as they have been accidentally
massed in the piecemeal process of acquisition. Kant un
hesitatingly endorses Hume s conclusion on this point: that
&quot;experience&quot; cannot yield universality and necessity is the
ground common to both Kant and Hume, which furnishes
the starting-point of the Critique. On the one hand,
Kant found himself faced by this assumption ; on the
other, by the existence of judgments continually made, and
whole sciences constructed, whose universal and necessary
application it would be mere affectation to deny. The
lines of his own theory were virtually settled by these
two admissions. If the necessity which we find in
experience is confessedly not derivable from the atomic
data furnished to the mind by things, then it must be
infused into these data by the action of the mind itself.
We have thus the spectacle of experience as the product
of an interaction taking place between
&quot; the mind
&quot; and




of experience ; the contribution
of the mind he calls the
&quot;




ought to be pure matter or unlimited




of the mind should
compel this mass into order and system. But it is, of
course, impossible for Kant to maintain himself at the
point of view of a distinction which in this case simply
does not exist. He is forced to admit that, for the
particular applications of the general forms or laws im
posed on experience by the mind, we remain dependent
upon things. But in such cases, if the particular applic
ation is given in the matter, then a fortiori the law or300 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
principle in its general form must be so given. It must
be possible, by an ordinary process of generalisation and
abstraction, to formulate in its generality the principle
which the specific instances exemplify. In other words,




to the mind is not
pure matter, not mere particulars, but matter already
formed, particulars already universalised that is to say,
related to one another, and characterised by these rela
tions. The task of the knower is simply to read off, or
at most laboriously to bring to light, what is there com
plete before him in his material. There is not the
slightest doubt that, when we remain at the point of
view of the abstract distinction between mind and the
world which we have signalised in Kant, empiricists are
correct in insisting that not the matter of his experience
only, but the form as well, is derived by the individual
from the world with which he is set in relation. The
mind is not the seat of universals and the world a jumble
of particulars, the former being superimposed upon the
latter for the production of knowledge. Neither mind
nor the world has any existence as so conceived. How,
for example, can the unfilled mind of the child be regarded
as creatively producing order in a chaos of pelting im
pressions, or what do we mean by postulating a mind at
all in such a case ? If they prove nothing else, such
considerations prove the complete impossibility of treating
knowledge from a psychological standpoint. We con
clude, therefore, that matter and form are shifting dis
tinctions relative to the point of view from which they
are contemplated ; and the same is true of the world and
the mind, of which opposition, indeed, the other is only
another form. From the standpoint of a theory of
knowledge it will be found that the mind and the world
are, in a sense, convertible terms. We may talk indiffer-PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES. 301
ently of the one or of the other; the content of our
notion remains in both cases the same.
A similar criticism applies to the criteria of univer
sality and necessity as employed by Kant. No sooner
are the words uttered than people begin to ransack their
minds in order to discover whether, as a matter of fact,
they ever make such judgments as are here attributed to
them. The absolute necessariness which Kant affirms of
certain judgments becomes a species of mystic quality.
Some thinkers persuade themselves that they recognise
this quality in the judgments in question ; others, more
cautious, maintain that whatever stringency the judgments
possess may be sufficiently accounted for without resort
ing to what they brand as an
&quot;
intuition.&quot; Thus, when
a conscientious associationist like Mill comes forward and
denies that he finds any absolute universality and neces
sity whatever in his experience, Kant s argument is
brought to a complete standstill. The question of fact
on which he builds being denied, there is no common
ground between him and his opponent. Few things can
be imagined more unfortunate than this reduction of the
controversy between Kant and empiricism to a discussion
about the existence or non-existence of some mystical
necessity in the propositions of geometry. Yet this
actually happened in the earlier stages of Kantian study
in England. Wherever
&quot; intuitions
&quot; come into play, the
point in dispute is referred to a merely subjective test,







&quot; from the opposite sides.
No one who has learned Kant s lesson so as to profit by
it, should have any hesitation in finding Mill s hypo
thetical theory of demonstration to be truer in conception
than any theory which insists on a difference of kind
between the necessity of geometrical and that of any302 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
other scientific propositions. All necessity is hypothetical
or relative, and simply expresses the dependence of one
thing upon another. No truth is necessary except in
relation to certain conditions, which being fulfilled, the
truth always holds good. The more general or simple
the conditions on which any truth depends, the wider is
the range of its validity ; and truths which, like those of
geometry, depend only on the most rudimentary elements
or conditions of experience, will of course be universally
and necessarily valid for all experience depending on these
conditions. This, as every student ought to know, is the
only necessity which Kant s theory eventually leads him
to attribute to the propositions of geometry. It is the
more unfortunate that he should seem to base his argu
mentation upon the assertion of an abstract or absolute
necessity. But this is only one of many instances in
which the true sense of Kantian terms must be defined
by the completed theory. Necessity of the latter type
absolute necessity is not so much doubtful in fact





ably raises the question
&quot; Why ?
&quot; and the answer must
consist in showing the conditions. Something may be
necessary in relation to conditions which are themselves
of limited application
: in that case we never speak of
it as necessary unless when these conditions are them
selves under consideration. When we speak of any
thing as being necessary in a pre-eminent sense, we
mean that our assertion depends for its validity on
nothing more than the system of conditions on which
experience is founded. There is no abstract opposition,
therefore, between the necessary and the contingent, such
as Kant presents us with : the difference is not one of
kind, but of degree.
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keeping in mind in connection with the Kantian cate
gories or conceptions of the understanding; for Kant s
treatment of these so-called a priori elements as the
contribution of the mind has again led him into false
issues or at least it has led many of his followers and
opponents. It is supposed, for example, that the whole
question turns upon the mental origin of certain concep
tions, and this, as has been seen, is a fact which may very
properly be denied. It appears to be forgotten, amid the
pros and cons of such an argument, that mental origin is
in itself no clue to the function of a conception or the
range of its validity, unless we connect our assertion
with a whole theory as to the nature of experience in
general. This, it must be allowed, Kant has not
neglected to do
; and his ultimate proof of the necessity
of conceptions like substance and cause is simply that
without them experience would be impossible. They are
the most general principles on which we find a concaten
ated universe to depend. Their mental origin falls in
such a deduction completely into the background; and
Kant is only obliged to assert it because of the absolute
opposition which he set up between the necessary and the
contingent, and the presupposition with which he started,
that experience can give us nothing but contingency.
The conceptions derive their necessity from their relation
to experience as a whole. Kant proceeds, indeed, to de
scribe the conceptions in this relation as modes of mental
combination, according to which the Ego lays out the
variety poured in upon it from without. As nothing
can come within experience except so far as it fits itself
into the structure of the mental mould, the necessary
validity for experience of these conceptions is evident.
But nothing is gained by isolating these conditions, prin
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are disclosed to us, and hypostatising them as faculties
or modes of faculties methods of action inherent in the
mind. On the contrary, this is essentially a mischievous
step ; for when we talk thus, we are inevitably held to
refer to the individual mind
; and the difficulties, or rather
absurdities, of such a position have already come under
our notice. It is to be regretted, therefore, that Kant
frequently described his undertaking as a criticism of
faculties, instead of keeping by the more comprehensive
and less misleading title (which, as we have seen, he also
employs) of a criticism of conceptions. Unfortunately,
this is not merely a verbal inconsistency ; it represents
two widely different views of the Critical philosophy.
Kant s general scheme is sufficiently well known to
render any minute account of it superfluous in this
connection. It was framed, as has been seen, to account
for the fact of universal and necessary judgments, and
its form was conditioned by the previous acceptance of
Hume s fundamental assumptions. Kant s way out of
the difficulty was contained in what he called his
Copernican change of standpoint. If there is no
necessity to be got by waiting on the world of things,
let us try what success attends us if objects are made





of experience which Kant
discovers in following out this idea, consists of twelve
categories, conceptions, or methods of combination, ac
cording to which the matter of sense is arranged in the
perceptive or imaginative spectra of space and time, the
process of arrangement being ultimately guided by three
ideals of intellectual completeness, and being referable at
every point to the unity of the transcendental Ego. Or
in Kant s psychological language, the mind is furnished,
first, with the a priori forms of space and time, in whichPHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES. 305
all its impressions must be received
; and secondly, with
twelve principles of intellectual synthesis, by submission
to which the impressions of sense first become objects
in a world of related things. The relations of space and
of objects in space,
1
as dependent upon the nature of the
mind-form and of the mind-imposed laws of combination,
may evidently thus be known with complete certainty.
We are in a position, so far as these points are con
cerned, to anticipate experience
: universality and neces
sity are saved. But the counter-stroke is obvious. We
anticipate experience and to that extent, as Kant
paradoxically puts it, legislate for nature simply
because it is our own necessity, and not the necessity
of things, which is reflected back to us from the face
of this mind-shaped world. We purchase the sense of
certainty in our knowledge at the cost of being told that
our knowledge is not in a strict sense real knowledge at
all. The world of real objects (improperly so called,
inasmuch as they never are, objects), on which Kant
represents us as waiting for the matter of our experience,
is necessarily cut off from us by the constitution of our
powers of knowing. Here Kant draws the line which
he says Hume neglected to draw the line dividing the
region of complete certitude from that of necessary and
eternal ignorance. The first region is the field of
phenomena, related to one another in space and time
the context of possible experience, consisting of the
mind - manipulated data of sense. The second, from
which our faculties debar us, is the world of things-in-
1 Time, Kant proves in the Refutation of Idealism, is knowable only
in relation to space. He says elsewhere that inner sense receives its
whole filling from outer sense. The correlation of time and space being
necessary, the limitation of knowledge is correctly described in the text
as limitation to the contents of space.
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themselves, considered not merely as the unknown region
where our sense-experience takes its rise, but as a world
in which room may possibly be found for such non-
spatial entities as God and the soul, and the aspects
of human life which seem to depend on these ideas.
The nature of these results determines the special
sense which the term Criticism assumes in Kant s hands.
The term originally describes merely the method of
procedure, but it naturally becomes descriptive also of
the definite view of the universe to which his method
leads him. The Critical philosopher, accordingly, is one
who clearly apprehends what is implied in calling the
deduction of the categories transcendental. A transcen
dental deduction is one undertaken solely with reference
to experience, one which leaves us, therefore, without
justification for employing the deduced conceptions in
any other reference. And if it be considered that ex
perience in this connection implies for Kant the relation
of the mind to an unknown object means, in fact, the
application of the categories to the matter derived from
that object, it is evident that when the latter element
falls away, the conceptions must become so many empty
words. Experience so conceived is called sense-experi
ence, in order to describe our partially receptive attitude
and the compound character of our knowledge. It yields
us a knowledge only of material things and their changes ;
and the attempt to gain any other species of knowledge
by means of the categories Kant compares to the flap
ping of wings in the unsupporting void. Criticism means,
then, the recognition of this limitation, and it pronounces
experience so limited to be merely phenomenal in char
acter. Experience actual and possible represents, in
other words, not things as they are in themselves, but
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world of reality. Our ignorance in this respect is in
evitable and final; and if there are other avenues by
which in the case of the Self and God we may pene
trate to noumenal existence, yet the conviction we reach
is not such that we can rightly speak of it as knowledge.
All knowledge remains in the Kantian scheme pheno
menal, phenomenal in the sense that there is a reality
behind, which we do not know.
If now it be asked, by what right Kant draws the line
exactly where he does, and cuts off from knowledge
everything but a spatial world of interacting sub
stances, the answer must be that his exclusion depends
ultimately on his uncritical acceptance of the dualistic
assumption of preceding philosophy. We express the
same thing in another form, when we say that the
result is due to the attempt to construct a theory of
knowledge from the standpoint of psychology. This
standpoint brings with it the distinction between
&quot; sense
&quot;









the material supplied by sense.
This is Locke s distinction, and it is Kant s too.
1
Kant minimises the contribution of sense; he speaks
of it on occasion as a mere blur, and in itself no better
than nothing at all. But the amount referred to sense
1 As it happens, Kant s phraseology in the opening paragraph of the
Introduction corresponds exactly with the account Locke gives of knowledge
in Book II., chap, xii., of the Essay. &quot;The materials being such as he
has no power over, either to create or destroy, all that a man could do is
either to unite them together, or to set them one by another, or wholly
separate them.&quot; Kant s language looks like a reminiscence of this passage,
when he speaks of impressions producing ideas, and rousing &quot;the faculty
of the understanding to compare, connect, and separate these, and so to
work up the raw material of sensuous impressions into a knowledge of
objects.&quot; Of course, Kant s
&quot; raw material
&quot; turns out afterwards not to
mean so much as Locke s &quot;simple ideas.&quot;308 PHILOSOPHY AS CKITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
does not affect the principle of the distinction : so far as
it is made in this form at all, its consequences will be
essentially the same either with Hume, the denial
that (so far as we know) any real world exists, or with
Kant, the denial that such a world can ever be revealed
to us by knowledge. Hence the importance of observing
that the distinction is not a deduction from the theory of
knowledge, but a presupposition drawn from another
sphere. The division of the mind into receptivity and
spontaneity is the mere correlate of that view of the
universe from which the Kantian criticism was ultimately
destined to set us free the view which represents the
relation of the world to consciousness as a case of inter
action between two substances.
The effect of the distinction on the form of the
Kantian theory appears in the separation of the
^Esthetic from the Analytic, and the hard and fast
line drawn in consequence between space and time, as
forms of sensibility, and the categories, as functions of
the understanding. Kant gets the perceptive forms
in the ^Esthetic by an independent set of arguments,
while in the first part of the Analytic his categories
seem to drop at his feet as pure intellectual concep
tions. Hence the categories do not appear to him as
limited or inadequate in their own nature, but because
of their subsequent association with sense and its forms.
It would be nearer the truth to say that the Kantian
categories are themselves the reason why the world
appears to us in space
: space is merely the abstraction
or the ghost of the world of interacting substances which
these categories present us with. If the Kantian cate
gories can give us nothing beyond a world of material
things, the defect is in their own intellectual quality, and
not in any limitation extraneously attached to them.
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leave the elements they connect still independent of
one another. The categories of quantity, while in one
sense they express a connection between all things,
express even more emphatically the complete indifference
of every individual point to its neighbours ; and though
the categories of relation summed up, as they may be,
in reciprocity undoubtedly express a system of elements
in which this mutual indifference is overcome, yet the
individuals brought into connection are not seen to have
any necessary relation to one another in the sense of
being members together of one whole. The individuals
appear endlessly determined by their relations to one
another, but there is involved in this very endlessness
an unavoidable sense of contingency. If we are to have
a real whole and real parts parts, that is, whose exist
ence can be understood only through the whole that
determines them we must have recourse to other cate
gories than these. But the imperfect relatedness just
referred to is the essential mark of what we call the
world of sense; and for a theory of knowledge, if it
retain the term sensible world, that world is definable
simply by this characteristic, and not by an imaginary
reference of its contents to an impressing cause. It is
defined, in other words, by the categories that constitute
it, and by the relation of these categories to the other
modes in which the mind endeavours to harmonise the
world. With reference to Kant, then, the point to be
insisted on is, the categories which he offers as the only
categories are inherently inadequate to express a synthesis
more intimate than the mutual relatedness and mutual
externality of things in space. The world, therefore,
necessarily presents this aspect when viewed solely by
their light. They are not got independently of sense
(we might reply to Kant) and afterwards immersed in it
;
they are the categories of sense. Their true deduction is310 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.





in the second part of the
Analytic, where they are proved to be the ultimate con
ditions on which a coherent sense-experience depends.
In Kant s technical language, the categories do not
require to be schematised, because, apart from schematis-
ation, they do not exist even as conceptions. The con
ception of substance, for example, means just that
relation of a permanent to shifting (or conceivably
shifting) attributes which is familiar to us in the sensible
world. The logical relation of subject and predicate,
which Kant seems to say is the pure category before it
is soiled by sense, is merely the image
of&quot; this real
relation expressed in language.
1
There is thus no justification for a separation of space
from the categories, space being the ultimate appearance
of a world constructed on these categories alone. When
this is admitted, the mere fact that we perceive things
in space is no imputation upon the reality of our know
ledge. In itself space is no limitation; it is an
intellectual bond, it is one point of view from which
we may represent the world as one. This mode of
knowledge becomes limited and unreal only when it
claims to be the ultimate aspect from which the universe
is to be regarded. The nature of space affords no
grounds, then, for a division of knowledge into absolutely
phenomenal and absolutely noumenal, such as we find in
Kant. The so-called phenomenal world of sense is as
real as the so-called noumenal world of ethics that is
to say, its account of the universe is as legitimate so far
as it goes ; but to claim for either an absolute truth is
the essential mark of dogmatism, whether the claim be
1 The relation of the table of logical judgments to the Kantian
categories (where it actually exists and is not a matter of forced inter
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advanced by the man of science or the metaphysician.
Both are accounts which the mind gives to itself of the
world, relatively justified points of view from which
experience may be rationalised. It is the province of a
theory of knowledge to point out the relation of the one
point of view to the other, and, in general, while showing
the partial and abstract nature of any particular point of
view, to show at the same time how it is related to the
ultimate or concrete conception of the universe which
alone admits of being thought out without self - con
tradiction. The opposition between phenomenal and
noumenal worlds is thus replaced by one between more
abstract and more concrete points of view. That is to
say, the opposition itself is no longer of the rigid and
absolute nature which it was before. The truth of the
one point of view does not interfere with the truth of
the other : the higher may rather be regarded as the
completion or fulfilment of the lower.
Let us now see how far Kant helps us towards such
a philosophical conception. Eeasons have been given
for disallowing his absolute limitation of knowledge by
erecting behind it a realm of unknowables. These un-
knowables are simply the impressing things of preceding
philosophy, uncritically assumed, and removed into a
somewhat deeper obscurity. But the theory which
derives knowledge from impressions is essentially a
psychological theory which we, as spectators, form of
the rise of knowledge in an organised individual placed
in relation to a world which we already describe under
all the categories of knowledge. What we observe is,
strictly, an interaction between two things which are
themselves objects in a known world. And if we
afterwards extend inferentially to our own case the
conclusions which our observations suggest, we are
still simply repeating the picture of a known environ-312 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
ment acting on a known organism. The relation is
between phenomenal things and a phenomenal organism
in which they set up affections, not between a tran
scendent or metempirical somewhat and intelligence as
such. In other words, when we have formed our
notion of the world, and of our own position as indi
viduals in it, we can give even to such a misleading
metaphor as impression a certain intelligible meaning ;
but to step outside of the world of knowledge altogether
and characterise it by reference to something beyond
itself this is the type of all impossibility. Yet it is no
less than this that Kant and some of his followers under
take to do when they pronounce our knowledge to be
only phenomenal, implying by that term the existence
of something hidden from us in its own transcendency.
While adhering, therefore, in the fullest manner to
Kant s position that the categories are only of imma
nent use for the organisation of experience, we deny
altogether that the existence of transcendent entities
may be justly inferred from such a statement. Only
to those who are haunted by the ghosts of the old
metaphysic can the proposition appear in the light
of a limitation of human reason : to others adhesion
to Kant s position, so far as it asserts immanence,
becomes a matter of course. What they combat in
Kant s scheme is the assumption that his twelve
categories are the only categories implied in our ex
perience, and the belief, corresponding to this assump
tion, that they give a completely coherent and exhaustive
account of that experience.
Kant himself, however, is prone to confess that ex
perience is not exhausted by these categories, if by
experience is understood the whole life of man. The
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stance) remains completely unintelligible when viewed
from the standpoint of mechanism. Determination by
ends is the characteristic feature of this world
; and
action so determined cannot be understood, Kant says,
except under the idea of freedom. That is to say, the
attempt to explain it by the categories of natural
causality is equivalent to a denial of the existence of
the facts in question. Such a procedure means that
in our levelling zeal we obliterate the specific difference
between two sets of facts
; whereas in reality the differ
ence is the fundamental feature of the case which calls
upon us for a rationale of its possibility. Now it is
a matter of common knowledge that for Kant himself
moral experience was the reality. In the Preface to
the Critique of Practical Eeason he speaks of the
idea of freedom as the
&quot;
topstone of the whole edifice
of a system of pure reason, speculative as well as
practical
&quot;
; and no attentive reader of the first Critique
can fail to notice the vista, ever and anon opened up,
of a world of supersensible reality into which we
are eventually to be carried by the march of the
argument. The whole Critical scheme of sense-experi
ence is thereby invested with a palpably preparatory
character. Kant fully recognises, and indeed enforces^
this aspect of his work when he comes to review its
scope and method in the Preface to the second edition.




for the extension of our knowledge on
the basis of practical data: Criticism simply fulfils the
function of
&quot; a police force
&quot;
in keeping the unregulated
activity of the speculative reason within bounds.
It might well seem, then, as if, in going on to
treat the presuppositions of morality, we were merely
passing from one sphere of rational experience to314 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OP CATEGORIES.
another. Kant s method, too, is essentially the same
in all three Critiques. It is an analysis of certain
experiences with a view to determine the conditions of
their possibility. One would expect, therefore, that the
different sets of conceptions to which his analysis leads
him would be treated impartially, and on their own
merits, or looked at merely in their relation to one
another as parts of one rational explanation of ex
perience. If there is no flaw in our deduction of the
conceptions, it seems very like stultifying the tran
scendental method to talk of differences between them
in respect of objective truth or validity. Kant, how
ever, as is well known, draws a variety of such dis
tinctions. Thus, in the Critique of Judgment, he
finds the idea of organisation to be as essential to a
complete account of nature as he had previously found
the conception of substance to be for a narrower
range of experience. Yet he arbitrarily holds the
former to be of merely regulative utility a fiction
or contrivance of the mind to aid it in investigation,
while the latter is allowed to be constitutive of
nature as such. And so, again, Kant restricts the terms
experience and knowledge to the sense-phenomena of the
first Critique, while the presuppositions of ethical ex
perience are made at most matters of rational belief
or moral certainty. It is impossible to decorate the
one with pre
- eminent titles without a corresponding
disparagement of the others. The term experience is
in these circumstances a question-begging epithet. When
such distinctions are drawn it inevitably tends to make
men regard the Critique of Pure Eeason as alone em
bodying Kant s substantive theory of the world. The
categories of life, of beauty, and of morality come to
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certain character, the acceptance or rejection of which
does not interfere with the finality of the categories
of sense. This is unquestionably the form in which
Kantian results are most widely current at present. It
is a form for which Kant himself is chiefly responsible,





experience for the purpose of his analysis, and neglect
ing afterwards to exhibit their organic relation to one
another. None the less is it a form which ignores
explicit intimations like those quoted from above from
the two Prefaces, and one which is based upon that
very notion of the relation of mind to reality which
Kant came to destroy. After all, too much stress
has probably been laid upon the difference of nomen
clature which Kant adopts, and it ought to be re
membered that though he refuses to call his moral
faith knowledge, he yet holds that it, and it alone,
brings him into contact with reality.
If we now return to Kant s account of the phenomenal
nature of our knowledge, and abstract altogether from
the illegitimate reference of our sense -
objects to the
transcendent thing -in -itself, another meaning of the
phenomenality of sense-experience begins to emerge.
The opposition is no longer between the world of sense
and its unknown correlate (or cause), but between the
world of sense as nature or the realm of causal necessity,
and the
&quot;
intelligible world,&quot; as Kant calls it, or the
realm of ends, in which the will determines itself by its
own law. Noumenal personality and freedom are reached
in the notion of the self-legislative and self-obedient will.
The condemnation of phenomenality comes upon the
world of sense because of the contrast which its exter
nality of connected part and part offers to the self-
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will. If this is not the meaning of phenomenality which
is most prominent in the Critique of Pure Eeason/
still it is continually appearing there also
; and in pro
portion as it comes into the foreground, the other refer
ence of objects to their transcendental correlates tends
to lose its importance and almost to disappear. Any
one may convince himself of this by turning to Kant s
official chapter
&quot; On the ground of division of all objects
into phenomena and noumena.&quot; He will find that the
conception of noumena or non-sensuous objects is there
defined as a
&quot;
Grenzbegriff,&quot; a limitative conception, or,
more exactly, as a conception which sets bounds to the
sphere of sense (ein die Sinnlichkeit in Schranken set-
zender Begriff). The conception is problematical, Kant
says, inasmuch as it does not give us a knowledge of
intelligible or non-sensuous objects as actually existing,
but merely affirms their possibility. Its utility lies in
the fact that by it we prevent sense-knowledge from
laying claim to the whole of reality. Evidently it would
be unfair to interpret the term problematical here as if
Kant meant by using it to throw doubt on the actual





&quot; In what other fashion is it to be
supposed that the knowing faculty should be roused to
exercise,&quot; he might repeat,
&quot;
if not by objects which
affect our senses ?
&quot; The question of the origin of the
matter of sense remains for Kant just where it was, but
he is speaking here in quite another connection, and that
problem has fallen out of view for the time. He is




mundus intelligibilis which he is afterwards to produce
as guaranteed by the Practical Eeason. It is the existence
of freedom and its implicates that is declared to be, in
the meantime, merely problematical. The phrase
&quot;
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telligible world
&quot;
is never used by Kant, so far as I know,
except of the world of ethically determined agents, an
additional proof that we are right in attributing to him
here a point of view which judges the inadequacy of
sense, not by reference to a somewhat beyond the confines
of intelligible experience altogether, but by reference to
a higher phase of experience itself. The lower point of
view is not, strictly speaking, abolished by the higher;
but it is perceived that to try to take the sensible world
absolutely or by itself would be to render it unintelligible.
Isolated in this way, the world of interacting substances
would have all the irrationality of a series that cannot
be summed, of multiplicity without unity, of externality
without internality. It is impossible, in Kant s language,
to treat nature as an End-in-itself, as something there on
its own account
; yet reason demands this notion of the
self-sufficing and self-justifying, as that in which alone it
can rest. Kant recognises that it is only intelligence, and
especially intelligence in its moral aspect, that supplies
the lacking notion
; nature itself, he says, assumes a




or system, when viewed in relation to rational
beings as its end.
1
It is thus on account of its incomplete and self-less
character that the mundus sensibilis appears phenomenal,
when regarded from the standpoint of the intelligible
world. And reason is compelled, Kant says, to pass be
yond the phenomenal and occupy such a standpoint,
&quot;
if
we are not to deny to man the consciousness of himself
as intelligence, i.e., as rational and through reason active,
in other words, as a free cause.&quot;
2 The importance
1 Cf. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Werke, iv. 286.





cantly by Kant himself in this context.318 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
of the change in the point of view can hardly be over
estimated. Self-consciousness is here put forward ex
plicitly as the one noumenon to which all phenomena
are referred, and by which they are, as it were, judged,
and declared to be phenomenal. This is the real
Copernican change of standpoint which Kant effected,
or which at least he puts us in the way of effecting ;
and it must be pronounced fundamental, seeing that it
reverses the whole notion of reality on which the old
metaphysic was built. The dominating categories of
philosophy in the present day are still, it is to be feared,
those of inner and outer, substance and quality, or in
their latest and most imposing garb, noumenon and
phenomenon. And these are so interpreted as to repre
sent the intellect clinging round the outside of things,
getting to know only the surface of the world, and
pining for the revelation of that intense reality, the
&quot;
support of accidents,&quot; which yet is unrevealable and
mocks our cries. A true metaphysic teaches that if we
so conduct ourselves, we do in very truth
&quot;
pine for what
is not.&quot; This unapproachable reality is entirely a fiction
of the mind
; there is nothing transcendent, no unknow
able, if we once see that a phenomenal world is a per
missible phrase only when taken to mean something in
which reason cannot rest, and that the ultimate noumenon
is to be found in self-consciousness, or in the notion of
knowledge and its implications. The centre of the world
lies then in our own nature as self-conscious beings, and
in that life with our fellows which, in different aspects,
constitutes alike the secular and divine community. The
spirit fostered by physical science, and the mood familiar
to all of us the mood which weighs man s paltry life
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than that of the poet and humanist, to whom this pomp
is barren save as the background of the human drama.
Ordinary people get most of their metaphysics through
religion or through poetry, and they probably often come
nearer the truth in that way than if they went to the
professed philosophers.
Kant s ethics are part, therefore, of the strength and
not of the weakness of their author. They are not to be
regarded as a calling in of faith to repair the breaches of
knowledge ; on the contrary, they are founded on Kant s
deepest philosophical conceptions. But for all that, the
superstructure contains much questionable material
; and
as we are not engaged on a question of hermeneutics, it
is essential to arrive for ourselves at a general notion of
how the ethical point of view stands related to the
mechanical. This will serve as an illustration of the
main thesis of this essay, the distinction of categories or
points of view. It is at the same time the more neces
sary in the present case, as Kant has expressed the
relation chiefly by negations, and has left the sensible
and intelligible systems separated by an apparently im
passable gulf. The positive predicate of freedom which
he applies to the ethical world is, on the other hand, so
ambiguous, and to men of scientific training so ominous,
that it has been more productive of misconception than
of enlightenment. It may be said at once, then, that if
Kant s account of freedom contains anything which seems
to lift man, as it were, out of all the influences and
surroundings that make him what he is, and from this
height makes him hurl a decisive and solely self-originated
fiat into the strife of motives beneath then, undoubtedly,
this idea is not only at variance with the teaching of
physical and social science, but is fatal to all rational
connection in the universe. But the self in such a con-320 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
ception is a bare unit, an abstraction which has no
existence in fact. So long as we take up with such
notions of the self, we must inevitably seem to be battered
about by the shocks of circumstance. The man whose
self could be emptied of all its contents and reduced to
this atomic condition would be, in a strict sense, no more
than the moving point which exemplifies the composition
of forces. In reducing the abstract self to this position,
and so abolishing it, determinism is entirely within its
rights




try to save for this self even a power of directing atten
tion on one motive rather than another. But happily
the real self is not this ghost of argumentative fancy. A
man cannot be separated from the world which lies about
him from his infancy and long before it, moulding him
after its own image, and supplying him with all sorts of
permanent motives in the shape of creeds and laws,
customs and prejudices, creating, in a word, the concrete
personality we are held to refer to when, in ordinary
speech, we name this or the other individual. The self-
conscious individual is not something identical with him
self alone, and different from everything else : he is not
even exclusive as one thing in nature is exclusive of
other things. The whole past and the whole present are
transformed, as it were, by self-consciousness into its own
nature. A man s motives do not seem to him, therefore,
to come to him from without : they are the suggestions
of his good or evil self. And if he reviews his past
experience, when his self, as others might say, was in the
making, he cannot himself take this external view. It
is impossible to him, because it abolishes the one pre
supposition from which he cannot depart
: it abolishes
himself. Much rather he will say that he has made
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all his past, and of every deed he can say,
&quot; Alone I
did it.&quot;
In short, though the external view with its tabu
lation of motives may be useful for statistical purposes,
and may yield scientific results that are not to be
despised, it is absolutely valueless in ethics or the ex
planation of moral experience as such. The presupposi
tion of ethical action, as of intelligence generally, is the
Ego. It is true that, as explained above, we do not
suppose the Ego, in action, to bring an inexplicable force
into play, any more than we suppose it, as intellect, to
add any determinations to things which were not there
already. But just as any metaphysic which does not
base itself on self-consciousness, as the fundamental pre
supposition and the supreme category of thought, is
forced openly or tacitly to deny the conscious life, so a
science of ethics which does not assume as its basis the
self-determination of the rational being, remains outside
of moral experience altogether. Moral experience con
sists entirely in this self-reference
; if this be destroyed,
the whole ethical point of view vanishes. Let us contrast
with this the point of view of physical science from which
we started. From this standpoint every moral action is
simply an event, and, as an event, forms a term in a series
of mechanical transformations. This is certainly one
way of regarding the actions in question
: they are such
events, and for science that is the legitimate and true
method of treating them. All that we contend is that
the scientific explanation does not exhaust their signifi
cance
; so far as they are actions, that is, related to the
moral consciousness, it gives no account of them at all.
The world of ethics is superimposed therefore upon that
of science, not as contradicting it, but as introducing a
totally new order of conceptions, by which actions which
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are for science mere factual units in a series become
elements in a life guided by the notion of End, or Ought.
Their sole ethical meaning is in relation to this ideally
judging consciousness, and to that extent they cease to
be facts conditioned by other facts. The ethical con
sciousness identifies itself with each of its actions, and
each therefore is immediately referred to the standard of
duty. Ethically, that is to say, the action is not referred
backward in time to the circumstances and predispositions
of which, as motives, it is the legitimate outcome; but
the man brings his action face to face with a
&quot; Thou
shalt,&quot; which he finds within him,
1 and according to its
conformity or want of conformity with this law he ap
proves or condemns his conduct The former method of
looking at his actions is appropriate to a spectator a
psychologist, a statistician, a scientific educator, &c.
but not to the man himself. As soon as an individual
begins to seek excuses for his
&quot;
fault,&quot; by showing how
natural it was in the circumstances, he has fallen from
the ethical point of view. He is assuming the position
of a spectator or scientific observer, and however justi
fiable this standpoint may be for others, it certainly
means the destruction of the ethical consciousness in him
who deliberately adopts it in his own regard. The proper
category of ethics is not cause and effect, but End, with
its correlative Obligation.
The realm of ethical ends, however, is only one
of the conceptions or points of view by which reason
makes the world intelligible to itself
; and by treating it
as the sole antithesis of the world of sense, Kant ran
1 The &quot;matter&quot; which the law commands, depends of course upon his
social environment and his past; but the &quot;form&quot; of law exists wherever
consciousness exists, since rights and duties are involved in the most
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the risk, as was hinted above, of falling into a fresh






- eminence, lest the sensible
world lose its reference to consciousness altogether.
We might do worse than recall in this connection
Kant s demonstration of the intellectual elements in




in the mechanical scheme of science, and in ethics a
point of view from which to regard this factual world.
Bare facts in this sense have no existence save for
an abstract thought which conceives them as the pegs
on which relations may be hung. The process of
knowledge does not consist in the discovery of such
individua, but in the progressive overthrowal of such
ideas of the nature of the actual. In this process, the
scientific account of things forms one of the ways in
which the mind seeks to present the world as an in
telligible whole : it is a theorising of the world, and
as it turns out, the theorising is incomplete and ulti
mately contradicts itself. Such considerations prepare
us to expect a progress by more gradual stages from
the less to the more complete conception of the universe
than is found in Kant s great leap from mechanism to
morality. Here again Kant helps us on the way. The
Critique of Judgment, according to his own account
of it, is intended to bridge over the gulf between the
world of the understanding, outlined in the first
Critique, and the world of reason or of free deter
mination, outlined in the second. There is, as usual,
much that is artificial in the scheme of faculties with
which Kant connects his investigation. So far as we
are concerned here, the best method of approaching the
Critique of Judgment is simply by reference to the
aspects of nature which it endeavours to explain. Its324 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
importance lies in its recognition of certain points of
view which are continually recurring in our contem
plation of the world, but which find no place in the
Critical idea of nature, as so far expounded. These are
the aesthetic and the teleological judgment of things,
or, in less technical language, the phenomena of beauty
and of organisation.
1
The weakness of the book lies in the presupposition
on which it proceeds, that the record of objectivity
has been definitely closed in the first Critique. In
other words, Kant believes knowledge to be limited
by the imagination ; nothing is real (in the domain of
knowledge) unless what can be constructed in relations
of space. Now the Critique of Judgment consists
virtually in the production of two sets of negative
instances : a living body and an object considered as
beautiful are not exhausted in the space-relations which
constitute them. Imagination knows only parts that
are external to one another, and to that extent in
dependent of one another; but in the organism this
externality and independence disappear. The parts are
only parts through the whole of which they are parts.
Part and whole acquire, in fact, a meaning in which
their necessary correlation is for the first time ap
parent, a correlation or union so intimate as to be
inadequately expressed by terms which contain, like
part and whole, a quantitative suggestion. Similarly,
the category of cause breaks down when applied to
the organism, for all the parts are mutually cause
and effect; and the organism as a whole is its own
cause and its own effect (causa sui). It organises
1 To avoid confusion, the significance of the testhetic judgment, or of
the categories of art, for our ultimate notion of the world, is not touched
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itself. In all this, Kant s description of organic
phenomena is unexceptionable ; he pleads the case
well against himself. But unfortunately the negative
instances he produces did not lead to a recasting of
his theory. They only led to a fresh distinction.
The new aspects of nature could not be recognised
as constitutive or objectively valid, but they might
be accepted as regulative points of view for the in
vestigation of phenomena. But as there is no ground
for this distinction except in presuppositions which
have been shown to be irrelevant we shall make no
scruple of ignoring it, and treating the relation of
organism to mechanism not as subjectivity to object
ivity, but as a more adequate to a less adequate
interpretation of the same facts.
It must be observed that the notion of organism
given above constitutes no assertion of the existence
of a vital force as a separate cause of the phenomena
of life. This is the kind of deduction which meta
physicians of the kind that have brought the name
into disrepute were quick to draw. But it is easy to
see that by explanations of this sort we are just setting
up a duplicate of the thing to be explained, or, in
other words, hypostatising it as its own cause. Besides,
when the physiologist comes to close quarters with a
living body, he finds everywhere a mechanism of parts
connected with one another and communicating with
the surrounding world. Motion is handed on from
one member of this system to another without the
intervention of any other than mechanical contrivances
;
and so far from a necessity arising for a transcendent
cause, there is nowhere a gap to be found in the circle
of mechanical motions where its introduction could be
effected. The physiologist, in short, in describing the326 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
action of the different parts of the organism, is in
precisely the same position as the psychologist in giving
an account of mental states and processes. The em
pirical psychologist analyses the most complex states
into their elements, and builds up ethical and re
ligious sentiment out of desires and aversions, and
all by a process essentially mechanical, without any
reference to the unity of the conscious life for which
these states exist. Just as the psychologist has neither
occasion nor right to consider any special power which
he calls the Ego, so the physiologist in the case of the
organism. He works within the conditions of organic
existence, as the psychologist within those of conscious
ness, but neither requires for the purpose of his special
. science to make any explicit reference to these con
ditions. Hence it comes that physiology, so far as it
treats the living body as a whole, represents it as
merely a mechanical conjunction of parts in space. The
abstraction is not only defensible but necessary: none
the less, however, is it a complete abstraction from
the significance of the same parts viewed as members
of a living system. Viewed organically, or in their
relation to the whole, they are seen to be mutually
implicative, and within certain limits, mutually creative.
The presuppositions of mechanism are so far over
thrown that at the organic standpoint the mutual
exclusiveness of the parts disappears: the organism,
qud organism, is not in space at all. If we persist,
therefore, in looking at the parts abstractly or in
their separateness, and if we tender this as the com
plete account of them, we are leaving out of sight
the very fact which constitutes the phenomenon to be
explained.
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of organism only subjective, we should be compelled, if
we were in the way of talking in this strain, to reverse
the relation. For even as applied to mechanical things,
if the category of causality be thought out into reci
procity, and if reciprocity be conceived as complete, the
result is that we arrive at a closed circle of perfect
mutual conclitionedness, in which all play of actual
causality is brought to a standstill. The universe
becomes like the sleeping-palace of Dornroschen
; there
is no point where movement might be introduced into
the dead picture.
&quot;We sublate in this way the con
ceptions with which we started, and only find the
contradiction solved for us (at least temporarily) in
the notion of the organism.
If the categories of reciprocity and abstract individual
ity fail us in speaking of the living body, still less will
they serve us when they come to treat of conscious indi
viduals and of what is called the social organism. Step
by step we have combated the intellectual vice of ab
straction, but it is when we reach self-consciousness that
the nature of this fault becomes fully apparent. When
we examine the conceptions of ordinary and scientific
thought in the light thrown upon them by that supreme
category, of which they are all the imperfect reflections,
the whole series of stages from which the individual
knower views the world appears as a gradual deliver
ance from an abstract individualism, or, as Spinoza said,
from the imaginative thought which insists on taking the
individual as a thing by itself. &quot;When we reach the
only true individual, the self-conscious being, we find
that individuality is not the exclusive thing we had
imagined it to be. The self is individual only to the
extent that it is at the same time universal. It knows
itself, i.e., it is itself, just because it includes within its328 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
knowledge not only one particular self, as an object in
space and time, but also a whole intelligible world
embracing many such selves. A mere individual, sup
posed for a moment possible, would be a self-less point ;
and it was the assumption of the reality of such self-less
points that led us into contradiction at a lower stage.
In the notion of the self we find that what is outside of,
or different from, a man in the narrow sense, yet enters
into and constitutes his self in such a way, that without
it he would cease to be anything more than the imaginary
point just referred to. The individual is individualised
only by his relations to the totality of the intelligible
world. In a more restricted sense, his individuality
is constituted by the social organism of which he is a
member : he cannot be an individual except so far as
he is a member of society. If this is the relation of
society to the individual, it is at once apparent how false
any theory must be which tries to take the individual as
a mere individual, and regards society as an aggregate of
such beings combined together for mutual advantage.
The doctrine of laissez-faire and the theory of the police
state are immediate deductions from the individualistic
premisses. It is natural from such a point of view that
the State should be treated as a mechanism external to
the individuals, and constructed by them merely that
they may live at ease and enjoy their goods. But the
logic of practice refutes both these principles. The
economic doctrine has been largely modified even by
those who promulgated it, little as their professed philo
sophical principles give them a right to do so
; and the
external view of the State is refuted not only by its
practical action in numberless spheres of life, but by
every patriotic emotion that passes over individuals or
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represented as being, how shall we explain Shakespeare s
impassioned apostrophe to
&quot;This happy breed of men, this little world,
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
. . .
This blessed spot, this earth, this realm, this England,
. . .
This land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land
&quot;
?
This little world a more felicitous phrase could hardly
be desired to describe what the true State must always
be to its citizens. The State is not Leviathan, as Hobbes
supposed, swallowing up the individual, but the ethical
cosmos into which he is born, and by which his relation
to the wider cosmos of universal experience is mediated.
These, however, are considerations which are being
recognised, one is glad to see, in many quarters, even
though it be as yet without a consciousness of their
ultimate philosophical bearing. Still we are not entitled
to depart from individualistic metaphysics in one point,
unless we recognise the fallaciousness of its method
everywhere. We need not fear by so doing to sacrifice
what are called the rights of individuality. Socialism,
for example, is the recoil from individualism, not the
refutation of it. Individualism and socialism are alike
refuted by the true notion of self-consciousness, which
combines all-inclusiveness with intensest concentration
in a way which might have seemed impossible, had we
been engaged in an abstract argument and not simply in
an analysis of concrete reality. While this notion is
held fast, the members in whom the social organism is
realised will not cease to know themselves as personal
ities, and to demand that the free play of their lives be
not sacrificed to imaginary needs of the body politic.
Our whole criticism of categories thus leads us up to
the notion of self-consciousness or knowledge. Here we330 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
may connect ourselves for the last time with Kant. The
shortcomings of his theory of knowledge have been some
what severely criticised in the earlier part of the essay.
It has been seen that he vitiated his analysis to a great
extent by confusing a psychological or a spectator s,
account of the growth of knowledge with a transcendental
&quot;analysis of its conditions. It has also been shown how
the presuppositions that sprang from this confusion pre
vented him from seeing the mutual relations of the
categories in their true light, as simply stages or phases
of explanation (of greater or less abstractness) which
necessarily supersede one another in the development
of knowledge. But in spite of the absolute line which
Kant drew at reciprocity, he explicitly announced the
emancipation of the category of categories the unity of
apperception from the dominion of the conceptions
which were its own creatures. It can be compassed, he
says, by none of them ; it can be known only through
itself. Knowledge is related as such to a universally
synthetic principle which calls itself
&quot;
I,&quot; and which is
described by Kant as the transcendental Ego, to dis
tinguish it from the empirical consciousness which con
stitutes, as it were, the matter of this formal unity.
Kant s view of this unity as merely logical and merely
human prevented him from recognising that he had
found the true noumenon here as well as in the ethical
/
I sphere. Nevertheless, his assertion of the unity of the
subject as the ultimate principle of thought leads directly
to the conception of knowledge as necessarily organic
to a subject, and as constituting in this form the
complete Fact from which all so-called facts are only
abstractions.
Here the line between Dogmatism and Criticism may
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Dogmatism, or the use of uncriticised conceptions, means
practically the unquestioning application of the categories
of mechanism to the relation between consciousness and
things. Mind and matter are hypostatised, and the
category of reciprocity is employed to describe their
union in knowledge. How far Kant was himself a
Dogmatist in this sense has been already considered
; at
all events, the whole of modern philosophy before Kant
is based upon this conception.
&quot; In order to make his
theory work,&quot; says Professor Fraser in his article on
Locke in the Encyclopaedia Britannica,
&quot; he [Locke]
begins by assuming a hypothetical duality beneath pheno
mena some phenomena referable to external things,
others referable to the conscious self, and in fact con
fesses that this dual experience is the ultimate fact, the
denial of which would make it impossible to speak about
the growth and constitution of our thoughts.&quot; It is to
be noted that what is spoken of is not a duality with
reference to knowledge in which case knowledge itself
would be the ultimate fact
; there is an assumption of
two facts or things, out of whose (contingent) relation to
one another a third fact arises as something additional.
The derivative fact acts as a mirror in which actuality,
consisting of the first two facts, is reflected. Now if we
start with the notion of a mind - substance (existing
prior to the self -consciousness which constitutes the
real existence of a self} and of an independently
existing world, it is easy to make a watershed of
experience in the fashion indicated, and so to appear
to establish the hypothetical duality with which we
started. This, as Professor Fraser says, is what Locke
did
; and all psychological philosophy does so still. As
speculation becomes more acute, it is necessarily led, as
idealism or materialism, to dissolve one of these sub-332 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
stances into a series of changes in the other, while
scepticism calmly points out to both disputants that the
arguments which apply in the one case apply in the
other also. But idealism, materialism, and Humism
have meaning only with reference to the assumption
of a duality of self-existing substances to which experi
ence is referred as to its causes. These theories exist as
the denial of one of the factors, or as the assertion of the
impossibility of proving either, but they do not attack
the abstraction on which this hypothesis of dual exist
ence was originally founded. Hume is a sceptic because
he cannot prove either mind or matter to be real in the
- sense in which Cartesian and Lockian metaphysics
understood reality. But if such realities are no more
than fictions of abstract thought, then a sceptical
disproof of our knowledge of them is so far from
being a final disproof of the possibility of any real
knowledge, that it is rather to be taken as indis
pensably preliminary to the attainment of a true notion
of what reality is.
Such a notion is attainable only through a tran
scendental analysis of knowledge an analysis, that is,
which shall regard knowledge simply as it is in itself,
without any presupposition of existences which give rise
to it. An analysis of this sort, so far as it remains true
to its transcendental standpoint, will not be tempted to
substantiate the conditions of knowledge apart from the
synthesis in which it finds them. It will simply relate
them to one another as different elements in or better,
perhaps, as different aspects of the one concrete reality.




different from Descartes procedure with his
&quot;
Cogito.&quot;
Kant, like Descartes, finds the presupposition of know
ledge and of intelligible existence in an
&quot; I think
&quot;
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he never forgets that it is only in relation to the world,
or as the synthesis of intelligible elements, that the self .
exists or can have a meaning. A world without this
unifying principle would fall asunder into unrelated
particulars ; the synthetic principle itself, apart from the
world which it unifies, would be no more than the barren
identity, 1 = 1. Even this consciousness of self-identity
is reached only through the synthesis of objects to which
it stands in relation. This necessity of ciicrelajtion may
be treated without injustice as the fundamental feature
of the transcendental method. So far is it from being
a figure of speech that the self exists only through the
world and vice versa, that we might say with equal truth
the self is the world and the world is the self. The
l
relation between them is that of subject to predicate
when the predication is supposed to be exhaustive. The-
subject is identical with its completed predicate without
remainder. So the self and the world are only two sides
of the same reality
: they are the same intelligible world
looked at from two opposite points of view. But, finally,
it must not be forgotten that it is only from the point
of view of the self or subject that the identity can be (
grasped
: this, therefore, is the ultimate point of view j
which unifies the whole.
It will be easily understood that, in speaking thus of
the self of knowledge, abstraction is made from any
particular self in experience. No one who has mastered
Kant s distinction between the transcendental and em
pirical Ego is likely to have any difficulty here. At the
same time, the theory of knowledge makes no assertion
of the existence of the transcendental self otherwise than
as the form of these empirical individuals. To raise the
question of existence in this shape is to fall back once
more into mechanical or spatial categories, and to treat334 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
the ultimate synthesis of thought as if it were a thing
that could exist here or there. Separate facts, however,
are the type of reality only to that abstract thought
which has faced us in every sphere. The transcendental
self, as the implicate of all experience, is, for a theory
I of knowledge, simply the necessary point of view from
which the universe can be unified that is, from which
it becomes an universe.
Thus the Kantian criticism with its claim to map out
knowledge and ignorance has assumed under our hands
the less pretentious form of a criticism of categories.
The attempt is no longer made to determine the validity
of reason as such
; the trustworthiness of knowledge is and
must be an assumption. But this does not mean that
every reasoned conclusion is true. Knowledge is not a
collection of facts known as such once for all, and to
which we afterwards add other facts, extending our
knowledge as we might extend an estate by adding acre
to acre. This is not a true picture of the march of
knowledge. On the contrary, every advance of science is
a partial refutation of what we supposed we knew
; we
undertake in every new scientific theory a criticism and
rectification of the conceptions on which the old was con
structed. On the largest scale, the advance of knowledge
is neither more nor less than a progressive criticism of
its own conceptions. And, as we have seen, this is not
all. Besides the continual self-criticism carried on by
the individual sciences, there is the criticism which one
science or department of inquiry passes upon another.
The science of life cannot move hand or foot without the
category of development which, in its biological con
ception, is foreign to the inorganic world; and the
science of conduct is founded upon the notion of duty,
of which the whole world of nature knows nothing. ButPHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES. 335
so long as this mutual criticism is left in the hands of
the separate sciences themselves, it tends to degenerate
into a strife in which there is no umpire. Philosophy,
as theory of knowledge, can alone arbitrate between the
combatants, by showing the relation of the different
points of view to one another, and allowing to each a
sphere of relative justification. When physical science,
for example, begins to formulate its own results and to
put them forward as an adequate theory of the universe,
it is for philosophy to step in and show how these
results depend entirely upon preconceptions drawn from
a certain stage of knowledge and found to be refuted
in the further progress of thought. Philosophy in the
capacity of a science of thought should possess a com
plete survey of its categories and of their dialectical
connection
; but this
&quot; Wissenschaft der Logik
&quot;
will
probably never be completely written. In the mean
time, it is perhaps better if philosophy, as critic of the
sciences, is content to derive its matter from them and
to prophesy in part. Examples of this progress and
connection among conceptions or points of view have
been given in the preceding pages, and whether we
apply to them the name of dialectic or not is of little
matter. This critical office, in which philosophy acts,
as it were, as the watch-dog of knowledge, is important
enough not to compromise the dignity even of the
queen of the sciences. She is critic not only of the
special sciences, but especially of all metaphysics and
systems of philosophy.
Most men of science believe that metaphysics consist
in the elaboration of transcendent entities like an
extraneous Deity, or Mr Spencer s Unknowable, or the




phenomenal. But the theory of knowledge336 PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES.
teaches us that all such constructions in the void have
their genesis in a belief that the substance is some
thing different from all its qualities, or that the cause
is not identical with the sum of its effects. We learn,
on the contrary, that cause and effect, substance and
quality, and all similar conceptions, are not the names
of two different things, but necessary aspects of the
same object, and that therefore, when we are dealing,
not with limited objects, but with the universe as the
synthesis of all objects, it is a mere repetition to invent
a cause of this synthesis. To be delivered from bad
metaphysics is the first step and the most important
one towards the true conception of the science. True
metaphysic lies, as we have tried to show, in that criti
cism of experience which aims at developing out of the
material of science and of life the completed notion of
experience itself.
THE END.
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